Interpreted as “all philosophers who talk about possible worlds believe they are real”, that isn’t true. The belief that possible world are real, modal realism, is contentious.
Yes, you shouldn’t interpret it this way. Modal realism is not the point of contention of this post. The whole framework of “possible worlds” is, regardless of whether one thinks they are somehow real or not.
I don’t know how you manage to keep misinterpreting me about it, even though I’ve already explained it to you under a different post.
Talk of possible worlds is common, because of the popularity of modal logic, and modal logic is …old … the sort of thing rationalists should approve of?
Why? Are we suppose to endource everything that’s old? Somehow I didn’t get the memo.
It allows you to put the notions of necessity and possibility on a formal basis, instead of leaving them as vague metaphysical notions.
The sentiment is good the implementation, is not. To be useful such formalization should be based on the framework of probability experiments and not possible worlds, for the reasons described in the post
Which choice? What are the possible outcomes of a given experiment? Check this post of mine, I explain the application of the framework of probability experiments in more details.
Can you give me an example? I’m not sure I understand your question.
Well, yes. That’s why the framework is bad and we should use a better one.
I don’t understand what you mean by “inherently”. I’m not trying to make any metaphysical claims about essence of the idea of possible worlds or some such. I just notice that it works poorly for what we need from a framework for probability theory and propose a better one.