The issue with the Sleeping Beauty Problem, that makes it unique, is that each running of the experiment produces two outcomes. One on Monday, and another on Tuesday. These are different, and independent, outcomes because an outcome is defined by SB’s ability to experience it
That’s not what an “outcome” means. From Wikipedia:
In probability theory, an outcome is a possible result of an experiment or trial.[1] Each possible outcome of a particular experiment is unique, and different outcomes are mutually exclusive (only one outcome will occur on each trial of the experiment). All of the possible outcomes of an experiment form the elements of a sample space.[2]
We are, of course, free to talk about something else, that isn’t outcomes, and even build an alternative mathematical model with a different measure function, that isn’t probability, using them. I explicitly do it here. It’s not really necessary, there is no advantages in doing it, but it can be done.
When you are logically pinpointing Y instead of X, you are, quite obvioiusly, talking about Y and not X anymore. This doesn’t change even if some philosophers, in attempt to confuse everyone, insist on calling both X and Y the same name.
According to this modified framework the answer is 1⁄3. But according to probability theory the answer is 1⁄2. And we are interested in probability due to the fact that it correspond to the rational credences of an agent.
And it doesn’t matter how many more alternative problems about memory loss you can come up with. They are all solved in a similar manner that I describe in this post.
That’s not what an “outcome” means. From Wikipedia:
We are, of course, free to talk about something else, that isn’t outcomes, and even build an alternative mathematical model with a different measure function, that isn’t probability, using them. I explicitly do it here. It’s not really necessary, there is no advantages in doing it, but it can be done.
When you are logically pinpointing Y instead of X, you are, quite obvioiusly, talking about Y and not X anymore. This doesn’t change even if some philosophers, in attempt to confuse everyone, insist on calling both X and Y the same name.
According to this modified framework the answer is 1⁄3. But according to probability theory the answer is 1⁄2. And we are interested in probability due to the fact that it correspond to the rational credences of an agent.
And it doesn’t matter how many more alternative problems about memory loss you can come up with. They are all solved in a similar manner that I describe in this post.