Interpreted as “all philosophers who talk about possible worlds believe they are real”, that isn’t true. The belief that possible world are real, modal realism, is contentious.
Yes, you shouldn’t interpret it this way. Modal realism is not the point of contention of this post. The whole framework of “possible worlds” is, regardless of whether one thinks they are somehow real or not.
I don’t know how you manage to keep misinterpreting me about it, even though I’ve already explained it to you under a different post.
Talk of possible worlds is common, because of the popularity of modal logic, and modal logic is …old … the sort of thing rationalists should approve of?
Why? Are we suppose to endource everything that’s old? Somehow I didn’t get the memo.
It allows you to put the notions of necessity and possibility on a formal basis, instead of leaving them as vague metaphysical notions.
The sentiment is good the implementation, is not. To be useful such formalization should be based on the framework of probability experiments and not possible worlds, for the reasons described in the post
The fact that you gave no citations or examples isn’t helping. You mentioned philosophers, not otherwise specified, and I have seen philosophers have debate modal realism I don’t know of anybody insisting that probability needs a motion of possible worlds—particularly, logically possible worlds.
Here we are supposed to conceptualize all the ways the world could be that are logically consistent with our previous observations and arrive to the conclusion that there are worlds where the coin comes Heads and worlds where it comes Tails
Trying to imagine an entire possible world to.solve a simple probability problem is of course far too much effort, so it is worth condemning if anyone is actually recommending it...but is anybody?
Yes, you shouldn’t interpret it this way. Modal realism is not the point of contention of this post. The whole framework of “possible worlds” is, regardless of whether one thinks they are somehow real or not.
I don’t know how you manage to keep misinterpreting me about it, even though I’ve already explained it to you under a different post.
Why? Are we suppose to endource everything that’s old? Somehow I didn’t get the memo.
The sentiment is good the implementation, is not. To be useful such formalization should be based on the framework of probability experiments and not possible worlds, for the reasons described in the post
The fact that you gave no citations or examples isn’t helping. You mentioned philosophers, not otherwise specified, and I have seen philosophers have debate modal realism I don’t know of anybody insisting that probability needs a motion of possible worlds—particularly, logically possible worlds.
Trying to imagine an entire possible world to.solve a simple probability problem is of course far too much effort, so it is worth condemning if anyone is actually recommending it...but is anybody?