No. Smart grids do nothing to give you energy in dark winter months.
Wind and wave are renewables.
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Karma: 448
Hundreds of tons” is not an intensifier that you stick in a sentence like the word “very”;
Here’s the first result I got when I googled “Germany tonnes nuclear waste”
Blippo could have googled, but you could have googled.
belief only gets worn away by reality if you believe untrue things. If you believe true things then your faith gets stronger over time as evidence confirms it.
You believe untrue things because people told you to believe untrue things, for their own purposes. Arriving at a set of true beliefs in isolation from society isn’t really an option.
If you need to use an analogy to convince someone of your point then they are not worth discussing an issue with.
Explaining and convincing can be regarded as two separate stages. if you are explaining to someone something that is novel to them , you pretty much have to use an analogy.
They’re in the dictionary.
The existence of a set of facts is implied by the existence of a world or worlds. You are supposing be existence of a multiverse, not me.
I can have good-enough knowledge of what atoms near me are doing, because otherwise science wouldn’t work.
Of course, that’s only subjective, but you are the one supposing the existence of a large objective world.
Suppose there is no personal identity at all. Then there are still objective facts about what some bunch of atoms somewhere is doing.
Would you also refuse to use religious or aristocratic titles from other groups?
If there’s no meaningful sense in which you’re self located as someone else vs that subset,
If my supposed counterparts are identical in every way, then there is no confusion about whether they write thc sentence.
If they didn’t write the sentence, then they are not identical to me and don’t have to accept that they are me.
You don’t just need multiverse theory to be true , you need strong claims about transworld identity to be true.
That there is an external world. Which, in this case, happens to be a multiverse.
You seem to be taking an epistemology-flavoured approach, where realism depends on having a set of facts, rather than a set of things. But even at that, it’s not clear that multiverses imply a lack of facts. If there is a duplicate me somewhere that didn’t just type that sentence, that doesn’t indicate an lack of clarity about what I did , any more than if I had a twin who didn’t just type that sentence.
there’s no fact of the matter where the electron is before it’s observed, it’s in both places and you have self locating uncertainty.”
OTOH, realism isn’t defined as every observable having a simultaneous sharp value.
The idea that the neocortex is running a learning algorithm that needs some kind of evaluative weighting to start working , isn’t exclusive of the idea that the neocortex can learn to perform its own evaluations.
If the brain does something which would be impossible on the assumption of cortical uniformity, then that would indeed be a very good reason to reject cortical uniformity. :-)
Does it? I don’t think cortical uniformity implies the separation of motivation and mapping
By the way, an interesting aspect of cortical uniformity is that it’s a giant puzzle piece into which we need to (and haven’t yet) fit every other aspect of human nature and psychology. There should be whole books written on this. Instead, nothing. For example, I have all sorts of social instincts—guilt, the desire to be popular, etc. How exactly does that work? The neocortex knows whether or not I’m popular, but it doesn’t care, because (on this view) it’s just a generic learning algorithm. The old brain cares very much whether I’m popular, but it’s too stupid to understand the world, so how would it know whether I’m popular or not? I’ve casually speculated on this a bit (e.g. here) but it seems like a gaping hole in our understanding of the brain, and you won’t find any answers in Hawkins’s book … or anywhere else as far as I know!
Or maybe that’s a reason for rejecting, in general, the idea that cognition and motivation are handled by separate modules!
Illusionism thinks the illusion-of-phenomenal-consciousness is ‘perception-like’ — it’s more like seeing an optical illusion, and less like just having a stubborn hunch that won’t go away even though there’s no apparent perceptual basis for
If you say so, but it doesn’t make it any easier to believe!
Indeed, Dennett describes non-physicalism as being based on a “hunch”, as though it were just a nagging hard-to-pin-down belief and not something that feels palpably present in all experience
It’s not clear that it’s a hunch , and it’s not clear that the a palpable presence. Physics is a complicated subject that most people do not understand , so why would anyone have reliable hunches or introspections about non physicallity? And the phenomenology varies anyway...some people, but nobody here, have the intuition that thought is non physical.
And I have to wonder whether he has some aphantasia-like condition that made a view as weird as delusionism appealing.
Dennetts phenomenonology is a mystery. Maybe it’s like one of those early computer games that prints out “you see a fire breathing dragon”.
Illusionism thinks the illusion-of-phenomenal-consciousness is ‘perception-like’ — it’s more like seeing an optical illusion, and less like just having a stubborn hunch that won’t go away even though there’s no apparent perceptual basis for
If you say so, but it doesn’t make it any easier to believe!
Indeed, Dennett describes non-physicalism as being based on a “hunch”, as though it were just a nagging hard-to-pin-down belief and not something that feels palpably present in all experience
It’s not clear that it’s a hunch , and it’s not clear that it’s a palpable presence. Physics is a complicated subject that most people do not understand , so why would anyone have reliable hunches or introspections about non physicallity? And the phenomenology varies anyway...some people, but nobody here, have the intuition that thought is non physical.
And I have to wonder whether he has some aphantasia-like condition that made a view as weird as delusionism appealing.
Dennetts phenomenonology is a mystery. Maybe it’s like one of those early computer games that prints out “you see a fire breathing dragon”.
But it will only have the access to the lower level data for such perceptions from its own sensory inputs, not others’, so it won’t be able to tell for sure what it “feels like” to them, because it won’t be getting theirs stream of low-level sensory inputs.
That’s nothing new, it’s the intuition that the Mary thought experiment is designed to address.
I can categorsise stones , and I can categorise flowers, but that doesn’t mean stones are flowers. In general, the ability to categorise things of type X doesn’t exhaustively describe them because they also have intrinsic properties. There is a theory of qualia according to which they don’t have any interesting properties other than bring different from each other, the GENSYM, theory, but I don’t know whether you’re be endorsing it.
I’ll go for answering different questions. Bayes, although well known to mainstream academia , isn’t regarded as the one epistemology to rule them all , precisely because there are so many issues it doesn’t address.
People do that because they think models might be true and not just useful. If they didn’t, they would be quite happy to co-exist, trading off predictive accuracy against complexity. Or domain of applicability.
Truth leads to warfare in a way that usefulness dies not.
There’s no guarantee that everything is experimentally testable.
Worse still, the relationship between predictive accuracy and correspondence-to-reality is obscure. What happens if two theories are equally predictive, but imply different things about reality?