You’ve got a lot of questions to raise, but no apparent alternative.
Non computationalism physicalism is an alternative to either or both the computationalist theories. (That performing a certain class of computations is sufficient to be conscious in general, or that performing a specific one is sufficient to be a particular conscious individual. Computation as a theory of consciousness qua awareness isn’t known to be true, and even if it is assumed, it doesn’t directly give you a theory of personal identity).
The non existence, or incoherence, of personal identity is another. There doesn’t have to be an answer to “when is a mind me”.
Note that no one except andeslodes is arguing against copying. The issue is when a mind is me, the person typing this, not a copy-of-me.
Reproduce the matter, you’ve reproduced the mind.
Well, that’s only copying.
Consciousness, qua Awareness, and Personal Identity are easily confused, not least because both are often called “consciousness”.
A computational theory of consciousness is sometimes called on to solve the second problem, the problem of personal identity. But there is no strong reason to think a computational duplicate of you, actually is you, since there is no strong reason to think any other kind of duplicate is.
Qualitative identity is a relationship between two or more things that are identical in all their properties. Numerical identity is the relationship a thing has only to itself. The Olsen twins enjoy qualitative identity; Stephanie Germanota and Lady Gaga have numerical identity. The trick is to jump from qualitative identity to numerical identity, because the claim is that a computational duplicate of you, is you, the very same person.
Suppose you found out you had an identical twin. You would not consider them to be you yourself. Likewise for a biological clone. A computational duplicate would be lower resolution still, so why would it be you? The major problem is that you and your duplicate exist simultaneously in different places, which goes against the intuition that you are a unique individual.
You’re fighting against the counterintuitive conclusion. Sure I’d rather have a different version of me be tortured; it’s slightly different. But I won’t be happy about it. And my intuition is still drawn toward continuity being important, even though my whole rational mind disagrees. I’ve been back and forth over this extensively, and the conclusion is always the same- ever since I got over the counter-intuitive nature of the plural I
You don’t really believe in the plural I theory, or you would have a different and we to the torture question.
Non -computationalist physicalism doesn’t have to be the claim that material continuity matters , and pattern doesnt: it can be the claim that both do. So that you cease to be you if you are destructively cloned, and also if your mind is badly scrambled. No bullet biting about plural Is is required.
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Not 100% , but enough to illustrate the concept.
I didn’t have to have a solution to point out the flaws in other solutions. My main point is that a no to soul- theory isn’t a yes to computationalism. Computationalism isn’t the only alternative, or the best.
Some problems are insoluble.
My belief isn’t necessarily the actually really answer ..is it? That’s basic rationality. You need beliefs to act...but beliefs aren’t necessarily true.
And I have no practical need for a theory that can answer puzzles about destructive teleportation and the like.
Yes. That’s not an argument in favour of the contentious points, like computationalism and Plural Is. If I try to reverse the logic, and great everything I value as me, I get bizarre results...I am my dog, country, etc.
Tomorrow-me is a physical continuation , too.
If I accept that pattern is all that matters , I have to face counterintuitive consequences like Plural I’s.
If I accept that material continuity is all that matters, then I face other counterintuitive consequences, like having my connectome rewired.
Its an open philosophical problem. If there were an simple answer , it would have been answered long ago.
“Yer an algorithm, Arry” is a simple answer. Just not good
Fortunately, it’s not an either-or choice.
...and post copy I have a preference for the copy who isn’t me to be tortured. Which is to say that both copies say the same thing, which is to say that they are only copies. If they regarded themselves as numerically identical, the response “the other one!” would make no sense, and nor would the question. The questions presumes a lack of numerical identity, so how can it prove it?
You’re assuming pattern continuity matters more than material continuity. There’s no proof of that, and no proof that you have to make an either-or choice.
The abstract pattern can’t cause anything without the brain/body.
Noncomputational physicalism isn’t the claim that computation never occurs. Its the claim that the computational abstraction doesn’t capture everything that’s relevant to consciousness/mind. Its not physically necessary that the computational abstraction captures all the causally relevant information, so it isn’t logically necessary, a fortiori.
Computation is a lossy , high level abstraction of a what a physical system does. It doesn’t fundamentally cause anything in itself.
Now, you can argue that a physical duplicate would make the same claims to be conscious without actually having consciousness, and that’s literally a p-zombie argument.
But we do have consciousness. The insight of DAT is that “reports of consciousness have a physical/computational basis” isn’t exclusive of “reports of consciousness are caused by consciousness”. You can have your cake and eat it!
Of course, the above is all about consciousness-qua-awareness , not consciousness qua personal identity.
If it’s physical, why call it magical?
It’s completely standard that all computations run on a substrate. If you want to say that all physics is computation, OK, but then all computation is physics. You then no longer have plural I’s, because physics doesn’t allow the selfsame object to have multiple instances.
It’s easy to disagree if there is another explanation, which there is: a functional duplicate will behave the same, because it’s a functional duplicate..whether it’s conscious of not, whether it’s you or not.