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Why do you have faith in it?
I don’t, and I didn’t say I did. H. is one of my least favourite philosophers.
if intuitions are 100% garbage (not Luke’s actual conclusion) AND we can’t do without them, we are in a very bad situation.
I guess Luke would try to dissolve the question by looking at how it arises in our brains or something.
Why do only certain questions get the dissolution treatment? Is there a formal criterion, or is it based on biased and intuition?
I was struggling go see the the relevance of Lukeprogs sequence to Andrews posting. He attacks a notion of conceptual analysis that isn’t very relevant to Heidegger. He attacks intuitions, without answering the hard problem of how to manage without them entirely. He attacks philosophy without showing a better way of dealing with the same questions.
Something that pisses me off is alluding to sequences in a vague sweeping way. They don’t have to answer the question, just be on a similar topic
One-line comments are low-effort..including “read the sequences”.
What position do you think Andrew arguing against?
Professional philosophers as a class who’s culture is combative have a bad track record of changing their opinion when confronted with opposing views.
As opposed to whom? Who’s good?
however, our succesful predictions still would be able to tell us something true: that inside the matrix, physical attributes of the simulation work a certain way.
Except that its not real physics.
I think that succesful prediction leads to correspondence because it signals that the way you think the world is, is the way in which the world actually is.
How?
I don’t assume that we are inside the matrix as a matter of fact. I note that if we were, hypothetically, science would work just as well at making predictions, whilst failing completely at identifying the nature of reality. That’s how I am arguing that prediction and correspondence are not identical.
There is a criterion that tells you when correspondence has likely been achieved: Serialized experimental testing.
That’s a cached though for many people. The question is how does prediction lead to corresponence?
Nothings is ever ABSOLUTELY EVER TRULY PROVEN
Maybe not, but that’s not the problem. If you could make 100% accurate predictions inside the matrix, you would still have the problem outlined above.
Interestingly, humans are able to predict each other values in most cases—
Only across small inferential gaps. That works for most cases only because people interact inside bubbles, groups based on similarity. Interactions between random people would be mostly puzzling.
most lotteries have negative total expected utility.
Its quite possible for a lottery to have positive expected utility for an individual, and this was one of the cases that prompted the development of utility as a separate concept to value.
I followed his work, and I estimate the difference he made to be very high relative to other individuals working on the issue (on either side).
On what basis the polling was close before the referendum, and the result of the referendum was close. I am not seeing evidence that he made something happen that would not have happened. Are you saying that he must have got results, because he was using the right methods?
tried to determine what voters actually thought,
How come we sill don’t know?
That—compared to what? -- needed saying
To quote myself:
“Physical model” usually refers to something outside the head, like a set of equations on a blackboard, or a computer model
The winningest rationalist I know of is Dominic Cummings,
How much of a difference do you think he made? Was there strong pro-remain sentiment before he got stated?
I did not ask for a universally compelling argument: you brought that in.
Trying to solve problems by referring to the Sequences has a way of leading to derailment: people match the topic at hand to which ever of Yudkowsky’s writings is least irrelevant, even if it is not relevant enough to be on the same topic.
It seems that you don’t get it. Said just demonstrated that even if C exists it wouldn’t imply a universally compelling argument.
So what? Neither the existence or non existence of a Criterion of Truth that is persuasive to our minds is implied by the (non) existence of universally compelling arguments. The issue of universally compelling arguments is a red herring.
I don’t know what “directly” means, but there certainly is a causal pathway, and we can certainly evaluate whether our brains are tracking reality. Just make a prediction, then go outside and look with your eyes to see if it comes true.
Inasmuch as you are looking with your eyes, that would be tracking appearance. What you don’t have is a way of checking whether the ultimate causes of your sense data, in reality, are what you think they are.
Market behaviour is a known quantity, with, up to a point, known fixes. introducing gradually improving AI is not going to change the game.
I still think you can do even betterer still by throwing in some Poppper (actively try to falsify your beliefs) and Kuhn (sometimes you need to tear down to build up).
The “payoff” of of MWI, that there is a better way of doing science than the scientific method seems to have been dropped as well.
Versions of the “nature of being” question are relevant to things like MWI and the mathematical universe hypothesis.