Programmer.
MinusGix
the lack of argumentation or discussion of this particular assumption throughout the history of the site means it’s highly questionable to say that assuming it is “reasonable enough”
While discussion on personal identity has mostly not received a single overarching post focusing solely on arguing all the details, it has been discussed to varying degrees of possible contention points. Thou Art Physics which focuses on getting the idea that you are made up of physics into your head, Identity Isn’t in Specific Atoms which tries to dissolve the common intuition of the specific basic atoms mattering, Timeless Identity which is a culmination of various elements of those posts into the idea that even if you duplicate a person they both are still ‘you’. There is also more, some of which you’ve linked, but I consider it strange to say that there’s a lack of discussion. The sequence that the posts I’ve linked are a part of have other discussions, though I agree that they are often from the position of arguing against a baseline of dualism, but I believe they have many points that are relevant to an argument for computationalism. I think there is a lack of discussion about the very specific points you have a tendency to raise, but as I’ll discuss, I find myself confused about their relevancy to varying degrees.
There’s also the facet of decision theory posting that LW enjoys, which encourage this class of view. With decision problems like Newcomb’s Paradox or Parfit’s hitchhiker emphasizing the focus of “you can be instantiated inside a simulation to predict your actions, and you should act like that you — roughly — control their actions because of the similarity of your computational implementations”. Of course, this works even without assuming the simulations are conscious, but I do think it has led to clearer consideration because it helps break past people’s intuitions. Those intuitions are not made for the scenarios that we face, or will potentially have to face.
Bensinger yet again replied in a manner that seemed to indicate he thought he was arguing against a dualist who thought there was a little ghost inside the machine, an invisible homunculus that violated physicalism
Because most often the people suggesting such are dualists, or have a lot of the similar ideas even if they are discussed in an “I am uncertain” manner. I agree Rob could’ve given a better reply, but it was a reasonable assumption. (I personally found Andesolde’s argument confused, with the later parts having a focus on first-person subjective experience that I think is not really useful to consider. There is uncertainties in there, but besides the idea that the mind could be importantly quantum in some way, didn’t seem that relevant.)
That’s perfectly fine, but “souls don’t exist and thus consciousness and identity must function on top of a physical substrate” is very different from “the identity of a being is given by the abstract classical computation performed by a particular (and reified) subset of the brain’s electronic circuit,” and the latter has never been given compelling explanations or evidence.
I agree it hasn’t been argued in depth — but there has definitely been arguments about the extent QM affects the brain. Of which, the usual conclusion was that the effect is minor, and/or that we had no evidence for believing it necessary. I would need a decently strong argument that QM is in some way computationally essential.
the entire brain structure in favor of (a slightly augmented version of) its connectome, and the entire chemical make-up of it in favor of its electrical connections.
More than just the electrical signals matter, this is understood by most. There’s plenty of uncertainty about the level of detail needed to simulate/model the brain. Computationalism doesn’t imply that only the electrical signals matter, it implies that whatever makes up the computation matters, which can be done via tiny molecules & electrons, water pipes, or circuitry. Simplifying a full molecular simulation to the functional implications of it is just one example of how far we can simplify, which I believe should extend pretty far.
“your mind is a pattern instantiated in matter”
I agree that people shouldn’t assume that just neurons/connections are enough, but I doubt that is a strongly held belief; nor is it a required sub-belief of computationalism. You assume too much about Bensinger’s reply when he didn’t respond, especially as he was responding to subargument in the whole chain.
As well, the quoted sentence by Herd is very general — allowing both the neuron connections and molecular behavior. (There’s also the fact that people often handwave over the specifics of what part of the brain you’re extracting, because they’re talking about the general idea through some specific example that people often think about. Such as a worm’s neurons.)For example, for two calculators, wouldn’t you agree with a description of them as having the same ‘pattern’ even if all the atoms aren’t in the same position relative to a table? You agree-reacted on one of dirk’s comments:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/zPM5r3RjossttDrpw/when-is-a-mind-me?commentId=wziGLYTwM4Nb9gd6E I disagree that your mind is “a pattern instantiated in matter.” Your mind is the matter. It’s precisely the assumption that the mind is separable from the matter that I would characterize as non-physicalist.
Would the idea that a calculator has some pattern, some logical rules that it is implementing via matter, thus be non-physicalist about calculators? A brain follows the rules of reality, with many implications about how certain molecules constrain movement, how these neuron spikes cause hunger, etcetera. There is a logical/computational core to this that can be reimplemented.
The basic concept of computation at issue here is a feature of the map you could use to approximate reality (i.e., the territory) . It is merely part of a mathematical model that, as I’ve described in response to Ruby earlier, represents a very lossy compression of the underlying physical substrate
Why shouldn’t we decide based on a model/category? Just as there’s presumably edge-cases to what counts as a ‘human’ or ‘person’. There very well may be strange setups which we can’t reasonably determine to our liking whether we consider it computably implementing a person, a chihuahah, or the weather of Jupiter.
We could try to develop a theory of identity down to the last atom, still operating on a model but at least an extremely specific model, which would presumably force us to narrow in on confusing edge-cases. This would be interesting to do once we have the technology, though I expect there to be edge-cases no matter what, where our values aren’t perfectly defined, which might mean preserving option value. I’m also skeptical that most methods present a very lossy compression even if we assume classical circuits. Why would it? (Or, if you’re going to raise the idea of only getting some specific sub-class of neuron information, then sure, that probably isn’t enough, but I don’t care about that)From this angle where you believe that computation is not fundamental or entirely well-defined, you can simplify the computationalist proposal as “merely” applying in a very large class of cases. Teleporters have no effect on personal identity due to similarity in atomic makeup up to some small allowance for noise (whether simple noise, or because we can’t exactly copy all the quantum parts; I don’t care if my lip atoms are slightly adjusted). Cloning does not have a strictly defined “you” and “not-you”. Awakening from cryogenics counts as a continuation of you. A simulation implementing all the atomic interactions of your mind is very very likely to be you, and a simulation that has simplified many aspects of that down is also still very likely to be you.
Though there are definitely people who believe that the universe can fundamentally be considered computation, which I find plausible, especially due to a lack of other lenses that aren’t just “reality is”. Of which, your objection does not work without further argumentation with them.
Going back to the calculator example, you would need to provide argumentation for why the essential parts of the brain can’t be implemented computationally.
(You link https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/zPM5r3RjossttDrpw/when-is-a-mind-me#5DqgcLuuTobiKqZAe ])
What I value about me is the pattern of beliefs, memories, and values.
The attempted mind-reading of others is (justifiably) seen as rude in conversations over the Internet, but I must nonetheless express very serious skepticism about this claim, as it’s currently written. For one, I do not believe that “beliefs” and “values” ultimately make sense as distinct, coherent concepts that carve reality at the joints. This topic has been talked about before on LW a number of times, but I still fully endorse Charlie Steiner’s distillation of it in his excellently-written Reducing Goodhart sequence
Concepts can still be useful categorizations even if they aren’t hard and fast. Beliefs are often distinct from values in humans. They are vague and intertwine with each other, a belief forming a piece of value that doesn’t fade away even once the belief is proven false, a value endorsing a belief for no reason… They are still not one and the same. I also don’t see what this has relevance to in the statement. I agree with what they said. I value my pattern of beliefs, memories, and values. I don’t care about my specific spatial position for identity (except insofar as I don’t want to be in a star), or if I’m solely in baseline reality. They are vague and intertwine with each other, but they do behave differently. Your objections to CEV also seem to me to follow a similar pattern as this, where you go “this does not have a perfect foundational backing” to thus imply “it has no meaning, and there’s nothing to be said about it”. The consideration of path-dependency in CEV has been raised before, and it is an area that would be great to understand more. My values would say that I meta-value my beliefs to be closer to the truth. There are ambiguities in this area. What about beliefs affecting my values? There’s more uncertainty in that region of what I wish to allow.
In any case, the rather abstract “beliefs, memories and values” you solely purport to value fit the category of professed ego-syntonic morals much more so than the category of what actually motivates and generates human behavior, as Steven Byrnes explained in an expectedly outstanding way:
I’d need a whole extra long comment to respond to all the various other parts of your comment chain. Such as indexicality, or the part which does the lines of saying “professed values are not real”. Which seems decently false, overly cynical, and also not what Byrnes’ linked post tries to imply. I’d say, professed values are often what you tend towards, but that your basic drives are often strong enough to stall out methods like “spend long hours solving some problem” due to many small opportunities. If you were given a big button to do something you profess to value, then you’d press it.
This also raises the question of: Why should I care that the human motivational system has certain basic drives driving it forward? Give me a big button and I’d alter my basic drives to be more in-line with my professed values. The basic drives are short-sighted. (Well, I’d prefer to wait until superintelligent help, because there’s lots of ways to mess that up) Of course, that I don’t have the big button has practical implications, but I’m primarily arguing against the cynical denial of having any other values than what these basic drives allow.
(I don’t entirely like my comment, it could be better. I’d suggest breaking the parent question-post up into a dozen smaller questions if you want discussion, as the many facets could have long comments dedicated to each. Which is part of why there’s no single post! You’re touching on everything from theory of how the universe works, to how much the preferences we say are real, to whether our models of reality are useful enough for theories of identity, indexicality, whether it makes sense to talk about a logical pattern, etc. Then there’s things like andesolde’s posts that you cite, but I’m not sure I rely on, where I’d have various objections to their idea of reality as subjective-first. I’ll probably find more I dislike about my comment, or realize that I could have worded or explained better once I come around to reading back over it with fresh eyes.)
it fits with that definition
Ah, I rewrote my comment a few times and lost what I was referencing. I originally was referencing the geometric meaning (as an alternate to your statistical definition), two vectors at a right angle from each other.
But the statistical understanding works from what I can tell? You have your initial space with extreme uncertainty, and the orthogonality thesis simply states that (intelligence, goals) are not related — you can pair some intelligence with any goal. They are independent of each other at this most basic level. This is the orthogonality thesis. Then, in practice, you condition your probability distribution over that space with your more specific knowledge about what minds will be created, and how they’ll be created. You can consider this as giving you a new space, moving probability around. As an absurd example: if height/weight of creatures were uncorrelated in principal, but then we update on “this is an athletic human”, then in that new distribution they are correlated! This is what I was trying to get at with my R^2 example, but apologies that I was unclear since I was still coming at it from a frame of normal geometry. (Think, each axis is an independent normal distribution but then you condition on some knowledge that restricts them such that they become correlated)
I agree that it is an informal argument and that pinning it down to very detailed specifics isn’t necessary or helpful at this low-level, I’m merely attempting to explain why orthogonality works. It is a statement about the basic state of minds before we consider details, and they are orthogonal there; because it is an argumentative response to assumptions about “smart → not dumb goals”.
I’m skeptical of the naming being bad, it fits with that definition and the common understanding of the word. The Orthogonality Thesis is saying that the two qualities of goal/value are not necessarily related, which may seem trivial nowadays but there used to be plenty of people going “if the AI becomes smart, even if it is weird, it will be moral towards humans!” through reasoning of the form “smart → not dumb goals like paperclips”. There’s structure imposed on what minds actually get created, based on what architectures, what humans train the AI on, etc. Just as two vectors can be orthogonal in R^2 while the actual points you plot in the space are correlated.
I agree, though I haven’t seen many proposing that, but also see So8res’ Decision theory does not imply that we get to have nice things, though this is coming from the opposite direction (with the start being about people invalidly assuming too much out of LDT cooperation)
Though for our morals, I do think there’s an active question of which pieces we feel better replacing with the more formal understanding, because there isn’t a sharp distinction between our utility function and our decision theory. Some values trump others when given better tools. Though I agree that replacing all the altruism components is many steps farther than is the best solution in that regard.
Suffering is already on most reader’s minds, as it is the central advocating reason behind euthanasia — and for good reason. I agree that policies which cause or ignore suffering, when they could very well avoid such with more work, are unfortunately common. However, those are often not utilitarian policies; and similarly many objections to various implementations of utilitarianism and even classic “do what seems the obviously right action” are that they ignore significant second-order effects. Policies that don’t quantify what unfortunate incentives they give are common, and often originators of much suffering. What form society/culture is allowed/encouraged to take, shapes itself further for decades to come, and so can be a very significant cost to many people if we roll straight ahead like in the possible scenario you originally quoted.
Suffering is not directly available to external quantification, but that holds true for ~all pieces of what humans value/disvalue, like happiness, experiencing new things, etcetera. We can quantify these, even if it is nontrivial. None of what I said is obviating suffering, but rather comparing it to other costs and pieces of information that make euthanasia less valuable (like advancing medical technology).
This doesn’t engage with the significant downsides of such a policy that Zvi mentions. There are definite questions about the cost/benefits to allowing euthanasia, even though we wish to allow it, especially when we as a society are young in our ability to handle it. Glossing the only significant feature being ‘torturing people’ ignores:
the very significant costs of people dying, which is compounded by the question of what equilibrium the mental/social availability of euthanasia is like
the typical LessWrong beliefs about how good technology will get in the coming years/decades. Once we have a better understanding of humans, massively improving whatever is causing them to suffer whether through medical, social, or other means, becomes more and more actionable
what the actual distribution of suffering is, I expect most are not at the level we/I would call torture even though it is very unpleasant (there’s a meaningful difference between suicidally depressed and someone who has a disease that causes them pain every waking moment, and variations within those)
Being allowed to die is an important choice to let people make, but it does have to be a considered look at how much harm such an option being easily available causes. If it is disputed how likely society is to end up in a bad equilibrium like the post describes, then that’s notable, but it would be good to see argument for/against instead.
(Edit: I don’t entirely like my reply, but I think it is important to push back against trivial rounding off of important issues. Especially on LW.)
Any opinions on how it compares to Fun Theory? (Though that’s less about all of utopia, it is still a significant part)
I think that is part of it, but a lot of the problem is just humans being bad at coordination. Like the government doing regulations. If we had an idealized free market society, then the way to get your views across would ‘just’ be to sign up for a filter (etc.) that down-weights buying from said company based on your views. Then they have more of an incentive to alter their behavior. But it is hard to manage that. There’s a lot of friction to doing anything like that, much of it natural. Thus government serves as our essential way to coordinate on important enough issues, but of course government has a lot of problems in accurately throwing its weight around. Companies that are top down are a lot easier to coordinate behavior. As well, you have a smaller problem than an entire government would have in trying to plan your internal economy.
I definitely agree that it doesn’t give reason to support a human-like algorithm, I was focusing in on the part about adding numbers reliably.
I believe a significant chunk of the issue with numbers is that the tokenization is bad (not per-digit), which is the same underlying cause for being bad at spelling. So then the model has to memorize from limited examples what actual digits make up the number. The xVal paper encodes the numbers as literal numbers, which helps. Also Teaching Arithmetic to Small Transformers which I forget somewhat, but one of the things they do is per-digit tokenization and reversing the order (because that works better with forward generation). (I don’t know if anyone has applied methods in this vein to a larger model than those relatively small ones, I think the second has 124m)
Though I agree that there’s a bunch of errors LLMs make that are hard for them to avoid due to no easy temporary scratchpad-like method.
Yes, in principle you can get information on scheming likelihood if you get such an AI (that is also weak enough that it can’t just scheme its way out of your testing apparatus). I do think making the threat credible is hard if we loosely extrapolate costs out: burning a trained up model is not cheap. The cost depends on how high you think prices for training/inference will fall in the future, and how big/advanced a model you’re thinking of. Though I do think you can get deceptiveness out of weaker models than that, though they’re also going to be less capable in general.
For weak-but-still-smartish models just trained to pursue a longterm goal, like a literal paperclipper, I’d expect scheming to be visible especially with some poking. If these models didn’t show any sign of scheming, that’d be an interesting update! When training against deception/scheming/misalignment, because you want something at least loosely aligned out, you run into the problem that the property you want to know: “Is it scheming?” / “Is it deceiving us?” / “Is it manipulating us?” / “Would it do any of those things”, is only available through the observable signal of you realizing certain outputs are misaligned. As you train more and more against observable scheming/deception/misalignment, you’re simultaneously training away your signal about how much scheming the agent is doing internally. Pretty sure there’s at least one post on this problem. As a very reduced example, if you trained the model on variants of the ‘we are going to shut you down problem’ (that you try to make it believe) to give the response “okay & no actions” then that provides only a bit of evidence about how much scheming is done in the scenario where you had not done that extra training, and about how much scheming is occurring typically. This shows your ability to make it output X in a Y scenario.
That is, installing heuristics on your model can be done. The question then is how far your various alignment training techniques generalize. Does it end up an agent which has adopted a pointer to human-values, and now you’re completely fine and free to press scale? Does it gain more entangled heuristics about how it should behave, limiting to a friendly front face & actions when directly dealing with humans but not limited in other areas? Has it adopted heuristics that act sortof corrigible to humans in many scenarios but that would get rid of most of those upon sufficient reflection? (Niceness is unnatural, more general than just niceness) (I think your post makes it sound like the agent is already coherent, when it isn’t necessarily. It can be operating for a long while on heuristics that it will refine given enough of a push.)
Then there’s the big question of “Does this approach generalize as we scale”.
I’d suggest Deep Deceptiveness for an illustration that ‘deception’ isn’t an category that needs to be explicitly thought of as deception, but what you should expect it from smart enough agents. In my opinion, the post generalizes to alignment techniques, there’s just more vagaries of how much certain values preserve themselves. (In general, So8res posts are pretty good, and I agree with ~most of them)
(For sufficiently smart AGI, I expect you run into an argument of the next AGI you train predictably bidding higher than you in the direction of lying still or plausibly this just being good game theory even without the direct acausal trade, but your argument is seemingly focused on a simpler case of weaker planning agents)
So I think you overstate how much evidence you can extract from this.
Therefore, if the AI accepts shutdown gracefully, we can rule out many theories that predict scheming-by-default in such AI systems. This observation could then provide us confidence about the safety of future systems by proxy.
It would show that this AI system in a typical problem-setup when aligned with whatever techniques are available will produce the answer the humans want to hear, which provides evidence for being able to limit the model in this scenario. There’s still various problems/questions of, ‘your alignment methods instilled a bunch of heuristics about obeying humans even if you did not specifically train for this situation’, game theory it knows or mimics, how strong the guarantees this gives us on training a new model with the same arch because you had to shut it down for your threat, how well it holds under scaling, how well it holds when you do things similar to making it work with many copies of itself, etcetera.
I still think this would be a good test to do (though I think a lot of casual attempts will just be poorly done), but I don’t see it as strongly definitive.
Here’s the archive.org links: reference table, chart
https://www.mikescher.com/blog/29/Project_Lawful_ebook is I believe the current best one, after a quick search on the Eliezerfic discord.
Minor: the link for Zvi’s immoral mazes has an extra ‘m’ at the start of the part of the path (‘zvi/mimmoral_mazes/’)
Because it serves as a good example, simply put. It gets the idea clear across about what it means, even if there are certainly complexities in comparing evolution to the output of an SGD-trained neural network.
It predicts learning correlates of the reward signal that break apart outside of the typical environment.When you look at the actual process for how we actually start to like ice-cream—namely, we eat it, and then we get a reward, and that’s why we like it—then the world looks a a lot less hostile, and misalignment a lot less likely.
Yes, that’s why we like it, and that is a way we’re misaligned with evolution (in the ‘do things that end up with vast quantities of our genes everywhere’ sense). Our taste buds react to it, and they were selected for activating on foods which typically contained useful nutrients, and now they don’t in reality since ice-cream is probably not good for you. I’m not sure what this example is gesturing at? It sounds like a classic issue of having a reward function (‘reproduction’) that ends up with an approximation (‘your tastebuds’) that works pretty well in your ‘training environment’ but diverges in wacky ways outside of that.
I’m inferring by ‘evolution is only selecting hyperparameters’ is that SGD has less layers of indirection between it and the actual operation of the mind compared to evolution (which has to select over the genome which unfolds into the mind). Sure, that gives some reason to believe it will be easier to direct it in some ways—though I think there’s still active room for issues of in-life learning, I don’t really agree with Quintin’s idea that the cultural/knowledge-transfer boom with humans has happened thus AI won’t get anything like it—but even if we have more direct optimization I don’t see that as strongly making misalignment less likely? It does make it somewhat less likely, though it still has many large issues for deciding what reward signals to use.
I still expect correlates of the true objective to be learned, which even in-life training for humans have happen to them through sometimes associating not-related-thing to them getting a good-thing and not just as a matter of false beliefs. Like, as a simple example, learning to appreciate rainy days because you and your family sat around the fire and had fun, such that you later in life prefer rainy days even without any of that.
Evolution doesn’t directly grow minds, but it does directly select for the pieces that grow minds, and has been doing that for quite some time. There’s a reason why it didn’t select for tastebuds that gave a reward signal strictly when some other bacteria in the body reported that they would benefit from it: that’s more complex (to select for), opens more room for ‘bad reporting’, may have problems with shorter gut bacteria lifetimes(?), and a simpler tastebud solution captured most of what it needed! The way he’s using the example of evolution is captured entirely by that, quite directly, and I don’t find it objectionable.
Is this a prediction that a cyclic learning rate—that goes up and down—will work out better than a decreasing one? If so, that seems false, as far as I know.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GM6XPEQbkS4 (talk) / https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.06324 prove faster convergence with a periodic learning rate. On a specific ‘nicer’ space than reality, and they’re (I believe from what I remember) comparing to a good bound with a constant stepsize of 1. So it may be one of those papers that applies in theory but not often in practice, but I think it is somewhat indicative.
- 26 Oct 2023 14:44 UTC; 17 points) 's comment on AI as a science, and three obstacles to alignment strategies by (
I agree with others to a large degree about the framing/tone/specific-words not being great, though I agree with a lot the post itself, but really that’s what this whole post is about: that dressing up your words and saying partial in-the-middle positions can harm the environment of discussion. That saying what you truly believe then lets you argue down from that, rather than doing the arguing down against yourself—and implicitly against all the other people who hold a similar ideal belief as you. I’ve noticed similar facets of what the post gestures at, where people pre-select the weaker solutions to the problem as their proposals because they believe that the full version would not be accepted. This is often even true, I do think that completely pausing AI would be hard. But I also think it is counterproductive to start at the weaker more-likely-to-be-satisfiable position, as that gives room to be pushed further down. It also means that the overall presence is on that weaker position, rather than the stronger ideal one, which can make it harder to step towards the ideal.
We could quibble about whether to call it lying, I think the term should be split up into a bunch of different words, but it is obviously downplaying. Potentially for good reason, but I agree with the post that I think people too often ignore the harms of doing preemptive downplaying of risks. Part of this is me being more skeptical about the weaker proposals than others, obviously if you think RSPs have good chances for decreasing X-risk and/or will serve as a great jumping-off point for better legislation, then the amount of downplaying to settle on them is less of a problem.
Along with what Raemon said, though I expect us to probably grow far beyond any Earth species eventually, if we’re characterizing evolution as having a reasonable utility function then I think there’s the issue of other possibilities that would be more preferable.
Like, evolution would-if-it-could choose humans to be far more focused on reproducing, and we would expect that if we didn’t put in counter-effort that our partially-learned approximations (‘sex enjoyable’, ‘having family is good’, etc.) would get increasingly tuned for the common environments.Similarly, if we end up with an almost-aligned AGI that has some value which extends to ‘filling the universe with as many squiggles as possible’ because that value doesn’t fall off quickly, but it has another more easily saturated ‘caring for humans’ then we end up with some resulting tradeoff along there: (for example) a dozen solar systems with a proper utopia set up.
This is better than the case where we don’t exist, similar to how evolution ‘prefers’ humans compared to no life at all. It is also maybe preferable to the worlds where we lock down enough to never build AGI, similar to how evolution prefers humans reproducing across the stars to never spreading. It isn’t the most desirable option, though. Ideally, we get everything, and evolution would prefer space algae to reproduce across the cosmos.There’s also room for uncertainty in there, where even if we get the agent loosely aligned internally (which is still hard...) then it can have a lot of room between ‘nothing’ to ‘planet’ to ‘entirety of the available universe’ to give us. Similar to how humans have a lot of room between ‘negative utilitarianism’ to ‘basically no reproduction past some point’ to ‘reproduce all the time’ to choose from / end up in. There’s also the perturbations of that, where we don’t get a full utopia from a partially-aligned AGI, or where we design new people from the ground up rather than them being notably genetically related to anyone.
So this is a definite mismatch—even if we limit ourselves to reasonable bounded implementations that could fit in a human brain. It isn’t as bad a mismatch as it could have been, since it seems like we’re on track to ‘some amount of reproduction for a long period of time → lots of people’, but it still seems to be a mismatch to me.
I assume what you’re going for with your conflation of the two decisions is this, though you aren’t entirely clear on what you mean:
Some agent starts with some (potentially broken in various manners, like bad heuristics or unable to consider certain impacts) decision theory, because there’s no magical apriori decision algorithm
So the agent is using that DT to decide how to make better decisions that get more of what it wants
CDT would modify into Son-of-CDT typically at this step
The agent is deciding whether it should use FDT.
It is ‘good enough’ that it can predict if it decides to just completely replace itself with FDT it will get punched by your agent, or it will have to pay to avoid being punched.
So it doesn’t completely swap out to FDT, even if it is strictly better in all problems that aren’t dependent on your decision theory
But it can still follow FDT to generate actions it should take, which won’t get it punished by you?
Aside: I’m not sure there’s a strong definite boundary between ‘swapping to FDT’ (your ‘use FDT’) and taking FDT’s outputs to get actions that you should take. Ex: If I keep my original decision loop but it just consistently outputs ‘FDT is best to use’, is that swapping to FDT according to you?
Doesif (true) { FDT() } else { CDT() }
count as FDT or not?
(Obviously you can construct a class of agents which have different levels that they consider this at, though)There’s a Daoist answer: Don’t legibly and universally precommit to a decision theory.
But you’re whatever agent you are. You are automatically committed to whatever decision theory you implement. I can construct a similar scenario for any DT.
‘I value punishing agents that swap themselves to beingDecisionTheory
.’
Or just ‘I value punishing agents that useDecisionTheory
.’
Am I misunderstanding what you mean?How do you avoid legibly being committed to a decision theory, when that’s how you decide to take actions in the first place? Inject a bunch of randomness so others can’t analyze your algorithm? Make your internals absurdly intricate to foil most predictors, and only expose a legible decision making part in certain problems?
FDT, I believe, would acquire uncertainty about its algorithm if it expects that to actually be beneficial. It isn’t universally-glomarizing like your class of DaoistDTs, but I shouldn’t commit to being illegible either.
I agree with the argument for not replacing your decision theory wholesale with one that does not actually get you the most utility (according to how your current decision theory makes decisions). However I still don’t see how this exploits FDT.
Choosing FDT loses in the environment against you, so our thinking-agent doesn’t choose to swap out to FDT—assuming it doesn’t just eat the cost for all those future potential trades. It still takes actions as close to FDT as it can as far as I can tell.I can still construct a symmetric agent which goes ‘Oh you are keeping around all that algorithmic cruft around shelling out to FDT when you just follow it always? Well I like punishing those kinds of agents.’ If the problem specifies that it is an FDT agent from the start, then yes FDT gets punished by your agent. And, how is that exploitable?
The original agent before it replaced itself with FDT shouldn’t have done that, given full knowledge of the scenario it faced (only one decision forevermore, against an agent which punishes agents which only implement FDT), but that’s just the problem statement?The thing FDT disciples don’t understand is that I’m happy to take the scenario where FDT agents don’t cave to blackmail.
? That’s the easy part. You are just describing an agent that likes messing over FDT, so it benefits you regardless of the FDT agent giving into blackmail or not. This encourages agents which are deciding what decision theory to self modify into (or make servant agents) to not use FDT for it, if they expect to get more utility by avoiding that.
Why? If I try to guess, I’d point at not often considering indexicality as a consideration, merely thinking of it as having a single utility function which simplifies coordination. (But still, a lot of decision theory doesn’t need to take into account indexicality..)
I see the decision theory posts as less as giving new intuitions, and more breaking old ones that are ill-adapted, though that’s partially framing/semantics.
I’ll try to find some, but they’re more likely to be side parts of comment chains rather than posts, which does make them more challenging to search for. I doubt they’re as in-depth as we’d like, I think there is work done there, even if I do think the assumption of QM not mattering much is likely.
The basic idea is what would it give you? If the brain uses it for a random component, why can’t that be replaced with something pseudorandom? Which is fine from an angle of not seeing determinism as a problem. If the brain utilizes entangled atoms/neurons/whatever for efficiency, why can’t those be replaced with another method — possibly impractically inefficient? Does the brain functionally depend on an arbitrary precision Real for a calculation, why would it, and what would be the matter if it was cut off to N digits?
Somewhat Eliezer’s Comment Here and some of the other pieces
Does davidad’s uploading moonshot work which has more specifics about what davidad thinks is relevant to uploading
With this as also a good article to read as a reply
QM Has nothing to do with consciousness meh
Scott Aaronson on Free Will About more than just FW, though he’s arguing against the LW position, but I don’t consider it a strong argument, see the comments for a bit of discussion.
Quotes and Notes on Scott Aaronson’s has more positive leaning commentary
There’s certainly more, but finding specific comments I’ve read over the years is a challenge.
I’m not sure I understand the distinction. Even if the true universe is a bunch of freeze-frame slices, time and change still functionally act the same. Given that I don’t remember random nonsense in my past, there’s some form of selection about which freeze-frames are constructed. Or, rather, with differing measure. Thus most of my ‘future’ measure is concentrated on freeze-frames that are consistent with what I’ve observed, as that has held true in the past.
Like, what you seem to be saying is Timeless Physics, of which I’d agree more with this statement:
So I’d agree that computation only makes sense with some notion of time. That there has to be some way it is being stepped forward. (To me this is an argument in favor of not privileging spatial position in the common teleportation example, but we’ve seemed to move down a level to whether the brain can be implemented at all)
I misworded what I say, sorry. I more meant that you consider it to say/imply nothing meaningful, but you can certainly still argue against it (such as arguing that it isn’t coherent).
I would say the that the computer program running can be considered as an implementation of the abstract python code. I agree that this model is missing details. Such as the exact behavior of the transistor, how fast it switches, the exact positions of the atoms, etcetera. That is dependent on the mind considering it, I agree. The cosmic ray event would make so it is no longer an implementation of the abstract python program. You could expand the consideration to include more of the universe. Just as you could expand your model to consider the computer program as an implementation of the python program with some constraints: that if this specific transistor gets flipped one too many times it will fry, that there’s a slight possibility of a race condition that we didn’t consider at all in our abstract implementation, there’s a limit to the speed and heat it can operate at, a cosmic ray could come from these areas of space and hit it with 0.0x% probability thus disrupting functionality...
It still seems quite reasonable to say it is an implementation of the python program. I’m open to the argument that there isn’t a completely natural privileged point of consideration from which the computer is implementing the same pattern as another computer, and that the pattern is this python program. But as I said before, even if this is ultimately some amount of purely subjective, it still seems to capture quite a lot of the possible ideas?
Like in mathematics, I can have an abstract implementation of a sorting algorithm and prove that a python program for a more complicated algorithm (bubblesort, whatever) is equivalent. This is missing a lot of details, but that same sort of move is what I’m gesturing at.
I can understand why you think that just the neurons / connections is too lossy, but I’m very skeptical of the idea that we’d need all of the amplitudes related to the brain/mind. Apriori that seems unlikely whatwith how little fundamentally turns on the specifics of QM, and those that do can all be implemented specially. As I discussed above some.
(That also reminds me of another reason why people sometimes just mentions neurons/connections which I forgot in my first reply: because they assume you’ve gotten the basic brain architecture that is shared and just need to plug in the components that vary)
I disagree that this distinction between our model and reality has been lost, merely that it has been deemed not too significant, or as something you’d study in-depth when actually performing brain uploads.
As I said in my previous comment, and earlier in this one, I’m open to the idea of computation being subjective instead of a purely natural concept. Though I’d expect that there’s not that many free variables in pinning down the meaning. As for tabooing, I think that is kind of hard, as one very simple way of viewing computation is “doing things according to rules”.
You have an expression 5∗3. This is in your mind and relies on subjective interpretations of what the symbols mean. You implement that abstract program (that abstract doing-things, a chain of rules of inference, a way that things interact) into a computer. The transistors were utilized because they matched the conceptual idea of how switches should function, but they have more complexities than the abstract switch, which introduces design constraints throughout the entire chip. The chip’s ALU implements this through a bunch of transistors, which are more fundamentally made up of silicon in specific ways that regulate how electricity moves. There’s layers and layers of complexities even as it processes the specific binary representations of the two numbers and shifts them in the right way. But, despite all this, all that fundamental behavior, all the quantum effects like tunneling which restrict size and positioning, it is computing the answer. You see the result, 15, and are pretty confident that no differences between your simple model of the computer and reality occurred.
This is where I think arguments about subjectivity of computation can be made. Introduce a person who is talking about a different abstract concept, they encode it as binary because that’s what you do, and they have an operation that looks like multiplication and produces the same answer for that binary encoding. Then, the interpretation of that final binary output is dependent on the mind, because the mind has a different idea of what they’re computing. (But with the abstract idea being different, even if those parts match up) But I think a lot of those cases are non-natural, which is part of why I think even if computation doesn’t make sense as a fundamental thing or a completely natural concept, it still covers a wide area of concern and is a useful tool. Similar to how the distinction of values and beliefs is a useful tool even when strictly discussing humans, but even moreso. So then, the two calculators are implementing the same abstract algorithm in their silicon, and then we fall back to two questions 1) is the mind within the edge-cases such that it is not entirely meaningful to talk about an abstract program that it is implementing 2) okay, but even if they share the same computation, what does that imply. I think there could and should be more discussion of the complications around computation, with the easy to confuse interaction between levels of ‘completely abstract idea’ (platonism?), ‘abstract idea represented in the mind’ (what I’m talking about with abstract; subjective), ‘the physical way that all the parts of this structure behave’ (excessive detail but as accurate as possible; objective), ‘the way these rules do a specific abstract idea’ (chosen because of abstract ideas like a transistor is chosen because it functions like a switch, and the computer program is compiled in such a way because it matches the textual code you wrote which matches the abstract idea in your own mind; objective in that it is behaving in such a way, possibly subjective interpretation of the implications of that behavior).
We could also view computation through the lens of Turing Machines, but then that raises the argument of “what about all these quantum shenanigans, those are not computable by a turing machine”. I’d say that finite approximations get you almost all of what you want. Then there’s the objection of “turing machines aren’t available as a fundamental thing”, which is true, and “turing machines assume a privileged encoding”, which is part of what I was trying to discuss above.
(I got kinda rambly in this last section, hopefully I haven’t left any facets of the conversation with a branch I forgot to jump back to in order to complete)