Yes, having strong unfiltered evidence for X can justify suppressing evidence against X. But if suppression is already in effect, and someone doesn’t already have unfiltered evidence, I’m not sure where they’d get any. So the share of voters who can justify suppression will decrease over time.
cousin_it
Karma: 26,741
So if evidence against X is being suppressed, then people’s belief in X is unreliable, so it can’t justify suppressing evidence against X. That’s a great argument for free speech, thanks! Do you know if it’s been stated before?
in my mind, the point of having ideals isn’t at all that they will reward you
Maybe not the whole point, but if I have some ideal that’s about helping people, and these people turn out ungrateful again and again, it’s a sign that the ideal might be wrong.
I’ll side with ProPublica, because my understanding of fairness (equal treatment for everyone) seems to be closer to parity than calibration. For example, a test that always returns positive or always flips a coin is parity-fair but not calibration-fair.
This will sound horrible, but I think the view of idealists as fools has a grain of truth. There are many people, entities and ideas that, if you love them, will reward you generously. Why waste your love on something that won’t reward you?
Which is not to say that modeling such technical arguments is not important for forecasting AGI. I certainly could have written a post evaluating such arguments, and I decided to write this post instead, in part because I don’t have much to say on this issue that Gary Marcus hasn’t already said.
Is he an AI researcher though? Wikipedia says he’s a psychology professor, and his arXiv article criticizing deep learning doesn’t seem to have much math. If you have technical arguments, maybe you could state them?
Faith never recommends randomization, it justifies it. Like trusting the tea leaves to predict the future.
Don’t know about other faiths, but Christianity is pretty strongly against divination in practice.
I can’t think of any examples where religion recommends randomization. Also, randomness in physics is cheap, and nature uses randomization in many rock-paper-scissors games without requiring religion or even brains.
It’s not just about thrill-seeking though. A bit of courage can improve quality of life by making you less scared of events that happen, like the event habryka described.
I think living with courage and dignity is more fun in any social circumstances.
Saying “fuck you” and waiting ten seconds? There’s a good chance they were trying to bait you into a reportable offense. That said, you should’ve used more courage in the moment, and your “friends” should’ve backed you up. If you find yourself in that situation again, try saying “no you” and improvise from there.
A “naturalistic” approach to game theory is one in which game theory is an application of decision theory (not an extension) -- there should be no special reasoning which applies only to other agents.
But game theory doesn’t require such special reasoning! It doesn’t care how players reason. They might not reason at all, like the three mating variants of the side-blotched lizard. And when they do reason, game theory still shows they can’t reason their way out of a situation unilaterally, no matter if their decision theory is “naturalistic” or not. So I think of game theory as an upper bound on all possible decision theories, not an application of some future decision theory.
I’ve had some success overcoming everyday fears by trying to be courageous in my thoughts and actions. For me it works better than trying to think my way out of feeling afraid. But I never had chronic anxiety and don’t know if that approach would work there—have people tried it?
UDT doesn’t give us conceptual tools for dealing with multiagent coordination problems.
I think there’s no best player of multiplayer games. Or rather, choosing the best player depends on what other players exist in the world, and that goes all the way down (describing the theory of choosing the best player also depends on what other players exist, and so on).
Of course that doesn’t mean UDT is the best we can do. We cannot solve the whole problem, but UDT carves out a chunk, and we can and should try to carve out a bigger chunk.
For me the most productive way has been to come up with crisp toy problems and try to solve them. (Like ASP, or my tiling agents formulation.) Your post makes many interesting points; I’d love to see crisp toy problems for each of them!
For the glider vs honeycomb maximizer, I think the problem is agreeing on what division of the universe counts as (C,C).
How about sequential vs random-access?
Or linear vs open-world, as in video games.
Well, he was talking about marketing vs choice of market, and my comment was riffing on that :-) The book uses the quote to make a point about individual credit, but I’m not sure it fits—even if success depends only on choice of market, individuals can still deserve credit for choosing a great market.
One of the top executives in Weft Corporation echoes this sentiment: I always say that there is no such thing as a marketing genius; there are only great markets.
Some markets are mainly propped up by marketing though, like diamonds. But I agree that it’s more virtuous to fulfill needs that already exist.
Are you sure the difference you’ve noticed actually exists? The financial system crashed and hurt a lot of people, but rewarded a few people greatly. The same thing can happen in companies or communities—they can fail overall, but reward a few people greatly.