Thanks for the link (and the excellent write-up of the problem)!
Regarding the setting, how would the agent gain the ability to create a sub-agent, roll a rock, or limit it’s own abilities initially? Throughout AUP, you normally start with a high penalty for acquiring power, and then you scale it down to reach reasonable, non-catastrophic plans, but your post begins with having higher power.
I don’t think AUP prevents abuse of power you have currently have (?), but prevents gaining that power in the first place.
I expect AUP to fail in embedded agency problems (which I interpret the subagent problem to be included). Do you expect it to fail in other areas?
I realized afterwards that only “not sharing others secrets” is an example of “it’s ethical to lie if someone asks a direct question”. The other two were more “don’t go out of your way to tell the whole truth in this situation (but wait for a better situation)”
I do believe my ethics is composed of wanting what’s “best” for others and truthful communication is just an instrumental goal.
If I had to blatantly lie every day, so that all my loved ones could be perfectly healthy and feel great, I would lie every day.
I don’t think anyone would terminally value honesty (in any of it’s forms).
Thanks for the clarification.
For me the answer is no, I don’t believe it’s ethically mandatory to share all information I know to everyone if they happen to ask the right question. I can’t give a complete formalization of why, but three specific situations are 1) keeping someone else’s information secret & 2) when I predict the other person will assume harmful implications that aren’t true &3) when the other person isn’t in the right mind to hear the true information.
Ex for #3: you would like your husband to change more diapers and help clean up a little more before they leave work every day, but you just thought of it right when he came home from a long work day. It would be better to wait to give a criticism when you’re sure they’re in a good mood.
An example for #2: I had a friend have positive thoughts towards a girl that wasn’t his girlfriend. He was confused about this and TOLD HIS GIRLFRIEND WHEN THEY WERE DATING LONG DISTANCE. The two girls have had an estranged relationship for years since.
If I was my friend, I would understand that positive thoughts towards a pretty girl my age doesn’t imply that I am required to romantically engage them. Telling my girlfriend about these thoughts might be truthful and honest, but it would likely cause her to feel insecure and jealous, even though she has nothing to worry about.
Ethical is undefined here, but if it was a defined standard, you’d just pick the available action that scores well on that standard, even if it doesn’t satisfy the constraint “behave as if you know all information you in fact know” (which I think the hiding Jews from a Nazi is the classic example)
If the point of solving the puzzle is to better understand the concept “ethics in relation to truth-acting” then I don’t think I’ve added much by the Nazi example or the games & performances ones.
What do you believe the point of the puzzle is? What would a good solution entail or imply?
If I understand your puzzle right, then poker, surprise parties/engagements, and those lying games you play with your friends where some people are “murderers” but are trying to hide the fact.
Is your puzzle different than that?
Thanks, and curious questions are welcomed.
I don’t think it’s affected it, though I don’t have an easy way to compare. I lost most of that vision last August, have been meditating for a year, and have learned to see these perceptions in the past week. The vision in my left eye is definitely much, much noisier!
You can sort of recreate it by covering one eye and checking, though the difference is my left eye has no lens, no iris, and some retinal detachment.
Thanks, I’ve honestly learned so much throughout our comment thread.
One thing I’m confused about it why/how local contexts recognized by neurotypicals.
Maybe “mimic high-status members of in-group” explains most of it(?), or “what’s other people doing?” or “what would someone else in my current role do?”
I think that’s confused because if I know what “role” I’m in, then I already have a context in mind, and I’m trying to figure out how that context is derived in the first place!
Maybe contexts feel more solid/real to neurotypicals. “School” feels like a real/solid thing (even though it’s just a building where kids …). “Money” feels like it’s real/solid (even though it’s just paper or a number in a database with a socially agreed upon value attached). Being a “Good Student” feels real/tangible (even though it’s just writing notes directly from the board and …)
Those 3 examples are definitely things I felt were real/solid/tangible and I didn’t connect the “even though it’s …” definitions until highschool/ undergrad.
Thanks for the info!
I also especially liked the saccadic masking, specifically
This can easily be duplicated by looking into a mirror, and looking from one eye to another. The eyes can never be observed in motion, yet an external observer clearly sees the motion of the eyes.
Which I remember trying and failing to do a few years ago. I recently lost my vision in one of my eyes, so it seems impossible to try the mirror test now (Although I still don’t notice movement in my peripheral switching from my good eye to my nose, so maybe?).
Could you give examples of s1 “knowing” things until s2 inquires? I can understand how it “knows” visual snow, and by doing these tests we are “inquiring” about it. But I’m sure there are other contexts (other than visual information) where this concept is true.
At one extreme all data could be sent all the time to all functionalities but each functionality only really digests a small portion of it.
Is this the context-blind extreme? and
Or in reverse a brain that gets easily confused by garbage data might limit by only transitting information really required for the operations
is the other extreme?
Rephrasing: All people need to filter data, but from which data? Context-blind filters global variables while context-sensitive filters from local variables.
Also, what about games/activities with explicit rules such as chess or programming languages? Wouldn’t everyone be able to identify those contexts and apply the right rules? (Assume they know the rules)
I agree. These all feel like very real sensory information. This is in contrast to being in sleep paralysis and creating extra sensory information or in very vivid dreams, since in both of these cases I realize afterwards “Oh, those weren’t real” as in, I didn’t actually receive that sensory information.
Also, I made a mistake in my initial post, my correction is separating different things that might be confused with “visual snow” such as:
1. Visual Snow—Like a million very tiny dots. Very much like static/white noise in the wiki. More visible in low light conditions or when you’re tired. I saw it for the first time this (8/12) morning in low-light conditions.
2. Patterned lines (?) - Like the geometric/kaleidoscopic shape in this picture. Doesn’t have to be that consistent or patterned but is better described by “lines” than either of the other two. This is what I meant by “jumpy spiderwebs made out of light” and what I thought visual snow was.
3. Blue-sky Sprites—The picture is a nice animation (can be seen without looking at the blue sky but apparently it’s more prominent in that case). Dots and wisps the size of a mm or a little bigger. Maybe 5-100 at a time vs the million in “visual snow”. Resembles afterimages and the “black stars” when feeling faint.
4. (Also very possible there’s more that I’ve missed)
Did you see visual snow as in #1? And the others?
Would you be willing to comment on the role of neurodivergence, meditation, psychedelic experiences, or a 4th alternative, that may explain why you can already see all of them?
Honestly I mixed up different phenomena for “visual snow” in my description:
1. Visual Snow—Like a million very tiny dots. Very much like static/white noise
2. Patterned lines (?) - Like the geometric shape in this picture. Doesn’t have to be that consistent or patterned but is better described by “lines” than either of the other two.
3. Blue-sky Sprites—The picture is a nice animation. This can be seen without looking at the blue sky but apparently it’s more prominent in that case.
Did you mean #1 for the “visual snow”?
That’s a really good animation for the blue-sky sprites. When teaching a friend to see visual snow, they could only see these.
Do you see the kaleidoscopic, patterned lines like the picture from slate star codex’s article? It’s not always regular or geometric, but it’s separate from visual snow and blue-sky sprites. Actually, I had never seen visual snow until this morning in low light conditions. I thought the patterned lines were visual snow the whole time!
Is it similar to when colors are more vibrant on a cloudy day? (When the blue glare of the sky is gone)
No wait, this doesn’t make sense framed this way. I think everyone isn’t context-blind when the rules are explicit. If we’re playing tag, or chess, or programming in Python, (I think) most people know which rules apply in this context because those rules are more explicit.
If so, maybe it’s contexts with implicit rules? And implicit rules are learned by mimicking other’s reactions?
One of the theories for the type of divergence I have is context-blindness. That would explain that if a more typical brain has very strong magisteria for each kind of context they can’t cross-pollute as easily. Thus low-level pattern matching would be encapsulated to be invisible to the rest of the brain.
Thanks for pointing out “context-blindness”. Let me see if I’ve got this straight.
A neurotypical has these different contexts/magisteria where different rules and interpretations apply. Someone who is context-blind has trouble identifying different contexts and so applies a global set of rules and interpretations in all situation.(?)
And this relates to low-level patterns because these different contexts are actually just sort of arbitrary, or just social constructs, so they’re impossible to see when you’re only paying attention to low-level details (?)
I think I understand your first point connecting “not seeing rawer data” and a synesthetic person having a mismatched letter/color. I think your main point is: You do/don’t see rawer data depending on the context. (Also, can you choose to see the rawer data, or choose to only the abstract deduction?)
I guess with meditation black boxes become more white. The effect would depend a lot how how boxed things were to begin with. And it probably isn’t activity that is generated but just acknowledged. Thus it is not really hallucinations
What is “not really hallucinations” here? The 3 tests above? Also, what do you mean by hallucinations in this context?