Normalized for length the number of triads is high but not absurd, which would be consistent with human-back-leakage. I would expect it to creep much higher if these were raw LLM-isms. It’s not even the highest ranking for (A + B + C) by length, this would be consistent with “at the high end for encyclicals, and the main place it varies is that the author has been accustomed to explicit instead of implicit triads”.
But this is relatively minor; if the humans have been using Claude enough to get into em dashes, towards the upper end of triad use for encyclicals, and an outlier level of explicit as opposed to implicit triads, this is not materially different from if Claude actually drafted a few of the paragraphs.
I do note that the length means that it is much more rhetoric-heavy than shorter encyclicals though. That is, much more of it is doing pure persuasion, which is where it’s natural to use this construction. At least one of these is probably restating the trinity, for example, which would be bizarre in a to-the-point message. So I am not sure it should be expected that its length-normalized count should be the same as shorter encyclicals
This isn’t true, but publishing a detailed breakdown of why it isn’t true makes the FBI jumpy. Men with guns, skillfully deployed are a pretty successful countermeasure.
This assumes that AI accelerates bio research but not any of the machinery for managing bio research.
On some level all xrisk arguments have this form:
The advancement rate of bad_thing must be faster than the rate of progress in good_thing.
Therefore, bad_thing will kill us all unless we globally prohibit every _thing.
This is an extraordinary claim and we should require evidence for it.
Let’s take cybersecurity as an example. Mythos is, by good attestation from many parties, a world-changing cyberweapon capable of either exploiting or fixing many latent security problems. However, with even a small lead time you can simply patch every security problem that Mythos can find. Provided we continue to see a responsibly phased rollout, good_thing has, in fact, happened sooner than bad_thing. Wonderful success.
So to carry this case you have to argue that this can’t be true of unknown future events, which seems essentially impossible. Among other things: Everyone involved in model release processes assesses for these sorts of risks before release, by agreements that have been in place for years now. What makes you think these processes must break down and this goes completely wrong?