Interested in math, Game Theory, etc.
 I looked up a commentary on Cardano’s probability research to see if it’s actually plausible that he thought that calculating probabilities in games of dice was intractable. Apparently he drew a distinction between “chance” and “luck,” claimed they were both at play in dice games, and suggested that one cannot have “rational knowledge” of luck. This seems like a really interesting mistake, which might be intertwined his supernatural/non-mechanistic view of the world.
It’s not clear that he’s wrong, or what he’s wrong about. What did he call “luck”, and what did he call “chance”?
To be charitable to Cardano:
1. If you buy a lottery ticket you probably won’t win.
2. But someone will win.
3. In other words, chance are your odds before. If “Lucky” is being the unlikely case, then to say ‘one cannot have rational knowledge of luck’ is to say ‘you can’t (rationally) know you’re going to win the lottery, the odds are against you.’ It is precisely that understanding which conveys why buying the lottery ticket is a fool’s errand: because you don’t know you will be lucky. You don’t know you ‘have a chance’.
I also think that examining past beliefs about progress can help to inform present-day debates. If historical people have tended to severely underestimate opportunities for future progress, then we should be wary of making the same mistake. We should, for example, feel some reflexive skepticism toward the predictions of growth pessimists like Robert Gordon, who worry that most really important inventions have already been developed. Like Cardano reacting to the inventions of the 1400s, they look out at electricity and plumbing and the internet and ask: “What lack we yet unless it be the taking of Heaven by storm?”
You have outlined that in context that phrase was pessimistic. But, today it sounds very different. It sounds like someone saying a) “We have everything we need to start colonizing the stars.” b) that’s our next goal.
You have reinvented Google Docs.
A similar effect could be achieved by having a sequence which...all appears on one page. (With the comments.)
There isn’t a way to search for posts with “Predictions” in the title?
Alike minds think they think great.
Alike minds think alike minds think great.
(Systematically) Overestimating the effectiveness of similarity*
*This one points towards possibilities like
1. people aren’t evaluating ‘how good/effective is (someone else)’ but ‘how well would I work with them’, or 2. something about the way ‘the value of similar contributions’ is valued.
These seem testable.
2 is an exception to 5.
6. To capture en passant you must attempt the capture simultaneously.
i.e., you must predict that the other player will move their pawn forward, and simultaneously eliminate that pawn via en passant.
because pawns [are] very powerful.
The kicker here is that we’ll be just as able to derive meaning from owning the “original”; it’ll be satisfying in the same way that hanging the Mona Lisa in your living room would.
Unless you value having the original. Imagine a private collector and the head of an art gallery, both happy they have the Mona Lisa. And only the thief who promised the private collector they’d switch it out for a forgery knows which is the forgery, and which, is the original.
Let’s say scientists devised a way to create a perfect copy of a painting. They manufactured a machine that can read the exact configuration of atoms in DaVinci’s Mona Lisa, and create a perfect “clone” with the exact same type of atoms arranged in the exact same order. Would those clones be just as valuable as the Mona Lisa that hangs in the Louvre?
This thought experiment is probably right, although it hasn’t been performed.
If the value of the original is derived from it being the original—that knowledge—then if a forgery was switched out for the original successfully, it would obtain that value (or price).
Suggested title: If it’s not obvious, then how do we know it’s true?
Where does this Breaking News section appear? Is this a horror inflicted only on those poor souls that log in?
The footnotes aren’t numbered at the bottom of the post.
Much mas made of this in Eliezer’s Sequences.
“was” or “more”. (I know the red underlining in the editor won’t show up in the final version, so it’s “mas” that is a typo (in English).
If one said ‘hello’, so would the other. Having a conversation would be impossible, since both would say the same things at the exact same time.
This helps explain why determinism is weird.
Charity (see B.)
I didn’t generalize that much.
Confidence (distinct from probability)*
Decision making heuristic (also distinct from probability)**
I’ve read stuff that you’ve written that didn’t seem bad the same way.
Reading Where to Draw the Boundaries?***
It’s long, hard to read/understand, and seem kind of wrong. Sometimes this is because the author is bouncing between (two) things that conflict, like: ‘I think I’m right about this interpretation’ and ‘multiple interpretations are possible’. (This confusion that might be fixable by breaking things up more.)
Given that the post is about a specific thing, maybe it’s written in a way that is really hard to read because references to thing have been moved/altered. (I could make some of the same points just using numbers and functions. An infinite number of series**** begin with 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, then don’t follow up with 36, 49, etc. And yet, upon seeing those numbers you may see a pattern, and expect the 36, and the 49. And if “our brains know what they’re doing” there’s a reason for that. (But beware the Law of Small Numbers.))
It’s also like a dialgoue, but without the two sides delineated, or the reader doesn’t get to read half the conversation and it’s really confusing because the rebuttals are confusing on their own.
The issue with removed references/abstracting politics has been mentioned before. On it’s own it’s slightly convincing. Looking these specific examples, it seems like it’s horribly accurate.
*Like probability, but with wide error bars.
**Do more general hypotheses ‘need’ more evidence, or less?
***The word “the” might be out of place in that title. (And borders are drawn on maps. And they’re messy around the edges.)
****Similarly, an infinite number of functions have the properties that f(1) = 1, and f(2) = 4, and...
Your equations didn’t render.
All I Want Are Christmas
All I Want For Christmas
Success in existing systems tends to give you a big salary, which can be cut off if you step out of line, making you dependent.
Sometimes there’s a preference, or outright requirement, for candidates to be in a lot of debt, sometimes combined with the high salary. (Or the company is somewhere with a very high cost of living, which gwern dubbed “golden handcuffs”.*)
These existing systems will tend to have norms (implicit and explicit) which maintain the status quo. Putting up an extraordinary effort will tend to disrupt these norms. Furthermore, it won’t usually be rewarded proportionately to the risks; you basically get your salary one way or the other. (This is of course not 100% true, but you get the point.)
Lazy workers don’t like hard workers, because they make them have to work harder.
*After checking the source, I found he also highlighted the cost of healthcare, and student debt. This seems far more pervasive.
I appreciate this set of links grouped together being made because, given the similarity between them, having them grouped together seems useful.
I also think that every one of those posts is probably too long. Specifically, longer than they need to be. I consider this evidence in favor of ‘keeping politics out of lesswrong does help with ’rationality″.
This comment/post is the 3rd of 3 duplicates. (Link to main here.)
This comment/post is the 2nd of 3 duplicates. (Link to main here.)
A lot of explainability research has focused on instilling more trust in AI systems without asking how much trust would be appropriate, even though there is research showing that hiding model bias instead of truthfully revealing it can increase trust in an AI system.
So it might be better to ask “Does hiding model bias lead to better team performance?” (In what environments/over what time horizon/with what kind of players?)
I am more sceptical that the differences between inductive and deductive explanations will be the same in different contexts.
I wonder how people do without an explanation.