With tacit knowledge there are arising new forms of text that can make them a lot more transferrable. A good video game will have player participation designed in the process and is designed to work with widish amount of player types. They are currently mainly shooting for fun rather than knowledge transfer but they circumvent the “purely teorethical” barrier which would mean that a frozen game code can preserve the “guiding structure” of an expert long after the expert is dead.
I got a strong associative bond with “authenticity” to contrast with “integrity”. If you are under strong expectations you might just follow the incentives without really formulating your own stance in the matter. As discussed in the post integrity seems to focus on either words or actions changing but with autheticity it’s about (duty to) discover who you are and communicating it to others. If unintegrity is a form of falsehood of dissonance between action and talk unauthenticity is a form of lieing by omission by not discovering facts, sharing irrelevant information or taking on the vaguest available role.
This is very close to on how on magic color philosophy white sees red as dangerous, that order is required to keep chaos at bay. And lot of the of the standard counterarguments apply, red can argue that compromise stiffles freedom and having a to find a single solution that works for everyone takes forever compared to making quick local solutions to the persons that are affected by them.
For example it’s probably not a error state that the globe has multiple states in it instead of a single super country. Instead of intolerable chaos it’s more like diversity to be celebrated.
There is the argument that if you are a pack hunter then you need to be compromising enough to be able to form the hunt group instead of everyone hunting for themselfs. But then again people form villages and instead of doing a single super village around 150 they split of into multiple independent groups (this hints at hidden costs of unity).
Unity is not an unconditional requirement. Some things need / benefit from unity but the need is often finite or only in regards to some aspect. And it might be possible to solve the same need with some other method rather than unity.
There is the concept of a “freudian slip” which refers to things that are explained by motivations that are not super socially acceptable. However the attitude towards them seems to be that such slips should not be held against the person and the fact that they try to minimise the impact of the tendency works for their favour. And an extreme case would be tourettes where a person constantly spats explatives where it’s important to not take the insults at face value.
Might be too politcal, but it’s not super controversial when wondering why America wars so much to refer to “military-industrial complex” which seems to refer to an incentive-structure or actor strategy. If you “bolt” too much on that people will file you in the same folder with conspiracists with or without cause. The whole concept of “political correctness” can be thought of as a critique of a positon held becuase of social approval rather than cognitive work done.
There are also such idioms such as “money talks” and “You sing the songs of the of the ones whose bread you eat”.
The effects are pretty well known and the issue is not that the phenomenon can’t be singled out but what kinds of valuations are attributed to it.
Usually if someone is doing motivated cognition they are doing cognition which can usually be turned to be beneficial. It’s far too common for things to fail becuase nobody was thinking. And bad arguments once aired can be corrected. Courts have devils advocates and they are not seen to malfunction for having those.
post: a judge is expected to be impartial and undoing the negation part of that word the concept you are looking for is “being partial” or “partiality”. Attorneys are expected to be “zealous advocates” it’s okay for them to take sides. A judge being partial might get called a “corrupted” judge which has a pretty heavy connotation. Having a conversational move of “Alice is corrupted in thinking X!” would have the rhetorical weight but it seems to me hard to folow up in a constrcutive way from that and it would seem to imply a position of power that is probably missing in a peer-to-peer conversation.
I know of a set of norms where if you want to decline an invitation you can make up an excuse and if it is discovered that the excuse doesn’t hold water it’s no big deal. Additionally I have seen norms where just saying a flat unexplained “no” is seen as more erroneous than obviously false excuse. I am of personally the inclination that if I don’t have conflicting plans I won’t fabricate them and it making the “unwillingness” more bare seems to get under some peoples nerves. This might be that some people value “keeping face” more than honesty. But there is a funny effect in that if somebody has just announced that they have an excuse not to go at some specific time and you make a suggestion for another actvity for exact same time they might declare to be free to do that. If everybody is “in on the game” that it’s all “face” this doesn’t seem to cause problems.
I do have a problem where if somebody makes what seems like english level claim of fact I tend to favour it being a claim of fact and having trouble when it’s infact something else like invitation rejection. I also have bad understanding why people value “face-culture” and have trouble imagining what kinds of things would go wrong in a “faceless” dystopia.
I had a very approximate reading and understanding how the concept of “bad faith” enters into the mix. In my mind I was thinking of a situation that if what I say mainly implies whether I get hit in the face in the next second what I let out of my mouth can’t be said to attest to the truth of any matter. Consent under duress is no consent and in a similar way testimony under duress would spoil it from being any claim of fact making it incapable of being a lie (yet I used term “lie” to refer to a statement that would on literal english level be a claim of fact which in a speech act sense it would not be). In a way when you give into a “appeal to stick” you are yielding, not affirming anything.
> It’s clear why tone arguments are epistemically invalid. If someone says X, then X’s truth value is independent of their tone, so talking about their tone is changing the subject.
If tone is independent of truth then it should be possible to make a truth-compliant and tone-compliant comment. That is the thing should be bad even if you sugarcoat it. you don’t need ot be anti-tone to be pro-truth althought it is harder to be compliant on both and people typically need to spread their skills over those goods. There is the kind of problematic thing where any negative implication is forbidden. But then tone and truth are mingled.
Sometimes I value safety a lot and I have pretty general principle that discussions should be safe. I would totally lie to prevent my face from being punched. But even if I did that I don’t think I would be acting in bad faith. If I am going to be talking about a touchy subject I need to be certain that I won’t be touched in anger even if the other participant becomes furious. Bad faith can come to play if I exploit the safety boundaries to “be winning”. But I don’t need to be able to withstand all truths to be able to have a conversation. Some truths might be devastating and you as the messenger might not be committed to build me back up to working condition (ie building myself back to psychological working condition is my personal problem). So in a touchy subject conversation I might have a edge condition that I not be devastated and need at each step be sure that I am not left devastated. Sure it’s tricky if I can’t communicate that my participating is limited because of psychological self-preservance and I might not be always be aware that this is going on.
If someone doesn’t share the commitment that everything that could be destoyred by the truth should it doesn’t mean they are the champion of falsehood. That you trip over comfort safe guards in the name of truth doesn’t mean you want to optimise for most tortorous discussion. If one person is truth ambivalent and the other person is comfort ambivalent it means a comfort-truth solution might exist and trying to enforce comfort-ambivalence over comfort-seekment is likely to be ineffective. If one ends up playing prisoners dilemma between a truth seeker and a comfort seeker then the quadrant to shoot for might not be the highest in truth value.
Writing posts a certain way to get more karma on lesswrong is an area of application for this stance.
In the time travel game Achron my sense of what determinism is was really put into a stress test and I think it teased out distinctions that are not relevant in more casual settings.
The game has a world where time travel is not involved things appear very reliable and deteministic. When time travel influences things there are previously unfamiliar concepts to take into account. There are mechanics about that and it forms a system. The overall rules end up being deterministic in that the enlargened ontology works like a clockwork. However from the perspective of a entity that is not privy to the more esoteric parts fo the ontology things are not pure chaos but their sense of determinism will be of a different kind than what ontologically holds.
In the system you can have a system in grandfather paradox which approximately means that in half the timelines the system will be in one state and in half the timelines the system will be in another state. It’s not obvious to non-time-travellers how paradoxes work (but there actually are rules about it). In all the timelines they can be in exact same epistemological state before they come in contact with such paradoxed systems. After they interact they are aware what the systems state is in this timeline. Ofcourse they do not think in terms of multiple timelines but it happens to be that in different timelines they are now in different epistemological states (ie the paradox has “spread” to them). It pretty much must appear to them that what the state of the system is is stochastic before they have done such interaction.
A being in such position might be well served to take note of when “weird” things happen and they might be able to narrow down what the relevant choice outcomes might be. For example if it is now T and someone is ordered to enter a chronoporter at T+20 to go back 10 seconds to shoot themselfs at T+10 you know that at T+15 the ordered person will either be alive or dead ie you know that those are the relevant alternatives. however becuase you don’t know the esoterics you don’t have the capability to determine which one of those it will be. The situation has strong paralells to schrödingers cat. However in this game we know that god does not indeed throw dice althought we might make use of two kinds of time to specify the esoterics. But even if we know that on game mechanics level no dice is thrown it would seem useful to refer to the fact that a person not having good access to the second kind of time really has a super hard time / impossible for them to figure things out. It’s not because they observe the system sloppily or are undiligent. So in a sense it’s not illusory that it’s stochastic for them but really is effectively stochastic for them.
So it becomes meanigful and useful to say something to the effect of “The best linear time understanding of the game verse will neccesarily be stochastic”.
I think you are still treating infinite desimals with some approximation when the question you are pursuing relies on the more finer details.
**Appeal to graphical asymptotes**
Make a plot of the value of the series after x terms so that one plot F is 0.9, 0.99,0.999,… and another G is 0.A, 0.AA, 0.AAA,.… Now it is true that all of Gs have a F below them and that F never crosses “over” above G. Now consider the asymptotes of F and G (ie draw the line that F and G approach to). Now my claim is that the asymptotes of F and G are the same line. It is not the case that G has a line higher than F. They are of exactly the same height which happens to be 1. The meaning of infinite decimals is more closely connected to the asymptote rather than what happens “to the right” in the graph. There is a possibly surprising “taking of limit” which might not be totally natural.
**constustruction of wedges that don’t break limit**
It might be illuminateing to take the reverse approach. Have an asymptote of 1 and ask what all series have it as it’s asymtote. Note that among the candidates some might be strictly greater than others. If per term value domination forced a different limit that would push such “wedgings” to have a different limit. But given some series that has 1 as limit it’s always possible to have another series that fits between 1 and the original series and the new series limit will be 1. Thus there should be series whose are per item-dominating but end up summing to the same thing.
**Rate mismatch between accuracy and digits**
If you have 0.9 and 0.99 the latter is more precise. This is also true with 0.A and 0.AA. However between 0.9 and 0.A, 0.A is a bit more precise. In general if the bases are not nice multiples of each other the level of accuracy won’t be the same. However there are critical number of digits where the accuracy ends up being exactly the same. If you write out the sums as fractions and want to have a common denominator one lazy way to guarantee a common demoninator is to multiply all different demoniators together. This means that a fraction in a decimal number multiplied by 11 and a fraction in undecimal multiplied by 10 will have the same denominators. This means that 0.99999999999 and 0.AAAAAAAAAA are of same precision and have the same value but one has 11 digits and the other has 10. If we go by pure digits to digits comparison we end up comparing two 11 digit numbers when the equal value is expressed by a 10 and 11 digit numbers. At this level of accuracy it’s fair to give decimals 11 digits and undecimals 10 digits. If we go blindly by digit numbers we are unfair to the amount of digits available for the level of accuracy demanded. Sure for most level of accuracy there is no nice natural number of digits that would be fair to both at the same time.
**Graphical rate mismatch**
One can highlight the rate mismatch in graphical terms too. Have a nice x=y graph and then have a decimal scale and undecimal salce on the x axis. Mark every point of the x=y that corresponds to a scale mark on both scales. Comparing digit to digit corresponds to firt going to 9/10th marker on decimal scale and 10/11th mark on the undecimal scale and then going 9th subdivison on the decimal scale and 10th subdivision on the undecimal scale. If we step so it’s true that on each step the undecimal “resting place” is to the right and up to the decimal resting place. But it should also be clear that each time we take a step we keep within the original compartment and we end up in the high part of the orginal department and that right side of the comparment will always be limited by (x=1,y=1). By every 11 decimal steps we land in a location that was landed in by the undecimal series and by every 10 undecimal steps we land in a location that will be visited by the decimal steps. This gives a nice interpretation for having a finite number of digits. What you do when you want to take infinite steps? One way is to say you can’t take infinite steps but you can talk about the limit of the finite steps. For every real number less than 1 both steppings will at some finite step cross over that number. 1 is the first real number for which this doesn’t happen. Thus 1 is the “destination of infinite steps”.
Sure you can carry on trying but you are not guaranteed to succeed. You could go increasingly meta without finding a loop.
If meta-justifications are just not adhoc you could employ them against loops. If I was unsatisafied with a level of justification being circular I could insist that there must be a further level of intuitions that warrant the situation which themselfs don’t have the loopy nature.
I don’t really think that infinite chains are a good approach but I am not convinced that the investigation is cast in solid enough of logic that it makes explicit the reasons to take its finding seriously. A method of exhaustion with open vents is comparatively weak.
It would be really helpful to list the things that seem to be pointing to logic existing. One of the answers would be that establishing that there is reason to think that logic exists will fail thus there is no need to think of the mode of something that is not.
A lot of language that at one level seems to be about existence can be turned into forms where it’s not neccesarily so. “There exists a” means a value can be picked to satisfy a condition. For example unicorn satisfies “being horned” but that doesn’t make unicorns exist (ie it’s perfectly resonable to assert both that unicorns are horned and that there are no unicorns).
There is also the interesting question whether logic could be any different. Could 2+2 equal 5? (note the danger how 5 would be just 4 by another name.) Could logic turn out to be different or be created differently? One issue for example that if you imagine that number times number could be −1 that just points to another entity (imaginary number) rather than change in existing entities. One pecular possible property of their mode of existence pointed by this would be that there is no state to point in their existence. You can look at a ball and there claims about it’s position etc but when you “look” at numbers what you say can’t be evidence in the same way that ball reports would be correspondences to world state. There is no ambiguity on the state of logic and it’s questionable whether a “different state of logic” could even make sense. (All this kind of wackiness can be implied as perfectly expected and reasonable in such concepts such as “aprior”)
There are lot of interferences used where its unclear whether one can use old defintions for them. For example in paraconsistent logics some sorts of negation propagations are not always available (ie you might not have ~(P^Q)=>~P^~Q or ~~P=>P). It raises a suspicion where the interferences presented are a pre-formal mess. Thus I have a feeling that I am constantly “repairing” the message of the post to get it be relevant to me while it does seem there is substance to be salvaged.
If Gary says “this statement’s metalanguage is false” and Alice says “Vad Gary säger är falsk” and David says “Was Gary sagen ist falsch” does Gary refer to Swedish or German? I think it’s plausible that Gary’s statement does not by itself succesfully refer to Swedish or German and it remains plausible for me that there is really no good way from the object language to get a refererence to the metalanguage.
I am unsure whether I get the starting assumtions right but taking them to the extreme it seems contradictory enough that it should give pause for thought.
There are 1,000,000,000,000,000 people. Stick all of the people with needles or give all the people a candy. It would seem the negative gets multiplied by the subject amount but the positive doesn’t. Adding another person that receives candy makes you stay at +1 candy but adding another person to be needled would seem to increase suffering.
I can understand if you care about the impact to the world instead of your subjective qualia (ie refuse pill that makes you artificially happy but doesn’t improve the world) and I can understand a viewpoint where its all about your subjective wellbeing. But I would think you should use the same model for positive and negative things or that you are not taking into account subjective positivity and objective negativity.
I don’t understand how the heard world is less real than the seen world.
I had a misunderstanding regarding a very similar topic. I was thinking of arithmetic being very core to mathematics when other people included all of formal deductive reasoning (ie stuff other than that has to do with numbers). Humans do have subconcious thoughts which are not well captured by mathematics.
The case for math being beyond human extends far bigger than cosmic. If you had a fictional story that fullfilled some axioms then math based on those axioms would be in full effect.
There are some activities that rely heavily on math yes, but I think we do have observations we don’t arrange into neat systems. For example we can’t do 3-body problems but we have general gravity kind of locked down (a bit math adjaccent but still an example how we can do without a mathematical theory despite knowing we would like one).
The concept of “one” can be made problematic. And there are systems were the concept is not an elementary one but emerges from deeper principles. For example one has to somehow argue why sexual reproduction doesn’t make an example of “1+1=3″. In some systems it could be argued that 0 is actually the first digit and more fundamental.
The concept of a core game loop seems to point to similar phenomenon when explictly setting up games.
You need background education in general to understand a language. No statement is really free of auxillary hypotheses.
In the limit you don’t need any external prompt to start activating concepts you have gathered or booting up your imagination. But for some psychologies they don’t automatically try to match every theory they know against every percept they have but only apply concepts very selectively. Sometime you proposefully make that selectivity wider but it’s hard to say which level of selectivity is appropriate. On the other end there is akrasia where you don’t answer direct questions but only activate your brain when somebody punches you in the face. And in the other extreme being constantly paranoid about everything can burn a lot of energy and thinktime for little improvement.
A guess would be equally good without dice throwing. Indeed if you have access to the dice that generated the result we want to know about you can infer distribution information. But if you have a different die and determine that it’s weighted it doesn’t tell whether the orignal die is weighted. If you knew the dice came from the same factory you could infer something. But you manufacturing a fresh dice is justified to assume to not be distributionally connected. If you have information that you know to correlate your manunfacturing process to be similar then that contains your information and the actual rolling of the die doesn’t tell you anything.
You can’t. But for example if they say what they rolled and you assume there is a correlation what they actually get and what they would say then you have a chance to narrow it down. If you know it’s not corrrelated to anything (ie is pure dice) you know it can’ t be evidence.