In abuse it is very important to be aware which qualifications are in fact used and they in fact differ and their differences are important. However declaring one set of qualifications as “correct” goes into actual opinion rather than just clearing definitions.
I most disagree with 4) instead fo assuming that a mischaracterization is taking place it would be more apporiate to think the person actually cares about threats. In a real life example when I am playing overwatch and somebody says “pick reinhart or I throw” I might pick reinhart but I will file a report for “inactivity”. The threat of throwing not carried out is on the same severity level as actually throwing. I get there might be genuine difference in opinion whether it is as bad but to me it is.
Heinouness of benefitting from violence without comitting it. Consider workplace sexual harassment. If you in a position to fire a person and ask for a sexual favour you don’t need to make an explicit ultimatum for a person to be genuinely concerned that they will be fired if they refuse. “It was just talk” isn’t going to fly. Further more illegal threats. If you credibly say you are going to beat somebody that is an offence even if you do not lay a finger on them. It has to be credible thought. If it is absurd then it can be counted as just talk. In the same way if a polician starts to talk about how somebody should be hurt that can credibly be construed to be a suggestion/order to commit violence. Hence “incitement against a group of people” being something you can be quilty of. And if you call in a bomb threat with no actual bomb there is a chance it will not be written off as a joke.
There is a genuine discussion how to respond to and whether to utilise credible threats. Assuming what the correct stance should be is avoiding that discussion instead of having it.
With fruit salads I don’t know whether I meanigfully disagree. Like if somebody assumes my gender wrong and I don’t correct them have I mislead them? And I think there is room that a opinionated cook could try to sell that cucumber is now a fruit. In fashion if you are low status and don’t do as the fashion says you are violating the norms but if you are high status and do something original you are a trend setter and define what the fashion is. Thus “those shoes do not go with those pants” is a similar kind of claim to “cucumber doesn’t go into fruit salad”. If I stylise someone and their close ones decry them as ugly have I lied that I stylised them? If the restuarant list “champagne” as one of drink options but it is not produced in the correct area, it that misrepresentation or does the saving grace that average customer gets the idea what kind of drink it is effectively save it from being blameworthy?
You usually justify the existence of a concept althought it can often take the form that some particular species appears in the ontology. There are real cases when you want to justify entities for example whether a particular state should exist or not. Then you are not just arguing whether it should be understood in the terms of a state or some other organizational principle but what actually happens in the world.
Well that is a good contrast on what kind of difference is seeked.
I thought not being grounded was about having only theory that has no implications for anything.
If I claim “I am sad” that is not empty just becuase it refers to my mind. I could be wrong about that and sadness is grounded.
In a similar way “that axe is sharp” could be construed to mean about intentions to use the axe. In an extreme interpretation it doesn’t specify any physical properties about the axe because the same axe could appear dull to another person. It could mean something “I am about to use that axe to chop down some wood” which would be solely about psychological stances towards the future. So this would be an argument line to say that “that axe is sharp” is not grounded. While the absurdity is strong with “sharp” consider “hotness” as in sexyness. Trying to ground it out into particular biological or physical features isn’t a trivial thing at all.
If an axe can groundedly be good for cutting then an environment can be suitable for living and saying that the universe is suitable for prospering expresses a similar kind of “fit for use” property.
The difference is not obvious to me. How they are relevantly different? You just seem to favour lore from one magisterium.
How can groundings be correct or incorrect? If it walks like a duck, eats like a duck, swims like a duck and I call it God it’s a duck by different name. It might be that Bobs god is placebo. To the extent opened in the example dialogue it is synonymous. Any additonal facets are assumed and when the point of the exchance was to disambiguate what we mean great weight must be placed on what was actually said. If someone is not believing but only beliefs in belief as an external person it would be an inaccurate belief to think they belief.
It would seem in the text that the given definition of god would lay out enough information that the existence of impact on healing factors could be checked for and the text claims such a check would show no impact. Now if you believe that pacebo is a thing you would probably think that a setup where some patients are visited by their doctors vs one where they ar not visited by their doctor would show impact. If the test for healing was to have the prayer by their medside it would seem mostly analogous to the doctor visit and should have comparable impact. Such a test would show impact. In arguing why the impact result is wrong one needs to argue how the test setup did not test for the correct hypothesis. What bob gave us wasn’t exactly rocket science “I pray—they heal” (I think I assumed that a “pray campaign” would involve visiting but it was not infact mentioned). If the procedure involved artificial hiding or no contact prayer that could be significantly different how it would happen “in the wild”. An a prayer might geniunely be a practise that differ which would perform differently. Depression medication is warranted enough for having impact comparable to placebo, then deploying a prayer campaign to a patient that would not get placebo benefits otherwise would be medically warranted.
I have trouble evaluating what giving such a definition would look like. Most definitions i can find care to get the mathematics represented. And while it doesn’t have an explicit medium reference it’s unclear whether the mathematical device connected with physical theory avoids forming a medium at all. That you avoid physics at the mathematics level is not surprising at all. And just like a duck can’t avoid being a duck for beign called God that the theory doesn’t have an explicit part called “medium” doesn’t mean it doesn’t sport one. I would probably benefit from actually receiving such a definition and going over the question for reals. But in any case it refers back to more entrenched beliefs were things rely on other things and simple point changes to the theories are unlikely.
Stephanie: No, having a higher purpose makes me have more spring in my step in my daily life. Having a higher purpose is not just empty words.
It might not be the most insightful thing but it could be a thing that is associable even if the theory is hazy and might be typical of how such belief systems funciton within a psychology. It would still be very vague and would warrant closer inspection.
I get that you are trying to target folks that are very neglient in their belief details. But I think it risk falsely processing a lot of different kinds of folks as that type. If you start talking to a person and they have some grasp of their concepts or they do have meaning in their words it would be prudent to catch on that even if the beliefs were strange, wrong or vaguely expressed. It might also be that the sanity waterline is geniunely different in different environments. In my experience faith-healers are looked down upon by religious people and they try to mitigate it. That is it’s not the faith that is seen as the problem but that they are unironically trying to use magic.
That discussion strategy for many-worlds would try to dodge having to be specific. The start-up idea did not receive an out for trying to sharply direct the discussion but was counted as being not specific.
The survivors are living in an area that shatters the illusion of classical reality. The survivor probabilities favour classical probabilities so you should be able to expect for things to get classical. In a non-classical universe it might be possible to get a very rapid regeneration that might bounce you far from the torment zone for a long time. Even if you do not get a particuarly stellar regeneration you will constantly be tunneling out of the torment zone too. At some point the tunneling to torment and tunneling to relief should balance out where you have 50% chance of being in a bad scenario and 50% chance of being in a good scenario. That is if you are sustained longer in a scenario that classically would be considered bad the less faith you can have that the mechanics of the scenario continue to work. It will either resolve to a classical situation different from current or it is such a jumbled mess that “being stuck in a bad place” is not representative.
In general the jumbling might also target your personality and then the question of how much of your alteration really counts as you starts to get relevant. If you escape with a cunning deduction you made because you tought you were Sherlock Holmes because cosmic rays fabricated your memories for it does that count as Sherlock Holmes or you waking up or both? One might need classical mechanics to maintain a sense of identity stability (that is the you on the next second has very similar personality) and when that is taken away it is not sure the concept applies with the same strength. Sure somebody concious will get to expererience a bunch of stuff and it will be structurally reminicient of you. But will it really be you?
Asking for exact complete error report might be a bit taunting in challenging error states. I am sure also partial hints would be appriciated.
If you think something is bad you are likely to oppose it or suffer experiencing it.
If you have opposed it for quite a while then there is inductive proof that opposing it is not effective. Those resources are then not producing anything. You are better of moving resources from opposition to other tasks.
If you experience it often without opposition thinking that it should not happen to you might make you suffer more. There you can cut your losses by making the adverse event hurt you as little as possible.
Magic baseball bats are ambigious how easy it would be to oppose them. Smallpox clearly does admit effective opposing.
Well “Proving too much” form: We don’t want to hit all slave owners so it would be more handy if the term “abuser” only referred to a small group of people. A related point of view could be that someone that tortures their slaves is a abuser but someone that beats their slaves to bruises in keeping of discipline is just correct normal everyday housekeeping.
I don’t mean we should start forming defintions with instrumental goals in mind. The term “abuse” is loaded with attitudes and the text was close to reading “abuse would imply I should oppose it and I do not oppose this behaviour therefore it is not abuse”. The default mode of operations comes with a lot of unpercieved instrumentality baked in. If you notice it you can decontruct it and do a more deliberate/explicit decision. It is very different to say “That is not abuse, that is microagression” than “That is not abuse, that is okay”.
Literal meaning is downplayed by the post. Instead of answering “what is a fruit salad?” we just bypass by referring that a expectation would be violated in a certain circumstance. With different definitions one could argue either a)”Just because you have a salad made of fruit doesn’t make it a fruit salad” or b) “Fruit salad is a salad made of fruit”. Some persons might worry that accepting A introduces an inconsistency. For example applying the word “terrorist” to someone that uses threat of violence for poliical ends could definitionally apply to well liked groups. Using the standard “well I would not have expected for terrorist to mean that person” to reject such labelings would radicallly change what retoric like “we oppose terrorists” means (it starts to means something close to “we hate your enemies” instead of a principled stance against spesific tactics).
With the mathmatican example I was more going for the behaviour of “most”. Someone that doesn’t know it it can mean “if I think up a random real numbers very few of them are non-trancendental”. However for a mathematician “most” can have the “almost all” meaning of “all but a set of measure 0” which makes for a claim that can be exactly proven. And the proof is not up to interpretation. For example “most real numbers are not between 5.4 and 5.5″ would be false as read by a mathematician but probably interpreted to be true by a more lay person. A mathematician doesn’t have the problem of making a judgement call what is or is not “most”. The contrasting approach would be to have number grouping A and number grouping B. “A has numbers like 3, 5.46 and 7.222 and B has numbers like pi, e and e^pi. Is the overlap in members of A and B signifcant or insignificant?” This kind of framing doesn’t allow for mathematics to have teeth. “well is 6.13 in A? I would probably expect it to be but it could fail to be in it”. If you have a intension of “A is real numbers” then you can go “6.13 is real so it is in A”. If you have to be suspicious whether the foundation of the word applies to this particular situation it’s more like the grouping approach rather than the set approach.
Sometimes there are genuinely progress otbe made changing those expectations. For example say that the “abuse” angle happened on a slave-owner context. If the situation is standard slave-owning with no neglects would the conclusion to be to not apply “abuse” to slavery? If that context can be wrong about the appropriateness of their norms how can we be sure that our relationship norms are optimal?
I happen to think that “manipulative” is not inherently bad and the girl used the word correctly. In general the perspective that words have literal meanings is really downplayed. At the limit where words are only their expectations “literally” starts to mean “figuratively”. The kind of reasoning that goes “most real numbers are transendental numbers” works because words have intensions and not just a fuzzy cloud of associations.
I could see it very plausible that someone would say “Hey let’s ran for two hours unlike the one hour we ran yesterday” and if he doesn’t want to spesify the amount he might express it with “further” and not mean “farther”. The reply is not an error correction but rather a needed disambiguation.
The viewpoint of connecting words to their qualifications seems powerful. I just think that it should direct the discussion to the qualifications rather than enforce some magically all agreed upon qualication standard.
Placebo effects area a real thing. If one truly takes Bob’s grounding then it is not obvious that it is factually incorrect. If “dark matter” means “whatever causes this expansion” then “whatever causes this healing” probably hits a whole bunch of aspects of reality.
It’s problematic when a person is judged for having illdefined stances when their characterization comes from the interluctor. For example asking about going to church as if it had some relevance to believing in god steps outside of a narrowly tailored question or presupposes that these are connected.
Slider: Do you believe in aether?
Aaron: No, I don’t.
Slider: So you don’t think that light is a wave?
Aaron: No, light is a wave.
Slider: But waves happen in a medium. So by believing that light is a wave you believe in lights medium.
Aaron: No, light is special and can travel without a medium
Slider: Seems contradictory and crazy
If I have a fixed understanding that aether theoyr is better than it’s precedessors and have a very fixed idea what a wave is I am likely to not listen what the stance of the other is. Aaron could be very well versed in relativity and conceptual work on what is a wave and what is simultaneuity might be essential to the discussion.
The Liron-Stephanie could also be read as Liron using vague concepts where Stephanie closely and narrowly desccribes what it means to her. If somebody asks a question like “What is bear divided by nine?” you might be asking “Do you think that bear is some kind of number or that nine is some kind of animal and is this division some sort of arithmetical or agricultural operation?” the discussion might go vague because we don’t know what we are talking about. A question like “Do you believe in God?” is polymorphic in the sense that it has multiple sensible ways it can be posed. For example it could mean “Do you participate in utilising forces you do not understand for personal benefit?”, “Are you an active participant in a congeration?”, “Do you find the universe meaningful and are not in a state of nihilism?”
The patience of discussion-liron runs out pretty fast and is likely because of preconceptions that “higher purpose” is likely to be empty. Wondering if it is not empty what it could look like I was imagining a scenario where a person with “higher purpose” is more likely to forgo the use of lethal force in a struggle for survival or critical resources (giving “benefit of the doubt” that the local situation can be lost but life/existence overall still won). That kind of scenario is really unwiedly to tell as an example and requires connecting many systems to have the cause and effect relationship. It would be way more natural to connect concepts on adjacent abstraction layers. And connecting god with “higher purpose” is one step down on that abstraction ladder. A more healthy discussion would encourage that and recursively step down until requested concreteness level was reached.
Think about the discussion of “what would be different in my daily life if many worlds interpretation was correct over copenhagen interpretation that isn’t just socialising about physics memes”. It would be a really challenging discussion and probably not that enlightening about physics. One could also say that because the quantum physics stays the same regardless of interpretation the distinction is in danger of being empty. But if the “content” is found over which direction is better for physics research then “research direction truths” would be even more indirect. So while I think it is important that the different systems and layers are relevant to each other doing all of them in a single bound is seldomly a good move. And deducing that if you can’t do such connections in a single jump then your concepts must be empty is throwing plenty of baby out with the water.
I have a very different impression how the einstein thought-process worked. There is the issue of how thought experiments can be used to illustrate the findingds and then there is the issue how they were used to generate the findings. To my understanding he thought about all sorts of weird and edge scenarios to explore the rules and then when he found that the theory could not say what happens or that it would say contradictory things that there was reason to suspect it was wrong. He was not suspicous that the theories are wrong and set out to find where but drove them to their limits or even somewhat beyond in order to discover that another theory needs to hold in order to say about the inapplicable territority. And I was of the impression that most of the explorings of the old theory found the old theory to be adequate, although such trips might have served as fuel how to set up a even crazier trip.
For example in the scenario about pulling a rope vs falling I thought that the initial thought process expected that there would be a difference that would point it out. Having diffculty formulating what it would be, would lead to trying to imagine what would be the needed properties. The conceptual analysis leads to suspecting that maybe there is no fact of the matter which situation is which. This all involves a lot of different cognitive processes which is very different from simple “observing” (or is analogous how anything that is analytically provable is “trivial”)
The bit about ridicolousness and thought experiment also has funny connotation to it. Thought experiments are not offensive tools to aim at things you want to destroy. Sure they can wreck theories. But general relativity is a perfectly valid thing to thought experiment with. And in fact because black holes form singularities GR has been “wrecked” by them. GR accepts closed timelike curves examples of which can be thought as thought experiments. And we know that in their current state quantum theories are irreconciable even if they are valid in their own domains. Set up a sitatuation where both have a relevant thing to say and it becomes dicey to say what if anything our current understanding says should happen. Note that shördinger’s cat was supposed to show quantum theory as absurd. Things like aether are not conceptually that inconsistent it’s more that actual experiment speak against them. We knew how to test for the existence of aether pretty staighforwardly and not finding it made us think of crazy alternatives. I t was not the case that aether was found to be conceptually inelegant or silly and I woudl htink it was actually the occam razor favourite. Again demonstarting that a position is faulty is a very different thing from discovering that it is. And the tool is not resricted to tearing down string thoery tries “constructive thought experiment”. If you can tell a story that has basic ontology of strings but which contains the appearance of matter then that could give clues how to setup experiments that would yield otherwise unexpected results.
While it is easier to posit a scenario where the stars align for you, I do not think that the overall diffuculty level is that easy. “Better than available options” means the person can turn to anybody for an alternative meaning you have to be better than everybody else. Being the worlds best at something sure sounds like atleast moderately challenging.
Consider that they make somewhat plausible story where they beat a lot of options. Now if you come up with an already existing option that does the job better that turns it into a failure but that kind of failure would not be so catastrophically bad as not being able to form a coherent position. The height of the bar is warranted, even if you succesfully make the product as claimed the better option would be in a position to market-dominate. However replies that fail in this way do not fail for not being able to be spesific.
It’s probably part of the background paradigm but it seems to me that if you posit a particular way of doing you can argue whether that would be good/desirable or not and if you posit a particular goal to shoot for you can argue whether it’s reachable. Either way there isi significant risk tha the other side of that coin is voefully underspesified. There is also the issue that even if the end user experience is clear the way of having a production chain that can deliver that can be murky. So it isn’t obvious which of these spesificities are especially critical/valuable. It’s one thing to answer too ambigiously to a question but it is another thing to know that a question should be answered or that you are answering that particular question.
The model is very simple and the conclusion pretty far-reaching althought interesting. Rather than assume that the conclusion is true I would hunt for what modelling details were glossed over.
Say both painting and stand-up comedy teach self-expression. If magic utilises that then it doesn’t double benefit from that. That is learning a field lowers how much other fields support learning of new fields.
I could also see how learning a field sements a mindset that makes it harder than completely naive person to learn something. Say a lawer benefits from a a mechanistic blind interpretation of rules and painting supports a impulsive reinterpretion and forfeiting rule use. The two experts teachings would actively resist the other kind of adatation. Now it might be it’s own skill to not make them conflict that much or find the context barriers were one approach is applicable over the other. But this is still work over someone to whom the area is the only truth. That is while there might be “synergistic” pairs the probablility that you have “antisynergistic” pairs increases as you pick up fields.
Even if the simple analysis isn’t ironglad ti is likely that the value of being a polymath is undervalued and the exact circumstances where it makes sense to adopt a polymath strategy rather than an expert strategy is not that widely discussed. Further complication to that is that a group of experts that have different areas of expertise is somewhat comparable to a group of homogenous polymaths. So even if moving to a more polymath strategy would make a single person more competent it’s likely that being more starkly expert would increase the groups effectiveness if others can employ enough trust to get dominated by the opinions of the experts. This might also have it’s own singularity conditions. That is at some point there is enough trust that any area you can train a single person to be a expert on, the group can be made to effectively have by adding a person to it.
I was not familiar with a book by that name but I guess the geist is in similar vein.
I think the issue is more orthagonal. I think there might be a deep and vast difference in opinion what the relevant mechanics are which falls out of the scope fof the post. Even what the hypothetical world were people did not have access to words like “lecture” would be like is pretty ambigious. But I think losing the cover of doing evil in the name of good would be (partially) counterbalanced by evilseekers being forced to pay tribute to an image of goodness which does some amount of actual good.
Making lecture specific seems to dissolve it only because here we are thinking that univertiy is a place were people try to learn. However if we are more specific about where lectures occur it might make more sense to characterise it as indoctrination, shared cultural experience or management of expectations.
If we did employ each individual learned being able to take on material in individualised order and pace then it would be harder to verify who knows what. Part of education is that employers can take on trust that newly arriving employees are work-compatible or atleast work-trainable. That compatibility might include technical capacity or knowledge posession but it might also include things like suggestibility, willigness to endure boredom or willigness and capability to adjust to externally imposed schedules
Any claim with “only because” is very bold and almost certainly wrong. The main thrust here is that it’s not knowledge efficient at all. But another kind of deduction would say that because it is not knowledge efficient it MUST have another reason keeping it alive. Just having the word seems like an incredibly weak reason and it being the only availbe reason doesn’t mean that unavailable reasons are outruled. I think the phenomenon would survive even if the word was not forced. But I do think that dispencing with the word makes it handy to look at the “ugly” reasons that are causing the phenomenon. Saying something abstract like “We are using education as a means to stabilize our society so that young people do not express themselfs in too novel ways” seems ridicolous but the concrete things that take place are less suspectible to being denied.
Well I am more familiar with settings where I have a duty to understand the world rather than the world having the duty to explain itself to me. I also hold that having unfamiliar things hit higher standards creates epistemic xenophobia. I would hold it important that one doesn’t assign falsehood to a claim they don’t understand. Althought it is also true that assigning truth to a claim one doesn’t understand is dangerous to relatively same caliber.
My go-to assumption would be that Steve understands something different with the word and might be running some sort of moon logic in his head. Rather than declare the “moon proof” to be invalid it’s more important that the translation between moon logic and my planet logic interfaces without confusion. Instead of using a word/concept I do know wrong he is using a word or concept I do not know.
“Coherent” usually points to a concept where a sentence is judged on it’s home logics terms. But as used here it’s clearly in the eye of the beholder. So it’s less “makes objective sense” and more a “makes sense to whom?”. The shared reality you create in a discussion or debate would be the arbiter but if the argument realies too much on those mechanics it doesn’t generalise to contextes outside of that.
I feel like the same scrutinity standard is not being applied. Guy with health insurance doesn’t check their health more often catching diseases earlier? Uncertainty doesn’t cause stress and workload on circulatory system? Why are these not holes that prevent it from being coherent? Why can’t Steve claim he has a friend that can be called that can exempilify exploitation?
If the bar is infact low Steve passed it upon positing McDonalds as relevant alternative and the argument went on to actually argue the argument. Or alternatively it requires opinion to have that Robin specification to be coherent and a reasonable arguer could try to hold it to be incoherent.
I feel like this is a case where epistemic status breaks symmetry. A white coat doctor and a witch doctor making the same claims requires the witch doctor to show more evidence to reach the same credibility levels. If argument truly screens off authority the problems needs to be in the argument. Steve is required to have the specification ready on hand during debate.
Relying that your opponent does a mistake is not a super reliable strategy. If someone reads your story and uses it as inspiration to start an argument they might end up in a situation where the actual person doesn’ t make that mistake. That could feel a lot more like “shooting yourself in the face in an argument” rather than “demolishing an argument”.
Argument methods that work because of misdirection arguably don’t serve truth very well or work very indirectly (being deceptive makes it rewarding for the other to be keen).
Most people have reasons for their stances. Their point might be louzy or unimportant but usually one exists. If he truly doesn’ t have a point then there is no specific story to tell. As author you have the options of him having a story or not meaning anything with his words but not both.
Relies very heavily that in adversial context a free pick should be an optimal pick. The other arguer demonstrated that he didn’t even realise that he can pick so its is reasonable to assume he doesn’t know the pick should be optimal.
Doing re-dos without preannouncing them is giving free mulligans for yourself. I think would have been in the safe in saying that he did not make new claims, denying the mulligan. There could have been 10 facets of the exploitation in the scenario and fixing one of them would still leave 9 open. You can’t say that a forest doesn’t exist if it is not any of the individual trees.
The new claim is also not contradictory with the old story. It could also be taken as further spesification of it.