I think we must still be missing each other somehow. To reiterate, I’m aware that there is non-accidental biorisk, for which one can hardly blame the safety measures. But there is also accident risk, since labs often fail to contain pathogens even when they’re trying to.
Adam Scholl
My guess is more that we were talking past each other than that his intended claim was false/unrepresentative. I do think it’s true that EA’s mostly talk about people doing gain of function research as the problem, rather than about the insufficiency of the safeguards; I just think the latter is why the former is a problem.
There have been frequent and severe biosafety accidents for decades, many of which occurred at labs which were attempting to follow BSL protocol.
The EA cause area around biorisk is mostly happy to rely on those levels
I disagree—I think nearly all EA’s focused on biorisk think gain of function research should be banned, since the risk management framework doesn’t work well enough to drive the expected risk below that of the expected benefit. If our framework for preventing lab accidents worked as well as e.g. our framework for preventing plane accidents, I think few EA’s would worry much about GoF.
(Obviously there are non-accidental sources of biorisk too, for which we can hardly blame the safety measures; but I do think the measures work sufficiently poorly that even accident risk alone would justify a major EA cause area).
Man, I can’t believe there are no straightforwardly excited comments so far!
Personally, I think an institution like this is sorely needed, and I’d be thrilled if Lightcone built one. There are remarkably few people in the world who are trying to think carefully about the future, and fewer still who are trying to solve alignment; institutions like this seem like one of the most obvious ways to help them.
Your answer might also be “I, Oliver, will play this role”. My gut take would be excited for you to be like one of three people in this role (with strong co-leads, who are maybe complementary in the sense that they’re strong at some styles of thinking you don’t know exactly how to replicate), and kind of weakly pessimistic about you doing it alone. (It certainly might be that that pessimism is misplaced.)
For what it’s worth, my guess is that your pessimism is misplaced. Oliver certainly isn’t as famous as Bostrom, so I doubt he’d be a similar “beacon.” But I’m not sure a beacon is needed—historically, plenty of successful research institutions (e.g. Bells Labs, IAS, the Royal Society in most eras) weren’t led by their star researchers, and the track record of those that were strikes me as pretty mixed.
Oliver spends most of his time building infrastructure for researchers, and I think he’s become quite good at it. For example, you are reading this comment on (what strikes me as) rather obviously the best-designed forum on the internet; I think the review books LessWrong made are probably the second-best designed books I’ve seen, after those from Stripe Press; and the Lighthaven campus is an exceedingly nice place to work.
Personally, I think Oliver would probably be my literal top choice to head an institution like this.
I ask partly because I personally would be more excited of a version of this that wasn’t ignoring AGI timelines, but I think a version of this that’s not ignoring AGI timelines would probably be quite different from the intellectual spirit/tradition of FHI.
This frame feels a bit off to me. Partly because I don’t think FHI was ignoring timelines, and because I think their work has proved quite useful already—mostly by substantially improving our concepts for reasoning about existential risk.
But also, the portfolio of alignment research with maximal expected value need not necessarily perform well in the most likely particular world. One might imagine, for example—and indeed this is my own bet—that the most valuable actions we can take will only actually save us in the subset of worlds in which we have enough time to develop a proper science of alignment.
I agree metrology is cool! But I think units are mostly helpful for engineering insofar as they reflect fundamental laws of nature—see e.g. the metric units—and we don’t have those yet for AI. Until we do, I expect attempts to define them will be vague, high-level descriptions more than deep scientific understanding.
(And I think the former approach has a terrible track record, at least when used to define units of risk or controllability—e.g. BSL levels, which have failed so consistently and catastrophically they’ve induced an EA cause area, and which for some reason AI labs are starting to emulate).
OMMC Announces RIP
I assumed “anyone” was meant to include OpenAI—do you interpret it as just describing novel entrants? If so I agree that wouldn’t be contradictory, but it seems like a strange interpretation to me in the context of a pitch deck asking investors for a billion dollars.
I agree it’s common for startups to somewhat oversell their products to investors, but I think it goes far beyond “somewhat”—maybe even beyond the bar for criminal fraud, though I’m not sure—to tell investors you’re aiming to soon get “too far ahead for anyone to catch up in subsequent cycles,” if your actual plan is to avoid getting meaningfully ahead at all.
“Diverting money” strikes me as the wrong frame here. Partly because I doubt this actually was the consequence—i.e., I doubt OpenAI etc. had a meaningfully harder time raising capital because of Anthropic’s raise—but also because it leaves out the part where this purported desirable consequence was achieved via (what seems to me like) straightforward deception!
If indeed Dario told investors he hoped to obtain an insurmountable lead soon, while telling Dustin and others that he was committed to avoid gaining any meaningful lead, then it sure seems like one of those claims was a lie. And by my ethical lights, this seems like a horribly unethical thing to lie about, regardless of whether it somehow caused OpenAI to have less money.
Huh, I’ve also noticed a larger effect from indoors/outdoors than seems reflected by CO2 monitors, and that I seem smarter when it’s windy, but I never thought of this hypothesis; it’s interesting, thanks.
Yeah, seems plausible; but either way it seems worth noting that Dario left Dustin, Evan and Anthropic’s investors with quite different impressions here.
It seems Dario left Dustin Moskovitz with a different impression—that Anthropic had a policy/commitment to not meaningfully advance the frontier:
Interesting, I checked LW/Google for the keyword before writing and didn’t see much, but maybe I missed it; it does seem like a fairly natural riff, e.g. someone wrote a similar post on EA forum a few months later.
I can imagine it being the case that their ability to reveal this information is their main source of leverage (over e.g. who replaces them on the board).
I do have substantial credence (~15%?) on AGI being built by hobbyists/small teams. I definitely think it’s more likely to be built by huge teams with huge computers, like most recent advances. But my guess is that physics permits vastly more algorithmic efficiency than we’ve discovered, and it seems pretty plausible to me—especially in worlds with longer timelines—that some small group might discover enough of it in time.
Nonetheless, I acknowledge that my disagreement with these proposals often comes down to a more fundamental disagreement about the difficulty of alignment, rather than any beliefs about the social response to AI risk.
My guess is that this disagreement (about the difficulty of alignment) also mostly explains the disagreement about humanity’s relative attentiveness/competence. If the recent regulatory moves seem encouraging to you, I can see how that would seem like counterevidence to the claim that governments are unlikely to help much with AI risk.
But personally it doesn’t seem like much counterevidence, because the recent moves haven’t seemed very encouraging. They’ve struck me as slightly encouraging, insofar as they’ve caused me to update slightly upwards that governments might eventually coordinate to entirely halt AI development. But absent the sort of scientific understanding we typically have when deploying high-risk engineering projects—where e.g., we can answer at least most of the basic questions about how the systems work, and generally understand how to predict in advance what will happen if we do various things, etc.—little short of a Stop is going to reduce my alarm much.
I mean, I’m sure something more restrictive is possible. But my issue with BSL levels isn’t that they include too few BSL-type restrictions, it’s that “lists of restrictions” are a poor way of managing risk when the attack surface is enormous. I’m sure someday we’ll figure out how to gain this information in a safer way—e.g., by running simulations of GoF experiments instead of literally building the dangerous thing—but at present, the best available safeguards aren’t sufficient.
I’m confused why you find this underspecified. I just meant “gain of function” in the standard, common-use sense—e.g., that used in the 2014 ban on federal funding for such research.