Prob­a­bil­is­tic Reasoning

TagLast edit: 19 Mar 2022 21:12 UTC by brook

Probabilistic reasoning is the opposite of black and white thinking.

When you reason in black and white you ask questions like: Is this true? Is this the right thing to do? Am I sick?

When you reason probabilistically you ask questions like: How likely is this? What’s the expected value of this action? What evidence have I seen that I am sick, and what evidence that I’m not? How likely is it that I’m sick without taking any evidence into account?

Reasoning probabilistically allows you to change your mind incrementally, accumulating many small pieces of evidence rather than requiring one overwhelmingly convincing piece.

On LessWrong, ‘probabilistic reasoning’ usually refers to Bayes theorem, which formally defines the optimal way to change your beliefs when you see evidence.

See Also: Bayes Theorem, Belief Update, Expected Value, Probability and Statistics

Rad­i­cal Probabilism

abramdemski18 Aug 2020 21:14 UTC
163 points
47 comments35 min readLW link1 review

Up­date Your­self Incrementally

Eliezer Yudkowsky14 Aug 2007 14:56 UTC
89 points
29 comments3 min readLW link

Ab­solute Authority

Eliezer Yudkowsky8 Jan 2008 3:33 UTC
91 points
78 comments7 min readLW link

Is your un­cer­tainty re­solv­able?

Raemon21 Jun 2019 7:32 UTC
30 points
15 comments1 min readLW link

A Bayesian Ag­gre­ga­tion Paradox

Jsevillamol22 Nov 2021 10:39 UTC
73 points
22 comments7 min readLW link

Gems from the Wiki: Do The Math, Then Burn The Math and Go With Your Gut

17 Sep 2020 22:41 UTC
53 points
3 comments3 min readLW link

What makes a prob­a­bil­ity ques­tion “well-defined”? (Part I)

Noah Topper2 Oct 2022 21:05 UTC
14 points
4 comments7 min readLW link

A new Heuris­tic to Up­date on the Cre­dences of Others

aaron_mai21 Jan 2023 21:00 UTC
6 points
0 comments20 min readLW link

Prob­a­bil­is­tic Payor Lemma?

abramdemski19 Mar 2023 17:57 UTC
68 points
7 comments4 min readLW link

[Question] Has Van Horn fixed Cox’s the­o­rem?

Haziq Muhammad29 Aug 2021 18:36 UTC
9 points
1 comment1 min readLW link

[Question] Is LessWrong dead with­out Cox’s the­o­rem?

Haziq Muhammad4 Sep 2021 5:45 UTC
−2 points
89 comments1 min readLW link

Why I don’t think that the prob­a­bil­ity that AGI kills ev­ery­one is roughly 1 (but rather around 0.995).

Karl Rökaeus30 May 2023 17:54 UTC
−6 points
0 comments2 min readLW link

Break­ing the SIA with an ex­po­nen­tially-Sleep­ing Beauty

0naut20 Feb 2022 8:03 UTC
7 points
9 comments3 min readLW link

Kling, Prob­a­bil­ity, and Economics

matt30 Mar 2009 5:15 UTC
1 point
3 comments1 min readLW link

Draw­ing Two Aces

Eliezer Yudkowsky3 Jan 2010 10:33 UTC
19 points
92 comments1 min readLW link

[Question] What is the most prob­a­ble AI?

Zeruel01720 Jun 2022 23:26 UTC
−2 points
0 comments3 min readLW link

Five views of Bayes’ Theorem

Adam Scherlis2 Jul 2022 2:25 UTC
38 points
4 comments1 min readLW link

Dice De­ci­sion Making

Stuckwork10 Mar 2023 13:01 UTC
18 points
14 comments3 min readLW link

Prob­a­bil­is­tic rea­son­ing for de­scrip­tion and experience

Q Home27 Sep 2022 10:57 UTC
0 points
0 comments26 min readLW link

How Not to be Stupid: Adorable Maybes

Psy-Kosh29 Apr 2009 19:15 UTC
1 point
55 comments3 min readLW link

No Univer­sal Prob­a­bil­ity Space

Gordon Seidoh Worley6 May 2009 2:58 UTC
2 points
43 comments2 min readLW link

No One Knows Stuff

talisman12 May 2009 5:11 UTC
9 points
47 comments1 min readLW link

You can’t be­lieve in Bayes

PhilGoetz9 Jun 2009 18:03 UTC
15 points
60 comments1 min readLW link

[Question] Jay­ne­sian in­ter­pre­ta­tion—How does “es­ti­mat­ing prob­a­bil­ities” make sense?

Haziq Muhammad21 Jul 2021 21:36 UTC
4 points
40 comments1 min readLW link

[Question] Halpern’s pa­per—A re­fu­ta­tion of Cox’s the­o­rem?

Haziq Muhammad11 Aug 2021 9:25 UTC
13 points
7 comments1 min readLW link