Thanks, pesky phone grammar.
romeostevensit
Karma: 2,943
Instead of just gears vs non gears it might be helpful to think of the size/complexity of the black boxes in question, with larger black boxes meaning less portability. Gears themselves are a black box but since we are rarely designing for environments at the extremes of steels properties we don’t have to think about it.
(crossposted from a recent facebook post)
Social orders function on the back of unfakeably costly signals. Proof of Work social orders encourage people to compete to burn more resources, Proof of Stake social orders encourage people to invest more into the common pool. PoS requires reliable reputation tracking and capital formation. They aren’t mutually exclusive, as both kinds of orders are operating all the time. People heavily invested in one will tend to view those heavily invested in the other as defectors. There is a market for narratives that help villainize the other strategy.
Anecdote: Mealsquares has to interface with around 17 companies.
Speaking for myself, I mostly don’t comment on such things for two related reasons
1. The sorts of people it attracts are often not arguing in good faith anyway.
2. Certain kinds of discourse are less about the contents of the discourse and instead are winning whenever they convince people to pay attention to them. Since the attention of researchers is scarce I try to avoid polluting it.
Which status quo? My current experience is that I wake up each day with about the same level of health as the previous day.
The process used to generate a valid computation could itself be a valuable compression/training process of some sort. Characteristics of the final computation might be useful as feedback. I guess generalizing is just taking your listed use cases and seeing the computation in question as either up or downstream from the thing we really care about.
Imagine that Herman Melville was doing IFS and that the book is his notes. There are different ways to think about how he splits things up into different characters (just as everyone’s ifs process is idiosyncratic but has recurring patterns), but the overall frame winds up feeling like it just fits. And I don’t mean this in the vacuous ‘everything could be an IFS manual if you think about it’ way. I’m actually not familiar with any others besides those two that are central examples of the thing. Thinking for a bit I’d venture The Metamorphosis probably counts, maybe No Exit.
Also Jed Mckenna has a book that discuses this for Moby Dick so I’m not the only one who’s noticed. Though IIRC it’s only a side story in Jed’s book (Spiritually Incorrect Enlightenment).
I found Marr’s levels highly helpful when trying to think about this area. YMMV. Marr’s levels also correspond to Aristotle’s four causes if we do as Marr does and split the algorithmic level into ‘representation’ and ‘traversal.’
Unfortunately I don’t know of a good overview. Chalmers might have one. Lukeprogs post on consciousness has some pointers.
The Republic is about this. As is Moby Dick though it is not explicit in the latter whereas the metaphor is explicitly declared in the former. Plato’s stuff actually makes even more sense if you append the death of socrates cycle to the end of the republic. First you instantiate the philosopher king who puts the house in order, then the philosopher king commits suicide as a logical result of the rules as set up by that very same philosopher king.
in the most extreme case, something that, by its very nature, would never leave any evidence of its truth or falsity.
In Buddhism this comes from fundamental ignorance. Bundling together incoherent concepts due to not perceiving their actual structure. The parable of the coins is used to illustrate that the child and the normal person both have different types of ignorance about coins (currency) and only the money changer has a correct causal view.
In practice, I try to understand the generator for the claim. I.e. the experience plus belief structures that lead to a claim like it to make sense to the person. This doesn’t address the central problem, and on inspection I guess what I’m doing is trying to reconcile my own intuitive sense of miniscule probability of the claim as stated to me and the much higher probability implied by the form of the claim to them.
Also knightian uncertainty seems relevant but I’m not sure how quantitatively speaking.
This seems like a good place to mention that if you are thinking about the future, doing contemplative practice, and get philosophically disoriented, and normal therapists and meditation teachers feel like they aren’t actually addressing your concerns, that I am more than happy to talk with you. Traditional instructions often don’t really emphasize that periods of high confusion are expected if you’re doing the thing correctly because it just doesn’t matter in a monastic context where you have a highly highly structured environment to fall back on.
Not really. Although proto joint stock corps existed at the time, The Glorious Revolution and the importation of Dutch commercial trading practices was a significant event.
Moral licensing: behaviorally connecting between two causally unrelated things as a justification for one of them.
Tu quoque: looking for ways others have failed to live up to an epistemic standard to excuse yourself. Related to kakonomics.
Becoming defensive and frustrated and retreating to vague language when asked for more specifics.
I think it’s valuable because of value of information considerations. Some types of uncertainty are dramatically more reducible than others. Some will be more prone to gotchas (sign flips).
I like this and feel it’s a step in the right direction. I’ve been finding that difficult uncertainties are often difficult because they are actually a pile up of 2+ types of uncertainty and therefore naive attempts to resolve it without first unpacking wind up with type errors in the proposed solution.
I think representationalism helps much more than the illusionist stance for loading the right intuitions. If you get close to a screen you see that really it’s a bunch of rgb pixels. Is it helpful to call the projected image you see from father away an illusion? Better to say we have multiple representations at different levels of abstraction and seen to get different sorts of computational advantages out of crunching on these different representations.
I model part of this as: bounding the hypothesis space is underspecified and poorly understood. Since status attends to confirmatory rather than exploratory research there is pressure to present the exploratory phase as more like the confirmatory phase.