I was once that young and naive. But I’d never heard of this book Moral Mazes. Seems great, and I intend to read it. https://twitter.com/robinhanson/status/1136260917644185606
The CEO proposal is to fire them at the end of the quarter if the prices just before then so indicate. This solves the problem of the market traders expecting later traders to have more info than they. And it doesn’t mean that the board can’t fire them at other times for other reasons.
The claim that AI is vastly better at coordination seems to me implausible on its face. I’m open to argument, but will remain skeptical until I hear good arguments.
Secrecy CAN have private value. But it isn’t at all clear that we are typically together better off with secrets. There are some cases, to be sure, where that is true. But there are also so many cases where it is not.
My guess is that the reason is close to why security is so bad: Its hard to add security to an architecture that didn’t consider it up front, and most projects are in too much of a rush to take time to do that. Similarly, it takes time to think about what parts of a system should own what and be trusted to judge what.. Easier/faster to just make a system that does things, without attending to this, even if that is very costly in the long run. When the long run arrives, the earlier players are usually gone.
We have to imagine that we have some influence over the allocation of something, or there’s nothing to debate here. Call it “resources” or “talent” or whatever, if there’s nothing to move, there’s nothing to discuss.
I’m skeptical solving hard philosophical problems will be of much use here. Once we see the actual form of relevant systems then we can do lots of useful work on concrete variations.
I’d call “human labor being obsolete within 10 years … 15%, and within 20 years … 35%” crazy extreme predictions, and happily bet against them.
If we look at direct economic impact, we’ve had a pretty steady trend for at least a century of jobs displaced by automation, and the continuation of past trend puts full AGI a long way off. So you need a huge unprecedented foom-like lump of innovation to have change that big that soon.
Solving problems is mostly a matter of total resources devoted, not time devoted. Yes some problems have intrinsic clocks, but this doesn’t look like such a problem. If we get signs of a problem looming, and can devote a lot of resources then, that makes it tempting to save resources today for such a future push, as we’ll know a lot more then and resources today become more resources when delayed.
Can you point to a good/best argument for the claim that AGI is coming soon enough to justify lots of effort today?
Its not quite about “fast” v. “slow” than about the chances for putting lots of resources into the problem with substantial warning. Even if things change fast, as long as you get enough warning and resources can be moved to the problem fast enough, waiting still makes sense.
By “main reason for concern” I mean best arguments; I’m not trying to categorize people’s motivations.
AGI isn’t remotely close, and I just don’t believe people who think they see signs of that. Yes for any problem that we’ll eventually want to work on, a few people should work on it now just so someone is tracking the problem, ready to tell the rest of us if they see signs of it coming soon. But I see people calling for much more than that minimal tracking effort.
Most people who work in research areas call for more relative funding for their areas. So the rest of us just can’t be in the habit of believing such calls. We must hold a higher standard than “people who get $ to work on this say more $ should go to this now.”
Even if there will be problems worth working on at some point, if we will know a lot more later and if resources today can be traded for a lot more resources later, the temptation to wait should be strong. The foom scenario has few visible indications of a problem looming, forcing one to work on the problems far ahead of time. But in scenarios where there’s warning, lots more resources, and better tools and understand later, waiting makes a lot more sense.
Your critique is plausible. I was never a fan of these supposedly simple interfaces.
There have long been lots of unexplored good ideas for interface improvements. But they need to be tested in the context of real systems and users.
Yes, we only did a half dozen trials, and mostly with new players, so players were inexperienced.
Note that all this analysis is based on thinking about the game, not from playing the game. From my observing game play, I’d say that price accuracy does not noticeably suffer in the endgame.
For game design, yes good to include a few characters who will be excluded early, so people attend to story in early period.
If more than one person “did it”, you could pay off that fraction of $100 to each. So if two did it, each card is worth $50 at the end.
The problem of how to be rational is hard enough that one shouldn’t expect to get good proposals for complete algorithms for how to be rational in all situations. Instead we must chip away at the problem. And one way to do that is to slowly collect rationality constraints. I saw myself as contributing by possibly adding a new one. I’m not very moved by the complaint “but what is the algorithm to become fully rational from any starting point?” as that is just too hard a problem to solve all at once.
I disagree with the claim that “this single simple tool gives a bigger advantage on a wider range of tasks than we have seen with previous tools.”
Consider the example of whether a big terror attack indicates that there has been an increase in the average rate or harm of terror attacks. You could easily say “You can’t possibly claim that big terror attack yesterday is no evidence; and if it is evidence it is surely in the direction of the ave rate/harm having increased.” Technically correct, but then every other day without such a big attack is also evidence for a slow decrease in the rate/harm of attacks. Even if the rate/harm didn’t change, every once in a while you should expect a big attack. This in the sense in which I’d say that finding one more big tool isn’t much evidence that big tools will matter more in the future. Sure the day when you find such a tool is itself weak evidence in that direction. But the whole recent history of that day and all the days before it may be an evidential wash.
This seems to me a reasonable statement of the kind of evidence that would be most relevant.