I agree with the orthogonality thesis, so no point disagreeing there. I’m not explaining the most widely held lesswrong beliefs—just a few that I strongly disagree with.
omnizoid
Karma: 72
Underwater Torture Chambers: The Horror Of Fish Farming
Eugenics Performed By A Blind, Idiot God
The commenting restrictions on LessWrong seem bad
Ethics Needs A Marginal Revolution
Two Pieces of Advice About How to Remember Things
Anyone want to debate publicly about FDT?
I dispute that . . .
I didn’t say Eliezer was a liar and a fraud. I said he was often overconfident and eggregiously wrong, and explicitly described him as an interesting thinker who was worth reading.
Yeah, I agree I have lots of views that LessWrongers find dumb. My claim is just that it’s bad when those views are hard to communicate on account of the way LW is set up.
It’s not epiphenomenalism because the law invokes consciousness. On the interactionalist account, consciousness causes things rather than just the physical stuff causing things. If you just got rid of consciousness, you’d get a physically different world.
I don’t think that induction on the basis of “science has explained a lot of things therefore it will explain consciousness” is convincing. For one, up until this point, science has only explained physical behavior, not subjective experience. This was the whole point (see Goff’s book Galileo’s error). For another, this seems to prove too much—it would seem to suggest that we could discover the corect modal beliefs in a test tube.
I agree! Eliezer deserves praise for writing publicly about his ideas. My article never denied that. It merely claimed that he often confidently says things that are totally wrong.
That sounds like anti-realism—probably some type of quasi realism.
Nature Releases A Stupid Editorial On AI Risk
Notably, about three quarters of decision theorists two box. I wasn’t arguing for non-physicalism so much as arguing that Eliezer’s specific argument against physicalism shows that he doesn’t know what he’s talking about. Pain is a subset of suffering—it’s the physical version of suffering, but the same argument can be made for suffering. I didn’t comment on Everetianism because I don’t know enough (just that I think it’s suspicious that Eliezer is so confident) nor on probability theory. I didn’t claim there was a contradiction between Bayesian and frequentist methods.
I really appreciate that! Though if you like the things I write, you can find my blog at benthams.substack.com
The fact that someone argues his positions publicly doesn’t make it so that they necessarily have an idea what they’re talking about. Deepak Chopra argues his positions publicly.
Wait, do you agree that rearranged heaven gets hell? If so, you either have to deny that HEAVEN>HELL or that arrangement matters.
You’re assuming we’re comparing them by galaxies. But there’s no natural way to individuate that explains why we should do that.
It’s not from the physical universe. We derive it through our ability to reflect on the nature of the putatively good things like pleasure. It is similar to how we learn modal facts, like that married bachelors are impossible.
Utilitarianism is a normative ethical view, not a meta-ethical view. I’m a utilitarian and a realist. One can be a utilitarian and adopt any meta-ethical view.