I don’t know.
no name
Karma: 64
Perhaps we should also consider the impact of a Third World War on global supply chains: China is the world’s most important industrial power, while the United States is a major consumer of its products. If a war were to bring trade between the two countries to a halt, the resulting economic crisis could severely hinder the development of artificial intelligence in both nations. Furthermore, even before escalating to a nuclear exchange, war would hinder AI development: if China and the United States were to use EMP weapons against each other and destroy one another’s power grids, or launch large-scale cyber warfare, we can safely assume that the timeline for both sides to develop AI capable of taking over would be significantly delayed.
Legally speaking, even Taipei acknowledges that Taiwan is part of China, and declaring independence would amount to publicly humiliating Beijing and seeking international recognition as an independent nation—rather than as another government within China. Such an act would undoubtedly undermine Beijing’s core legitimacy—even if military preparations are not yet fully in place, the PLA now possesses the full capability to occupy Taiwan at a high cost, and it would certainly exercise that capability.
China and the UAE are, in fact, quite similar: the UAE’s GDP comes primarily from non-oil sectors, and these industries rely heavily on the kafala system to bring in cheap labor from the Third World. Meanwhile, at least over the past few decades, China’s developed coastal regions and major cities (such as Shanghai) have developed labor-intensive industries to take on international industrial outsourcing, while its densely populated inland regions (such as Henan) have served as internal colonies and sources of cheap labor.
Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, China has achieved miraculous growth and eradicated absolute poverty despite a similar level of repression. What exactly leads you to believe that, under such repression, China could never reach the level of development enjoyed by the United States?
Why not consider what might happen if the repression were relaxed? For example, what if the household registration system and the detention and deportation system were abolished? Rural residents lacking basic urban job skills would flood into cities in a disorderly manner and establish slums, which would severely hinder urban planning and trigger a deterioration in public order. At the same time, a significant portion of the government’s main revenue comes from land sale proceeds. Without these systems, the government would be unable to generate revenue from urbanization and use it for critical infrastructure such as high-speed rail, which would in turn severely impact economic development!
It seems that much of the controversy surrounding this article stems from the claim that “China only attacks its neighbors,” but this claim is inaccurate. The fact is that “since 1949, the People’s Republic of China has never invaded another sovereign state with the aim of annexing it, ceding undisputed territory, or establishing a puppet regime.”
Perhaps explaining how gravity works isn’t the most effective way to respond when someone suggests installing a safety net to prevent people from falling to their deaths.
If I am not mistaken, China will secure control of the seas before launching an amphibious assault; there is no factor that would compel them to launch such an assault quickly. At the onset of war, China would use medium-range ballistic missiles (DF-15, 16, 21, 26) and hypersonic missiles (DF-17, 27, YJ-19, 20, 21) to launch a preemptive strike against U.S. military assets stretching from the Philippines to Hawaii, aiming to destroy as many air bases, naval ports, and warehouses as possible. The U.S. military’s intercept capabilities are insufficient to protect its land-based military assets: The conflict in Iran has already demonstrated that even the THAAD system is highly vulnerable to attacks from ballistic missiles based on 20th-century technology and large numbers of loitering munitions. Most of China’s current ballistic missiles possess penetration speeds and accuracy far surpassing those of Iran’s Scud-based variants, while its most advanced hypersonic missiles can perform evasive maneuvers at speeds exceeding Mach 5. The recent redeployment of THAAD systems from East Asia to the Middle East has further weakened U.S. missile defense capabilities. Regardless of how much military strength the U.S. and Japan retain after the initial exchange of fire, U.S. Navy and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force reinforcements arriving in East Asia during the next phase of the war will likely be detected by rocket-powered unmanned reconnaissance drones and large reconnaissance aircraft such as the Y-9DZ, triggering a missile exchange: In the most optimistic scenario, the U.S. military might be able to destroy one or two aircraft carriers and numerous Type 055⁄052 destroyers using cruise missiles; however, under a saturation attack involving dozens of hypersonic ballistic missiles and hundreds of sea-skimming anti-ship missiles, the U.S. fleet would suffer even greater losses. The Standard-3 and Standard-6 missiles could intercept some ballistic missiles during the exchange, but their effectiveness may be limited: The Standard-3’s infrared seeker can only guide its kinetic kill warhead outside the atmosphere, while the Standard-6 has a shorter range and slower speed, making it difficult to intercept hypersonic munitions maneuvering within the atmosphere. Overall, it is unlikely that U.S. military assets in the engagement zone would survive long enough to warrant consideration of the production capacity of high-energy materials.
Looking ahead to 2026, the likelihood of Russia using tactical nuclear weapons appears increasingly remote: following the initial military chaos, Russia has effectively consolidated its front lines and is gradually advancing into the remaining parts of the Donbas region; as the situation on the ground increasingly favors them, the use of nuclear weapons has undoubtedly lost all appeal for Moscow.
If World War III descends into a stalemate, leading the warring parties to attempt creating artificial general intelligence, or even deploying misaligned artificial general intelligence in desperation...
However, these mirrors could also be used to direct sunlight toward photovoltaic or solar thermal power stations in Antarctica, deserts, or at sea. The advantages of space colonies in this regard seem difficult to offset against the disadvantages of material scarcity and high logistics costs.
Perhaps a more plausible scenario is that human colonies in space were initially established to maintain the mirrors/space power stations, and after a nuclear war broke out, these space stations took in many refugees and became independent?
In these revolutions, the disintegration of state apparatus loyalty was a key factor, with poorly organized groups primarily serving to undermine the legitimacy of the existing regime and facilitate coups within the government, as seen in the Bangladeshi Revolution or the Ukrainian Revolution.
However, history records at least two distinct revolutionary models: In the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks exploited informational advantages and a vanguard-organized military to execute a decapitation strike and seize control of the existing state apparatus. In China’s revolution, the Communist Party established its own state apparatus capable of delivering more effective governance than the original government, ultimately defeating the state machinery of warlords and the Kuomintang through warfare.
Unfortunately, in the post-AGI era, neither of these methods of launching revolutions is any more likely to succeed than expecting a coup within the government.
1: As I’ve repeatedly emphasized across multiple platforms, I did not employ generative AI technology to compose these texts. If they resemble LLM output, it likely stems from my writing style.
2: If tanks can employ directed-energy weapons and cannon-mounted programmed munitions to shoot down hundreds of drones, while striking fortified positions from thousands of meters away under infantry or drone guidance, the enemy assets they destroy and the infantry lives they protect may far outweigh their own cost.
Armor itself serves as an excellent drone deployment platform: it can maneuver upon detection, possesses surplus defensive firepower, and offers at least splinter protection. Without such platforms, drone operators must either remain in rear areas—depleting drone range and reducing sortie frequency—or face certain death upon exposure.
3: DRG units can consist of relatively few humans and numerous robotic platforms, operating covertly whenever possible to minimize drone casualties. If smaller platforms can also deploy effective anti-drone weapons, their casualty rates would be even lower. These teams remain irreplaceable because FPV drones are poorly suited for clearing buildings and tunnels, and struggle to launch attacks from many routes (such as abandoned oil and gas pipelines). Additionally, FPV requires units to mark targets—including by drawing enemy fire—otherwise they prove ineffective against concealed adversaries.
4: Using Starlink to remotely control frontline units is a sound concept but imperfect: During large-scale warfare, frontline units operate in complex electromagnetic environments. You may need to position Starlink receivers tens of kilometers behind the contact line and connect them to frontline units via fiber optics. However, frontline units still require human operators at present.
5: These assumptions are based on cutting-edge technology projected for 2026. Should artificial intelligence advance to solve complex frontline combat challenges, we’ll all soon be turned into paperclips.
In fact, breaching enemy drone defense zones is not impossible:
If military strength is severely imbalanced, one side can suppress enemy drone operators through airstrikes and artillery bombardment;
Armored vehicles equipped with directed-energy weapons, anti-drone weapon stations, and active defense systems can theoretically withstand swarm attacks and penetrate defenses—such as China’s Type 100 tank;
Disrupting enemy drone supply chains is a sound strategy. Ukraine’s ability to assemble drones using civilian 3D printers stems from its vast strategic depth and imported components from China. These components require complex, large-scale manufacturing facilities—facilities and their logistics chains that are inherently vulnerable.
Future ground warfare will not be entirely dominated by drones: Drone-guided artillery shells, rockets, and aerial bombs will strike hardened targets beyond drone capabilities; Mechanized dog-infantry demolition reconnaissance teams (DRGs) will infiltrate complex terrain to establish incremental area control, with armored units providing direct fire support; across broader fronts, tactical missiles and long-range rockets will hunt self-propelled artillery and destroy supply hubs, while medium-range missiles will neutralize enemy airfields, warehouses, and factories.
1&3: Even if Taiwan maintains its non-nuclear status, Beijing’s intent to wage a unification war is increasingly overshadowing concerns about economic sanctions and casualties. Should Taipei attempt to acquire nuclear weapons again, it would trigger tensions far exceeding those of the North Korean nuclear crisis or the THAAD crisis, making war highly probable.
Acquiring nuclear weapons is fundamentally different from gaining the capability to deploy them. The advantage of nuclear terrorism gained through a small number of primitive fission devices would not secure victory for Taiwan, just as Iraq did not win the Gulf War through its chemical weapons advantage. If these devices are not destroyed, captured, or neutralized early in the conflict, their sole utility would be for scorched-earth tactics—but Taipei’s leadership is unlikely to descend into madness.
The United States is unwilling to engage in nuclear warfare. Therefore, should Taipei’s leadership exhibit overtly irrational behavior, Washington would likely refuse assistance, leaving Taiwan incapable of prevailing alone.
Taiwan cannot independently manufacture all equipment required for TSMC chip factories; its lithography machines and other apparatus rely on imports. Should Taiwan attempt to import centrifuges after its nuclear program is exposed, it might have to resort to submarine transport.
2: As the Three Gorges Dam is a gravity dam. Most conventional missiles cannot destroy it at an acceptable cost. To demolish it would require shattering hundreds of millions of tons of reinforced concrete.
China possesses robust air defense and anti-missile systems, while Taiwan’s missile technology remains at the PLA’s 2000s level. Even if the Taipei regime planned to strike mainland China before its launch platforms were destroyed, the civilian targets it could effectively attack would primarily be urban clusters along the Fujian coast.
However, villagers who readily accept the burning of their village exhibit lower fitness and shorter survival expectations in certain scenarios compared to those who resist invasion due to past disasters.
If the arguments in this article are correct, then nuclear war, unless it leads to the militarization of AGI, is unlikely to trigger an extinction risk.
Regardless of whether China acquires the H200, and perhaps regardless of their understanding of AI’s importance, they will attempt to retake Taiwan: public sentiment, ideology, and the fact that reclaiming Taiwan would permanently establish China’s semiconductor advantage over the US. China’s leadership has long recognized the critical importance of securing advanced chip supplies.
The freedoms Deng Xiaoping granted can in fact be explained by his personal interests: selling state assets cheaply to officials helped consolidate his support within the Party, while marketization stimulated economic growth and stabilized society. Yet at the same time, he effectively stripped away most political freedoms.
Mao Zedong’s late-stage governance, however, defies such explanation: even when power was unassailable, he encouraged radical leftist workers and students (the “rebels”) to confront pro-bureaucratic forces (the ‘conservatives’) and attempted to establish direct democratic systems like the Shanghai Commune. Despite ordering crackdowns on communist dissidents like the “May 16th” group, this behavior likely stemmed more from political ideals.
At least in the 21st century, new internal combustion engine technologies exhibit high reproducibility and low verification costs. There are no large numbers of internal combustion engine specialists employing various means to generate false or selectively filtered test reports for personal gain. Consequently, no engine configuration used in automotive development has been found fundamentally impossible.
Automobiles are not regulated by a group of accident experts with questionable ties to automotive giants and overly strict automotive ethicists. Consequently, a vehicle cannot be banned for violating some aspect of so-called automotive ethics. New cars also do not require decades of randomized controlled trials involving thousands of participants to gain market approval—costs that smaller automotive companies could never afford.
Driving a car is not regarded as a qualification requiring years of costly university education, but rather as a right enjoyed by all who undergo basic training. The thousands who die annually in car accidents are not perceived as a catastrophic failure of automobiles, compelling society to pressure for their elimination.
Society does not view automobiles as solely for transporting patients. Not every attempt to use cars for faster mobility faces resistance, suspicion from licensed drivers well-versed in automotive ethics, or sparks conspiracy-tinged debates about social equity and the value of life. On the contrary, people have the right to drive to most places they wish to go—provided roads exist and traffic restrictions do not apply.
Of course, there are also virtually no automotive conspiracy theories claiming that only divinely granted legs are suitable for transportation, advocating water as a fuel substitute, or declaring that adding trace amounts of explosives to fuel tanks can achieve any desired speed.
If a word processor falling into the hands of terrorists could easily generate a memetic virus capable of inducing schizophrenia in hundreds of millions of people, then I believe such concerns are warranted.
I was absolutely shocked when I first saw it, until I realized it had been posted on April Fools’ Day