Mitchell_Porter

Karma: 8,977

Mitchell_Porter 22 May 2025 10:09 UTC
7 points
0
on: Contain and verify: The endgame of US-China AI competition
My take on this: AGI has existed since 2022 (ChatGPT). There are now multiple companies in America and in China which have AGI-level agents. (It would be good to have a list of countries which are next in line to develop indigenous AGI capability.) Given that we are already in a state of coexistence between human and AGI, the next major transition is ASI, and that means, if not necessarily the end of humanity, the end of human control over human affairs. This most likely means that the dominant intelligence in the world is entirely nonhuman AI; it could also refer to some human-AI symbiosis, but again, it won’t be natural humanity in charge.
A world in which the development of AGI is allowed, let alone a world in which there is a race to create ever more powerful AI, is a world which by default is headed towards ASI and the dethronement of natural humanity. That is our world already, even if our tech and government leadership manage to not see it that way.
So the most consequential thing that humans can care about right now is the transition to ASI. You can try to stop it from ever happening. or you can try to shape it in advance. Once it happens, it’s over, humans per se have no further say, if they still exist they are at the mercy of the transhuman or posthuman agents now in charge.
Now let me try to analyze your essay from this point of view. Your essay is meant as a critique of the paradigm according to which there is a race between America and China to create powerful AI, as if all that either side needs to care about is getting there first. Your message is that even if America gets to powerful AI (or safe powerful AI) first, the possibility of China (and in fact anyone else) developing the same capability would still remain. I see two main suggestions: a “mutual containment” treaty, in which both countries place bounds on their development of AI along with means of verifying that the bounds are being obeyed; and spreading around defensive measures, which make it harder for powerful AI to impose itself on the world.
My take is that mutual containment really means a mutual commitment to stop the creation of ASI, a commitment which to be meaningful ultimately needs to be followed by everyone on Earth. It is a coherent position, but it’s an uphill struggle since current trends are all in the other direction. On the other hand, I regard defense against ASI as impossible. Possibly there are meaningful defensive measures against lesser forms of AI, but ASI’s relationship to human intelligence is like that of the best computer chess programs to the best human chess players—the latter simply have no chance in such a game.
On the other hand, the only truly safe form of powerful AI is ASI governed by a value system which, if placed in complete control of the Earth, would still be something we could live with, or even something that is good for us. Anything less, e.g. a legal order in which powerful AI exists but there is a ban on further development, is unstable against further development to the ASI level.
So there is a sense in which development of safe powerful AI really is all that matters, because it really has to mean safe ASI, and that is not something which will stay behind borders. If America, China, or any other country achieves ASI, that is success for everyone. But it does also imply the loss of sovereignty for natural humanity, in favor of the hypothetical benevolent superintelligent agent(s).

Mitchell_Porter 20 May 2025 8:19 UTC
4 points
0
on: America Makes AI Chip Diffusion Deal with UAE and KSA
It always seemed outlandish that in The Animatrix, the first AI city (01) was located in the Middle East…
If we had limitless time, it would be interesting to know how this happened. I guess the prehistory of it involved Saudi Vision 2030 (e.g. the desert city Noem), and the general hypermodernization of Dubai. You can see precursors in the robot Sophia getting Saudi citizenship in 2017, and the UAE’s “Falcon” LLM in 2023.
But the initiative must have come from the American side—some intersection of the geopolitical brain trust around Trump, and the AI/crypto brain trust around David Sacks. The audacity of CEOs who can pick a country on the map and say, let’s build a whole new technological facility here, combined with the audacity of grand strategists who can pick a region of the world and say, let’s do a huge techno-economic deal with our allies here.
There must have been some individual who first thought, hey, the Gulf Arabs have lots of money and electricity, that would be a good place to build all these AI data centers we’re going to need; I wonder who it was. Maybe Ivanka Trump was telling Jared Kushner about Aschenbrenner’s “Situational Awareness”, they put 2 and 2 together, and it became part of the strategic mix along with “Trump Gaza number one”, the new Syria, and whatever they’re negotiating with Iran.

Mitchell_Porter 20 May 2025 7:35 UTC
6 points
0
on: Winning the power to lose
Luckily I don’t think the Accelerationists have won control of the wheel
Could you expand on this? Also, have you had any interaction with accelerationists? In fact, are there any concrete Silicon Valley factions you would definitely count as accelerationists?

Mitchell_Porter 18 May 2025 11:19 UTC
5 points
0
in reply to: Ian’s comment on: Probability is in the Mind
The simpler explanation is that EY doesn’t understand QM
Presumably you wouldn’t say this of actual physicists who believe in MWI?

Mitchell_Porter 17 May 2025 14:30 UTC
2 points
0
on: AGI will result from an ecosystem not a single firm
I have tried looking at this from the perspective that we have had AGI since 2022 and ChatGPT. Creating ChatGPT didn’t require an ecosystem, did it? Just a well-resourced nonprofit/startup with good researchers.
So according to me, we’ve already had AGI for 2.5 years. We are still in a period of relative parity between humans and AI, in which we’re still different enough, and it is still weak enough, that humans have the upper hand, and we’re focused on exploring all possible variations on the theme of AI and human-AI relationship.
The real question is when and how will it escape human control. That will be the real sign that we have “achieved” ASI. Will that result from an ecosystem and not a single firm?
There seems to be an assumption that ASI will be achieved by continuing to scale up. All these analyses revolve around the economics of ever larger data centers and training runs, whether there’s enough data and whether synthetic data is a good enough substitute, and so on.
But surely that is just the dumbest way to achieve ASI. I’m sure some actors will keep pursuing that path. But we’re also now in a world of aggressive experimentation with AI on every front. I have been saying that the birthplace of ASI will not be ever larger foundation models, but rather research swarms of existing and very-near-future AIs. Think of something that combines China’s Absolute Zero Reasoner with the darwinism of Google AI’s AlphaEvolve. Once they figure out how to implement John-von-Neumann-level intelligence in a box, I think we’re done—and I don’t think the economics of that requires an ecosystem, though it may be carried out by a Big Tech company that has an ecosystem (such as Google).

Mitchell_Porter 17 May 2025 1:14 UTC
2 points
0
on: Regarding South Africa
This has never happened at OpenAI.
“This prompt (sometimes) makes ChatGPT think about terrorist organisations”

Mitchell_Porter 16 May 2025 12:51 UTC
4 points
0
on: reflecting on criticism
One is not philosophically obliged to regard the nature of reality as ineffable or inescapably uncertain.
Quarks are a good place to explore this point. The human race once had no concept of quarks. Now it does. You say that inevitably, one day, we’ll have some other concept. Maybe we will. But why is that inevitable? Why can’t quarks just turn out to be part of how reality actually is?
You cite Nagarjuna and talk about emptiness, so that gives me some idea of where you are coming from. This is a philosophy which emphasizes the role of concepts in constituting experience, and the role of the mind in constituting concepts, and typically concludes that reality has no essence, no nature that can be affirmed, because all such affirmations involve concepts that are introduced by the mind, rather than being inherent to anything.
This conclusion I think is overreaching. I actually consider direct experience to be the ultimate proof that reality is not just formlessness carved by mind. Consciousness is not just raw being, it is filled with form. My words and concepts may not capture it properly, I may not even notice everything that is implied by what I see or what I am. But I do see that complexity and multiplicity are there in reality—at the very least, they are there in my own consciousness.
Non-attachment to theories and concepts is a good thing if you’re interested in truth, and know that you don’t know the truth. It also has some pragmatic value if reality changes around you and you need to adapt. But in fundamental matters, one does not have to regard every concept and hypothesis that we have, as necessarily temporary. In some of them we may have latched onto the actual objective truth.
P.S. Having criticized the philosophy of emptiness, let me add ironically that just a few hours ago, I investigated a proposal for AI alignment that someone had posted here a few months ago, and found it to be very good—and its model of the mind, a nondual viewpoint is the highest form. So your philosophy may actually put you in a good position to appreciate the nuances of this potentially important work.

Mitchell_Porter 16 May 2025 12:14 UTC
3 points
0
on: It Is Untenable That Near-Future AI Scenario Models Like “AI 2027” Don’t Include Open Source AI
You could say there are two conflicting scenarios here: superintelligent AI taking over the world, and open-source AI taking over daily life. In the works that you mention, superintelligence comes so quickly that AI mostly remains a service offered by a few big companies, and open-source AI is just somewhere in the background. In an extreme opposite scenario, superintelligence might take so long to arrive, that the human race gets completely replaced by human-level AI before superintelligent AI ever exists.
It would be healthy to have all kinds of combinations of these scenarios being explored. For example, you focus a bit on open-source AI as a bioterror risk. I don’t think a supervirus is going to wipe out the human race or even end civilization, because (as Covid experience shows), we are capable of extreme measures in order to contain truly deadly disease. But a supervirus could certainly bring the world to a halt again, and if it was known to have been designed with open-source AI, that would surely have a huge impact on AI’s trajectory. (I suspect that in such a scenario, AI for civilian purposes would suffer, but deep states worldwide would insist on pressing forward, and that there would also be a lobby arguing for AI as a defense against superviruses. Also, it’s very plausible that a supervirus might be designed by AI, but that there would be no proof of it, in which case there wouldn’t even be a backlash.)
Another area where futurology about open-source AI might be good, is in the area of gradual disempowerment and replacement of humanity. We have societies with a division of roles, humans presently fill those roles but AI and robots will be capable of filling more and more of them; eventually every role in the economic, cultural, and political structure could be filled by AIs rather than by humans. The story of how that could happen, certainly deserves to be explored.
Still another area when open-source AI scenarios deserve to be studied, is in the highly concrete realm of near-future economics and culture. What does an AI economy look like if o4-level models are just freely available? This really is an urgent question for anyone concerned with concrete questions like, who will lead the AI industry and how will it be structured, because there seem to be factions in both China and America who are thinking in this direction. One should want to understand what they envision, and what kind of competitive landscape they are likely to create in the short term.
My own belief is that this would be such an upheaval, that it would inevitably end up invalidating many conventional political and economic premises. The current world order of billionaires and venture capitalists, stock markets and human democracies, I just don’t see it surviving such a transition, even without superintelligence appearing. There are just too many explosive possibilities, too many new symbioses of AI with human mind, for the map of the world and the solar system to not be redrawn.
However, in the end I believe in short timelines to superintelligence, and that makes all the above something of a secondary concern, because something is going to emerge that will overshadow humans and human-level AI equally. It’s a little monotonous to keep referring back to Iain Banks’s Culture universe, but it really is the outstanding depiction of a humanly tolerable world in which superintelligence has emerged. His starfaring society is really run by the “Minds”, which are superintelligent AIs characteristically inhabiting giant spaceships or whole artificial worlds, and the societies over which they invisibly preside, include both biological intelligences (such as humans) and human-level AIs (e.g. the drones). The Culture is a highly permissive anarchy which mostly regulates itself via culture, i.e. shared values among human-level intelligences, but it has its own deep state, in the form of special agencies and the Minds behind them, who step in when there’s a crisis that has escaped the Minds’ preemptive strategic foresight.
This is one model of what relations between superintelligence and lesser intelligences might be like. There are others. You could have an outcome in which there are no human-level intelligences at all, just one or more superintelligences. You could have superintelligences that have a far more utilitarian attitude to lower intelligences, creating them for temporary purposes and then retiring them when they are no longer needed. I’m sure there are other possibilities.
The point is that from the perspective of a governing superintelligence, open-source AIs are just another form of lower intelligence, that may be useful or destabilizing depending on circumstance, and I would expect a superintelligence to decide how things should be on this front, and then to make it so, just as it would with every other aspect of the world that it cared about. The period in which open-source AI was governed only by corporate decisions, user communities, and human law would only be transitory.
So if you’re focused on superintelligence, the real question is whether open-source AI matters in the development of superintelligence. I think potentially it does—for example, open source is both a world of resources that Big Tech can tap into, as well as a source of destabilizing advances that Big Tech has to keep up with. But in the end, superintelligence—not just reasoning models, but models that reason and solve problems with strongly superhuman effectiveness—looks like something that is going to emerge in a context that is well-resourced and very focused on algorithmic progress. And by definition, it’s not something that emerges incrementally and gets passed back and forth and perfected by the work of many independent hands. At best, that would describe a precursor of superintelligence.
Superintelligence is necessarily based on some kind of incredibly powerful algorithm or architecture, that gets maximum leverage out of minimum information, and bootstraps its way to overwhelming advantage in all domains at high speed. To me, that doesn’t sound like something invented by hobbyists or tinkerers or user communities. It’s something that is created by highly focused teams of genius, using the most advanced tools, who are also a bit lucky in their initial assumptions and strategies. That is something you’re going to find in an AI think tank, or a startup like Ilya Sutskever’s, or a rich Big Tech company that has set aside serious resources for the creation of superintelligence.
I recently posted that superintelligence is likely to emerge from the work of an “AI hive mind” or “research swarm” of reasoning models. Those could be open-source models, or they could be proprietary. What matters is that the human administrators of the research swarm (and ultimately, the AIs in the swarm itself) have access to their source code and their own specs and weights, so that they can engaged in informed self-modification. From a perspective that cares most about superintelligence, this is the main application of open source that matters.

Mitchell_Porter 16 May 2025 10:25 UTC
3 points
0
on: PRISM: Perspective Reasoning for Integrated Synthesis and Mediation (Interactive Demo)
Somehow this has escaped comment, so I’ll have a go. I write from the perspective of whether it’s suitable as the value system of a superintelligence. If PRISM became the ethical operating system of a posthuman civilization born on Earth, for as long as that civilization managed to survive in the cosmos—would that be a satisfactory outcome?
My immediate thoughts are: It has a robustness, due to its multi-perspective design, that gives it some plausibility. At the same time, it’s not clear to me where the seven basis worldviews come from. Why those seven, and no others? Is there some argument that these seven form a necessary and sufficient basis for ethical behavior by human-like beings and their descendants?
If I dig a little deeper into the paper, the justification is actually in part 2. Specifically, on page 12, six brain regions and their functions are singled out, as contributing to human decision-making at increasingly abstract levels (for the hierarchy, see page 15). The seven basis worldviews correspond to increasing levels of mastery of this hierarchy.
I have to say I’m impressed. I figured that the choice of worldviews would just be a product of the author’s intuition, but they are actually grounded in a theory of the brain. One of the old dreams associated with CEV, was that the decision procedure for a human-friendly AI would be extrapolated in a principled way from biological facts about human cognition, rather than just from a philosophical system, hallowed tradition, or set of community principles. June Ku’s MetaEthical AI, for example, is an attempt to define an algorithm for doing this. Well, this is a paper written by a human being, but the principles in part 2 are sufficiently specific, that one could actually imagine an automated process following them, and producing a form of PRISM as its candidate for CEV! I’d like @Steven Byrnes to have a look at this.

Mitchell_Porter 15 May 2025 14:13 UTC
8 points
0
in reply to: dirk’s comment on: dirk’s Shortform
We had Golden Gate Claude, now we have White Genocide Grok…

Mitchell_Porter 15 May 2025 9:52 UTC
2 points
0
on: Absolute Zero: Alpha Zero for LLM
This seems like a Chinese model for superintelligence! (All the authors are Chinese, though a few are working in the West.) Not in the AIXI sense of something which is optimal from the beginning, but rather something that could bootstrap its way to superintelligence. One could compare it to Schmidhuber’s Godel machine concept, but more concrete, and native to the deep learning era.
(If anyone has an argument as to why this isn’t a model that can become arbitrarily intelligent, I’m interested.)

Mitchell_Porter 15 May 2025 5:15 UTC
12 points
3
on: Why OpenAI projects only $174B of revenue by 2030?
If I have understood correctly, you’re saying that OpenAI should be forecasting greater revenue than this, if they truly think they will have AIs capable of replacing entire industries. But maybe they’re just being cautious in their forecasts?
Suppose I have a 3d printing / nanotechnology company, and I think that a year from now I’ll have an unlimited supply of infinity boxes capable of making any material artefact. World manufacturing is worth over US$10 trillion. If I thought I could put it all out of business, by charging just 10% of what current manufacturers charge, I could claim expected revenue of $1 trillion.
Such a prediction would certainly be attention-grabbing, but maybe it would be reckless to make it? Maybe my technology won’t be ready. Maybe my products will be blocked from most markets. Maybe someone will reverse-engineer and open-source the infinity boxes, and prices will crash to $0. Maybe I don’t want the competition or the government to grasp just how big my plans are. Maybe the investors I want wouldn’t believe such a scenario. There are a lot of reasons why a company that thinks it might be able to take over the economy or even the world, would nonetheless not put that in its prospectus.

Mitchell_Porter 15 May 2025 4:56 UTC
8 points
2
on: Mitchell_Porter’s Shortform
OpenAI gets a lot of critical attention here, because it’s been the leader in many ways. But what about Google AI? Many people think it’s the leader now, yet I don’t see anywhere near as much critical scrutiny of its decision-making process.

Mitchell_Porter 14 May 2025 1:00 UTC
4 points
0
on: October The First Is Too Late
That gives “Eternal September” a new meaning…

Mitchell_Porter 13 May 2025 10:59 UTC
11 points
0
in reply to: Baram Sosis’s comment on: Book Review: “Encounters with Einstein” by Heisenberg
The view that Heisenberg advocates—reductionism had reached a limit, and a new paradigm was needed—was a highly influential school of thought in the 1960s. In particle physics, there is a mathematical object called the S-matrix (scattering matrix), which tabulates scattering amplitudes (the quasiprobability that if these N particles enter a collision, these other M particles will be what comes out). Quantum electrodynamics (a theory with electrons and photons, let’s say) is a prototypical quantum field theory in which the S-matrix can be calculated from the stipulation that electrons and photons are fundamental. For the weak interactions (later unified with electromagnetism), this reductionist method also works.
But for the strong interactions, field theory looked intractable, and a new philosophy was advanced that the S-matrix itself should be the central mathematical object in the theory. Remember that quarks were never seen by themselves, only protons, neutrons, and a hundred other types of “hadron”. The idea of nuclear democracy was that the S-matrix for these hundred seemingly equi-fundamental particle species, would be derived from postulates about the properties of the S-matrix, rather than from an underlying field theory. This was called the bootstrap program, it is how the basic formulae of string theory were discovered (before they had even been identified as arising from strings), and it’s still used to study the S-matrix of computationally intractable theories.
These days, the philosophy that the S-matrix is primary, still has some credibility in quantum gravity. Here the problem is not that we can’t identify ultimate constituents, but rather that the very idea of points of space-time seems problematic, because of quantum fluctuations in the metric. The counterpart of the 1960s skepticism about quarks, would be that the holographic boundary of space-time is fundamental. For example, in the AdS/CFT correspondence, scattering events in Anti de Sitter space (in which particles approach each other “from the boundary”, interact, and then head back to the boundary) can be calculated entirely within the boundary CFT, without any reference to AdS space at all, which is regarded as emergent from the boundary space. The research program of celestial holography is an attempt to develop the same perspective within the physically relevant case of flat space-time. The whole universe that we see, would be a hologram built nonlocally from entanglement within a lower-dimensional space…
The eventual validation of quarks as particles might seem like a sign that this radical version of the holographic philosophy will also be wrong in the end, and perhaps it will be. But it really shows the extent to which the late thoughts of Heisenberg are still relevant. Holographic boundaries are the new S-matrix, they are a construct which has made quantum gravity uniquely tractable, and it’s reasonable to ask if they should be treated as fundamental, just as it was indeed entirely reasonable for Heisenberg and the other S-matrix theorists to ask whether the S-matrix itself is the final word.

Mitchell_Porter 13 May 2025 8:23 UTC
2 points
0
in reply to: RogerDearnaley’s comment on: What if we just…didn’t build AGI? An Argument Against Inevitability
Ugh, I was using LW’s custom reaction emoticons to annotate this comment, and through a fumble, have ended up expressing a confidence of 75% in the scenario that AI will “otherwise enforce on us a pause”, and I don’t see how to remove that annotation.
I will say that, alignment aside, the idea that an advanced AI will try to halt humanity’s AI research so it doesn’t produce a rival, makes a lot of sense to me.

Mitchell_Porter 13 May 2025 8:17 UTC
3 points
0
on: A Live Look at the Senate AI Hearing
Ted Cruz mentioned how his daughter was using ChatGPT when texting him. I wonder how many of these senators and CEOs, and their staffers and advisors, are already doing the same, when they try to decide AI policy. I guess that would be an example of weak-to-strong superalignment :-)

Mitchell_Porter 11 May 2025 13:37 UTC
26 points
0
on: Book Review: “Encounters with Einstein” by Heisenberg
Heisenberg versus quarks is one of the best lifelong physics thinkers, encountering one of the most subtle topics in physics. When he says
The questions about the statistics of quarks, about the forces that hold them together, about the particles corresponding to these forces, about the reasons why quarks never appear as free particles, about the pair-creation of quarks in the interior of the elementary particle—all these questions are more or less left in obscurity.
… he is raising all the right questions, and their resolution required a field theory with completely unprecedented behaviors. The statistics of quarks required a new threefold quantum property, “color”; the forces that hold them together were described by a new kind of quantum field, a strongly coupled Yang-Mills field; the particles corresponding to those forces are the gluons, and like quarks, they never appear as free particles, because of a new behavior, “confinement”.
The deeper story here is a struggle of paradigms in the 1960s, between the old search for the most elementary particles, and the idea of a “nuclear democracy” of transformations among a large number of equally fundamental particle species. We now see those many particle types as due to different combinations of quarks, but at the time no-one understood how quarks could literally be particles (for the reasons touched on by Heisenberg), and they were instead treated as bookkeeping devices, akin to conserved quantities.
The quark theorists won, once the gauge theory of gluons was figured out; but nuclear democracy (in the guise of “S-matrix theory”, pioneered by Heisenberg) left its mark too, because it gave rise to string theory. They aren’t even completely distinct paradigms; there are very close relationships between gauge theory and string theory, though not close enough that we know exactly what string theory corresponds to the quarks and gluons of the standard model.

Mitchell_Porter 10 May 2025 2:10 UTC
2 points
0
in reply to: Steven Byrnes’s comment on: steve2152′s Shortform
Incidentally, is there any meaningful sense in which we can say how many “person-years of thought” LLMs have already done?
We know they can do things in seconds that would take a human minutes. Does that mean those real-time seconds count as “human-minutes” of thought? Etc.

Mitchell_Porter 9 May 2025 9:17 UTC
4 points
0
on: Jim Babcock’s Mainline Doom Scenario: Human-Level AI Can’t Control Its Successor
Liron: … Turns out the answer to the symbol grounding problem is like you have a couple high dimensional vectors and their cosine similarity or whatever is the nature of meaning.
Could someone state this more clearly?
Jim: … a paper that looked at the values in one of the LLMs as inferred from prompts setting up things like trolley problems, and found first of all, that they did look like a utility function, second of all, that they got closer to following the VNM axioms as the network got bigger. And third of all, that the utility function that they seemed to represent was absolutely bonkers
What paper was this?