Worried that typical commenters at LW care way less than I expected about good epistemic practice. Hoping I’m wrong.
Software developer and EA with interests including programming language design, international auxiliary languages, rationalism, climate science and the psychology of its denial.
Looking for someone similar to myself to be my new best friend:
❖ Close friendship, preferably sharing a house ❖ Rationalist-appreciating epistemology; a love of accuracy and precision to the extent it is useful or important (but not excessively pedantic) ❖ Geeky, curious, and interested in improving the world ❖ Liberal/humanist values, such as a dislike of extreme inequality based on minor or irrelevant differences in starting points, and a like for ideas that may lead to solving such inequality. (OTOH, minor inequalities are certainly necessary and acceptable, and a high floor is clearly better than a low ceiling: an “equality” in which all are impoverished would be very bad) ❖ A love of freedom ❖ Utilitarian/consequentialist-leaning; preferably negative utilitarian ❖ High openness to experience: tolerance of ambiguity, low dogmatism, unconventionality, and again, intellectual curiosity ❖ I’m a nudist and would like someone who can participate at least sometimes ❖ Agnostic, atheist, or at least feeling doubts
Hmm: you say “Chalmers denies that he’s an epiphenomenalist” and has a “core objection to interactionism”, but Chalmers said he endorses “the thesis (Z) that zombies are logically possible”, and Bentham’s Bulldog says the zombie argument is an argument for non-physicalism, which he implies means “Consciousness is its own separate thing that is not explainable just in terms of the way matter behaves” and which is subdivided into dualism (epiphenomenalism and interactionism) and “niche views”. Does Chalmers, then, endorse one of the “niche views” like “idealism and panpsychism”?
Not exactly, as Chalmers said:
So I’m pretty confused about what Chalmers’ opinion is. Maybe it changed over time? Even so, I think it’s pretty bad that when Chalmers tried to correct EY’s 2008 post 4 days after he posted it, EY not only didn’t understand Chalmers’ argument (rather, he argues that Chalmers was thinking incorrectly), he didn’t even take notice that Chalmers said he doesn’t believe what EY says he believes, so when he reposts nearly the same article 8 years later, he misrepresents Chalmers’ beliefs in the same way again.