Speaking entirely in my personal capacity, I noticed that direct quotes from Holly Elmore are mostly missing from this piece, so I thought I’d add one that resonated with me:
“It’s wrong to work for the AI companies and it’s wrong to defend them. It’s wrong to have friends who have a stake in disempowering or destroying humanity. This is not something we can be nice about and discuss over tea. There is no ‘right’ way to deliver this vital critique— the reason they don’t want to hear it is that they are doing wrong.”
https://x.com/ilex_ulmus/status/2070746368910520506
I don’t draw my moral lines in exactly the same places that Holly does—I think it can be reasonable to work for an AI company if you’re working almost exclusively on safety or if you have a detailed, concrete, public commitment about how you will use your leverage for safety. I genuinely value much of the safety work being done by frontier developers. I also think it’s fine to attend conferences and other professional events with AI capabilities researchers and to negotiate with them—half the point of professional events is to provide an opportunity for dialogue among people who are not personal friends.
That said, I do think there are moral lines. I believe that working on frontier AI capabilities is usually wrong, just like it it would usually be wrong to work on mining dirty coal or locking people up without due process or bundling subprime mortgages or marketing tobacco to kids. If you go out and get a job like that and your children aren’t starving, then in my opinion, that’s pretty strong evidence that you have bad character. It’s always hard to see into other people’s hearts, and I think we should have a very high bar for accusing others of having bad character, but for me, working on frontier AI capabilities in 2026 typically clears that bar.
I can’t and won’t defend the details of Holly’s communication style—even she would admit that she’s more abrasive than necessary—but I think her core point is more true than false: it’s almost always wrong to work on AI capabilities, and people who choose to do so should usually feel ashamed. I don’t see it as useful to try to erase this core point from the AI safety movement’s public messaging. Instead, I think that both conflict theory and mistake theory should be part of our toolkit for addressing the problem of unsafe AI.
If you actually donate most of your earnings, and you actually are pretty replaceable as a capabilities researcher, and you actually find effective charities, then you’re an exception to the rule and I don’t think you’re a bad person. However, it’s one thing to speculate that a basis point of x-risk might be worth about $300M; it’s another to come up with trustworthy evidence that a particular charity is worth at least one basis point per $300M. If you’re going to take a day job that involves destroying the world, you’d better be damn sure that your ethical offsets actually function the way you intended.