The Death in Damascus thought experiment shows some conceptual shortcomings of CDT which precommitment cannot deal with.
In this thought experiment, CDT could (depending on implementation) enter into an infinite loop or keep on wasting resources to move between Damascus and Aleppo.
I like the idea a lot. There are some details I’d question (coming up with concepts of attention, boredom or gravity doesn’t feel easy to me). I don’t think there is enough information to reconstruct a human face. I appreciate the post, because I would have strived for perfection and either gave up or never finished it.
That’s an interesting approach. My thinking at the time was that the number of vaccines administered gives legitimacy to the government’s decisions. There were several other factors I considered besides the mandate:
All this happened while the vaccine was still in experimental stage in France.
There was political motivation to use all the vaccines already ordered. As far as I’m aware, the frequency of boosting was not justified by any science.
The benefits of the vaccines were exaggerated in public discourse (“you’ll never get sick”, “the virus will disappear”, etc.). The priority was never honest communication but manipulating people.
There was an attempt to ridicule any opposition to the vaccine mandate as being motivated by woo-woo.
Just to be clear, I still wasn’t sure I was making the right choice at the time and I would have gotten vaccinated if there was no mandate.
What is the relationship between convergent factorization and natural latent?
this sounds like 3. Context Refresh
60% resolved my social anxiety
I’m honestly curious how you measure that. I’ve been asking myself “am I progressing with respect to social anxiety” and I don’t have a good answer.
To me this reads as a definition of the term “free will” and then arguing against its existence.
If something can predict your action with better than random accuracy no matter how hard you try to prevent them, you don’t have free will over that action
The word “try” here hides lots of complexity and does some heavy lifting. Can you taboo it and rephrase that? Also, are you rejecting the computational theory of mind?
In the case of the brain-scanner, I’d say “the second before” just reflects the fact that taking an action in the physical world takes >0 time, and once you’ve made the decision to start the action you are no longer free to reverse it
If you take an agent embedded in the environment, I don’t think there is a clear-cut boundary between “not yet made a decision” and “have made the decision”. This abstraction just breaks down.
My fear with the teleporter has always been the engineering details—can it get a consistent snapshot of me? what about the last moments after the snapshot and before the old copy is destroyed? can it reliably reconstruct me? what happens in case of a failure?
Assuming many worlds quantum mechanics, we should have similar anticipations for forking into two and for tossing a quantum coin.
There is no rollback when open-weight models are almost SOTA. Could we convince people like Zuck that open weights are too risky? I seriously doubt it.
There are some differences between what women consider attractive female traits and what men actually find attractive. The example I like to give is how some women enlarge their lips even though men (usually) don’t find that attractive.
I think these are the relevant points:
Maybe women’s sense of each other’s beauty is more discriminating than men’s.
Some women probably don’t distinguish a sex symbol’s actual physical attractiveness from the other characteristics that would make her rarely and especially appealing to women (like fame, wealth, etc.), and they’re neglecting to account for these factors being less salient to men.
This:
Might agent rewrite agent ‘s brain to make agent better satisfy agent ’s utility function? Most forms of wire-heading inherently limit the ability of agents to affect the future
and this
We have not proved that agent does not try to affect agent ‘s utility function (in fact, I expect in many cases agent does try to influence agent ’s utility function).
appear to be in conflict. Are you trying to say that depending on the circumstances b may try to influence a’s utility function or avoid doing so?
How important is it to keep the system prompt short? I guess this would depend on the model, but does anybody have useful tips on that?
well-established
The usage I’m objecting to started, as far as I can tell, about 2 years ago with Llama 2. The term “open weights”, which is often used interchangably, is a much better fit.
At some point the open/closed distinction becomes insufficient as a description. You could very well have an open-source wrapper (or fine-tuning) of something which is closed-source. Just try to not mislead people about what you’re offering.
If I vibe-coded an app prompting, say, Claude, and released it along with the generated code, would you have the same objections to me calling it “open source,”
No, because I don’t think this misleads people. Granted, the term “open source” is fuzzy at the boundaries. Should we use the term? I don’t know, but if we do, it only makes sense if it means something different from “closed source”.
wrong in suggesting they prefer to work with the model by editing the training data and “recompiling” instead of starting with the weights
One doesn’t exclude the other. If you’re creating v2 of your model, you’d likely: take the training code and data for v1; make some changes / add new things; run the new training code on the new data. For minor changes you may prefer to do fine-tuning on the weights.
I don’t think I’ve heard people calling 1 wireheading. It certainly isn’t whatI have in mind when I hear the term.
For 2, I’m interested to see a non-embedded example. If the agent can tamper the input to its reward function, wouldn’t that make it embedded?