Started to enter a state that could be described as “meta analysis paralysis” (“meta-[analysis paralysis]” and not “[meta-analysis] paralysis”) when I wanted to formulate my comment about your very interesting take on EA Burnout!
Your post screamed to me as a great example of analysis paralysis and bounded rationality.
Then I started to get paralyzed trying to analyse analysis paralysis and bounded rationality in the context of EA burnout and I quickly burnt out solutionless writing this comment.
Oh the irony!
Even burnt out I was still stuck in analysis paralysis so in the end I told myself:
“Tomorrow I will ask Google and ChatGPT: ‘how to solve analysis paralysis?’”.
And then submitted that above comment which does not really help you… or maybe it does?!
Damned still paralyzed!
Anyway pushing the submit button now, not sure if is the right thing to do but my bounded rationality tells me that at least it is one thing done, even if I could have spent much more time on a much more thorough and thoughtful answer that would have allowed me to formulate a better (less wrong / more helpful) comment but maybe also hitting diminishing returns!
Loved the post and all the comments <3
Here is I think an interesting scenario / thought experiment:
A copy of a person is made while that original person is sleeping on a bed.
The original person is moved to a sofa while still sleeping.
The copy (which is also sleeping) is put in the bed at the exact same position where the original person was.
After a while the original and the copy both wake up and can see each other (we assume they are both completely oblivious to exactly what happened while they were sleeping and that they didn’t dream or they dreamt the same thing, etc...)
At wake-up, based on their own memory of where the original person fell asleep, the original person will likely feel they are the copy and the copy will likely feel they are the original person, wouldn’t they?!
Some might even argue that based on stream-of-consciousness continuity the original “me” is actually the copy (because the copy remembers falling asleep in the bed and actually wakes up in the bed as well).
Some others will argue that based on substrate/matter continuity the original “me” is the original person even if their stream-of-consciousness has experienced a discontinuity (remembering falling asleep in the bed but actually waking up on the sofa while seeing an identical person as them waking up in the bed).
I guess it is subjective and a matter of individual preference if the stream-of-consciousness continuity or the substrate continuity is more important to define who the original “me” is.
Some would even argue that in this case there is not actual any firm original “me”, just one “stream-of-consciousness me” and another different “substrate me”.
(The same/similar thought experiment could be done using the direct brain insertion of false memories instead of moving around people while they sleep / are unconscious, in this example an original person could be inserted false memories that they are a copy and vice-versa to manipulate the memory / self-awareness of who the original “me” is, also generally it obviously could be useful when someone is uploaded/copied if they want to alter some memories of their upload/copy for some reason)