War – What is it Good For?
Spoiler: positive expected utility. That’s what it’s good for.
In The War Trap[1], Bruce Bueno de Mesquita lays out a theory of war that beats all other theories. This is a great example of a model that is parsimonious, wrong, and useful. For every assumption Bueno de Mesquita makes, the reader goes, “What? That’s not how things work.”
Yet when we measure the things Bueno de Mesquita asks us to measure, and apply the equations he lays out, the result ends up closely matching reality. What’s better, his equations arrive at the same results that previous ad hoc theories did – and also explains observations those theories could not account for.
The work Bueno de Mesquita did on The War Trap is creative, intelligent, and inspiring.
We don’t know what a potential war will be like
Here’s the scene for the book: there’s an active international dispute, and one country has issued a threat of solving it with violence. We are faced with the same questions that troubled Tolstoy when he wrote War and Peace:
Will the threat escalate into a full-on war?
If so, which countries will join the war?
How bloody will the war be?
Tolstoy’s main complaint was that when people write about wars after the fact, they spin stories that are just so. They say things like
Of course France would attack Spain as part of the Thirty Years’ War because X.
but then this X is generally something that’s only obvious in hindsight. Often X is also very loosely correlated to the outcome: whenever X happens the next time, France does not attack Spain. The of-course-because-X theory is very common but it’s a bad theory because it can explain everything and predict nothing.
Bueno de Mesquita’s theory is different.
We measure military alliances and fuel usage
Here’s the weird thing: Bueno de Mesquita’s calculations depend only on three things:
For each country, the distance from its centre of power (usually the landmass which contains the capital[2]) and the closest point on every other country. This affects how well a country can project its power onto another.
For each country, we establish its at-home power through some broad metrics like population size, metal production, fuel consumption, and military expenditure. We assign each country a number in the range 0–1 based on how large their values of these measurements are compared to the total for all countries. This is a proxy for how well the country can fight on the battlefield.
For each pair of countries, we compute the correlation between their sets of military alliances (ranging from −1 to 1). Note what this says: we don’t need to know what the alliances are for any country, just the correlations between pairs of countries. This is a proxy for how much countries agree with each other in policy choices.
The last one deserves an elaboration. What we really want to measure is how strongly countries feel for each other’s choices, because this determines how ready they are to use violence to impose their own choices on other countries. However, it’s hard to measure what countries think of each other across the world and a long span of time, so Bueno de Mesquita figures that countries generally enter into military alliances with other countries they agree with, and if two sets of alliances are completely disjoint, it’s likely the two countries disagree on a lot of other things in addition to who to ally.
It’s a brilliant operationalisation of a value that is difficult to measure directly.
Then we compute expected utilities
We then assume[3] that winning a war means you get to impose your will on the loser, in effect forcing them to become your best friend. That is, the utility gain from winning a war (
The hypothetical probability of winning (
Once we figure out the probabilities and win/loss utilities using the measurements we have, we can compute how much, on average, any country would gain from declaring war on any other, as a regular mathematical expectation:
This can be a positive number – a profit – in which case war is a possibility, although by no means guaranteed. It can also be a negative number – a loss – in which case there is no rational grounds for entering a war. This expectation is most commonly negative (a random pair of countries has a 68 % chance of having negative utility of war against each other) which explains a part of why there is so much peace[5], despite the anarchic nature of international affairs.
All of the above involves fairly basic plus and minus calculations where we plug in our measurements from before. The resulting number is the expected utility of going to war.
If we can assume people are rough expected utility maximisers, which they seem to be, we would then predict that wars have historically been initiated by countries that according to our calculations have positive expected utility of going to war. Indeed, that has been the case in the past 200 years: the initiator is the one with positive utility 85 % of the time.[6]
Stop to appreciate how amazing that is! We have a very crappy way of measuring the terms of a very simple theory, and we can still predict with decent accuracy who initiates a conflict. We already have a theory that tells us who the initiator will be among a pair of countries, assuming that they end up in war. If only Tolstoy was around to witness this.
Predictions from expected utility calculus
What else can we learn from the theory?
Entering into alliances is traditionally viewed as something that strengthens a country’s position. The model, in contrast, predicts that entering into alliances can actually make a country weaker. By declaring its affiliation with some countries, a country is implicitly distancing itself from others. Any expression of opinion is a double-edged sword. The record of history confirms: it is not strange for a country to be attacked by their stronger neighbour only after they entered an alliance.
Even a weaker country with no alliances of its own may initiate war against its stronger neighbour when they enter an unpopular alliance, counting on support from third parties who form an impromptu coalition. (The example Bueno de Mesquita uses here is one that would be very familiar to Tolstoy: the Crimean war, which was fought “not for Turkey, but against Russia.”)The model predicts that in extreme cases, enemies can fight alongside each other against a common foe. All it takes is for the supporting country to have sufficiently lower utility for the common foe than the country they support. (This corresponds to the well-known expression my enemy’s enemy is my friend – except it gives us more details on exactly when that saying applies. Often it does not.)
Wars are more often fought between neighbours than across large distances. Some writers try to explain this as some sort of inherent tendency of neighbours to be more belligerent against each other (appealing to culture, historical territorial claims, etc.) The model explains this instead as a difficulty of projecting power across long distances, which makes the expected utility of war low. Much like the theory predicts, very powerful countries can and do fight long distance wars.
Those consequences of the theory are probably not surprising. They cover events that happen relatively frequently in history. But there are also more surprising predictions.
The surprising effects of good relations
We stated above that we don’t care about who is allied to whom. What makes it possible to ignore that? Allied countries are, it turns out, not inherently more likely to help each other just because they’re allied. What matters for an outsider to a war is whether they see some benefit of their own from entering the war. If they don’t, they won’t give their support. If they do, they will support enough to further their personal goals. It doesn’t matter whether they are allied to one of the belligerents or not.
In practise, allied countries often see it as beneficial to step in, but the model explains this as an attempt to preserve or spread their world view, rather than an obligation to their partner.[7]
Here’s something else that struck me as particularly odd:
Countries that really hate each other (because they have so incompatible views on the world) are less likely to go to war with each other, because their opinions of each other are so low that they can’t get much worse. It’s a relationship in which there is nothing left to save, and thus no point of a military intervention.
On the other hand, countries that are really close and share a common world view are more likely to go to war with each other. The reason is that they can’t love each other more, so any change in their dispositions is likely to be negative. Those changes may be most easily preventable by swift military intervention. Both the US and Soviet ran military interventions in their allies’ countries at various points during the cold war, for example.
Apparently, this is also confirmed by history. Wars between allies have been more common than wars between very antithetical foes.
Predicting the severity of wars
We can go even further with the theory.
If the defending country has a very negative expected utility compared to the initiator’s positive utility, the theory leads us to think the defending country will try to find ways to get out of the war, e.g. by yielding to the initiator’s demands without escalating the fight. This is the classic offer that can’t be refused. Thanks to Bueno de Mesquita, we know what the size of the threat must be relative to the concession desired.
The above is true also during a war. If at any moment one of the countries have their expected utility go very negative, we would predict a peace deal follows shortly thereafter. Specifically, the peace deal will be in favour of the country that still has positive expected utility – i.e. has the BATNA[8] of “keep fighting”.
One might think from a quick reading of the theory that a war will only break out if both sides have positive expected utility of war, but this is not true. If the defender has negative expected utility near zero, it is still a rational alternative for the defender to resist and fight back when attacked, even if they would not initiate a war themselves.
Intuitively, this situation means the initiator and defender both agree the defender will lose – but they disagree on the size of the concession the defender should need to make. The defender may need to resort to fighting to show the initiator that they are not as weak as the initiator assumed.
That is the basic logic of when war happens: there needs to be an initiator who thinks they can benefit from it, and then the war goes on for as long as the defender thinks they can negotiate a less costly deal in the future if they continue to fight today.
Following the same logic, we can guess when wars will be bloody: when the initiator and defender have very different ideas of what the outcome should be. In that situation, negotiating a settlement both agree to will be difficult, and it will take some time for their views on the appropriate settlement to converge. During this time, the fight goes on.
Can third parties stop the war? I.e. if a powerful third party says they will fight on behalf of e.g. the defender unless the initiator withdraws, will this deter the initiator? Not necessarily. The third country’s claim is not credible if the third country does not have positive expected utility of a war against the initiator.[9]
It’s impossible until the right person tries
As much as I’d like to explain all the juicy details, and list more consequences of the theory, there’s a certain limit to how much of a book can be squeezed into an article and I think that limit has been reached for now. The War Trap is one of the most interesting books I have read in a while. In part because it covers a serious and important topic, but in part because it is an excellent lesson in how to build quantitative theories.
Sometimes I get the feeling that every discovery a regular person can make has already been made. Sure, I could have come up with a simple algorithm like Dijkstra’s if I needed to – but that has already been done. Then there are the unanswered questions in, I don’t know, particle physics, which I’m sure still has discoverable answers but a regular person does not have the supercolliders to discover them. Then there are questions that are seemingly unanswerable, because they involve seemingly-chaotic systems to which no general laws apply, like wars.
Then Bueno de Mesquita comes along and comes up with a working theory of war using maths I know, plugging in data I have access to. He just had the right idea and connected all the pieces. I could have done that. And there are loads of those seemingly-unanswerable questions still hanging around, just waiting for someone to connect the dots in the right way and turn chaos into order. That gets me excited.
- ^
The War Trap; Bueno de Mesquita; Yale University Press; 1983.
- ^
This sort of thing matters a lot because otherwise in the early 1900s the distance from any country to Britain would be near zero.
- ^
Again, incorrectly but usefully.
- ^
Actaully, in The War Trap, Bueno de Mesquita had not yet figured out a parsimonious way of including risk tolerance, uncertainty, and the effect of third parties into the probability
so in the book the equations end up a little more complicated, including additional terms that are defined as binary cases that need to be considered separately and then added together to the main equation. I think that is rather immaterial to the usefulness of the model, so I’ll present the typographically simpler version here. - ^
If there are on the order of 200 countries in the world, there are around 4000 pairs of countries. The vast majority of these 4000 pairs are not at war with each other.
- ^
Bueno de Mesquita doesn’t give this figure, but he gives
and meaning the odds ratio of looking at the initiator of a war if they have positive utility is 5.4. Since the base odds are 1, this gives us 85 %. - ^
Bueno de Mesquita talks a little about how there are no actual ways of enforcing commitments in international relationships, because that’s what sovereignty means.
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Best alternative to negotiated agreement.
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If they don’t, they wouldn’t rationally enter the conflict anyway, so their posturing is just a trial balloon.
Rational for who? There is no disembodied nation-spirit whose interests are the country’s interests. It seems crazy to have a theory of war which never uses the phrase “principal-agent problem”.
Book was written in 1981, there have been many wars since then. Does the methodology predict those wars? Were there wars it predicts that did not happen?
That’s a great question (mirrored by virtually all the other comments too)! I know Bueno de Mesquita has made a few high-profile predictions which did turn out to be directionally true, but I’m unaware of any quantitative verification. It shouldn’t be so hard to perform one, though, so either one exists or I could be the one to do it. I’ll see what I can find the time for. Thanks for the idea!
Not if it’s curve fitting, which most historical theories are. Would be interested to find out how much of the data was blinded/actually predicted.
What do you think of the Fearon critique of most realist/rationalist theories of war? It seems pretty damning to me (see summary here).
tl;dr is that positive EU is nonsensical as a general case for actually going to war because war always destroys resources. So a pre-negotiated agreement is always theoretically superior, unless there’s a specific reason why a pre-negotiated agreement can’t go through. There are specific reasons this might be true (the Fearon critique and my summary + extension goes through several of them: for example information asymmetry + incentives to deceive, inability to credibly commit, and intrinsically valuing war), but any theory of war that doesn’t account for the negotiation theory prior against is a non-starter imo.
(Note that unlike most critiques the Fearon critique is theoretical rather than empirical, so it attacks the realist theories on their own terms).
This is why I like Carroll Quigley’s argument, that war is for resolving uncertainty in power relations. If Alice and Bob agree on their relative strengths, they enter some settlement where the stronger party dominates the weaker party (but not so much that it’s worth it for the weaker party to resist). But if Alice and Bob disagree on their relative strengths, then they fight it out.
Considering the war in Ukraine, if the Russians expected it to be a quick adventure and the Ukrainians expected that they could hold out, then it makes sense for there to be a war instead of a negotiated settlement, because the two parties have very different expectations of what will happen if there is a war.
I think this lens also helps explain the war in Israel and Palestine, and the war in Iran. (All three feel to me like this explanation is incomplete, and domestic disagreements seem like important factors. 10⁄7 being kicked off by the parts of the government that most benefit from continued conflict feels important—but also uncertainty over the outcome must have played into their decision-making.)
Does The War Trap explain the wars that are happening now?
This is likely insufficient due to analogues of no-trade theorems and Aumann. With fully rational actors and common knowledge of rationality, you can’t just have uncertainty, you need some reason why the uncertainty is not adjudicated via some means that’s less destructive than war.
Fearon’s (partial) explanation is that there are incentives to deceive about your advantages and disadvantages (an example I gave in my summary + extension is that telling you about a new technology we developed might make it easier for you to subvert it), and relatedly that there are incentives to bluff about your military advantages.
But it’s all pretty messy and while I tend to be pretty pro-Rational Actor Model in general as an explanation for various phenomenon (including for organizations bigger than individuals), I do think the positive story for war being explained by positive EU to go to war has major theoretical (not just empirical) flaws.
If the alternative uncertainty-resolution method is a negotiated settlement, the act of starting negotiations potentially changes the balance of force by the end of the negotiation, since opposing power will learn that you are considering a war and have time to prepare itself. Many modern military conflicts have started with a surprise attack intended to knock out or demoralize the enemy before they could build up their full strength. Once the attack begins, the fact that the defender resists might indicate that you were overconfident, but it could also be a bluff or a result of their own overconfidence—in any case there is no time to negotiate and find out. But this doesn’t explain why wars continue for years if the initial attack fails.
Purely pedantic correction:
One of your footnotes says: if there are ~200 countries in the world then there are ~4000 pairs of countries, and usually the great majority of those pairs of countries are not at war.
If there are 200 countries then there are about 20000 pairs of countries, not 4000.
Less pedantically, I’m not sure this observation is actually evidence favouring the book’s thesis. You say that 68% of pairs of countries have negative expected utility from going to war. Or, to put it differently, nearly 1⁄3 of pairs of countries have positive expected utility from going to war. And yet, as you observe, the vast majority of pairs of countries are not at war.
The main thing this suggests to me is that very little of the not-war in the world is explained by negative expected utility.
I think the theory is directionally correct, but there are a few mistakes:
Fewer wars between distal countries is only because they cannot project their power that far, and if they try a nearby country would opportunistically subsume them. Closer geographic distance also happens to make the countries similar in other ways, but those other ways have ~no explanatory power for the war.
Alliances form to make going to war positive EV, not the other way around. This is why the alliance that instigates a war is usually positive EV—because that alliance was put together specifically for that war.
I would recommend watching some games between the top players in Risk, a simplified simulation of war. They spell out what their plans are, and why. Obviously a game is not perfectly applicable to the real world, but Risk is the equivalent to grand strategy as Go is to positional strategy and Chess battlefield strategy.
I think a big issue with Risk as an analogue to grand strategy is that it presumes that war is correct and zero-sum (rather than negative sum in reality). This approximation is okay for battlefield strategy but vastly off for grand strategy.
Your comment is completely incorrect.
War is not zero sum in Risk. There are six players so any large conflict between two of them is usually negative sum.
War [edit: by occurrences, not weighted by scale] is usually positive sum in reality and Risk, e.g. evolution, proxy wars.
sorry, all competitive board games are zero-sum by default, there are exceptions but it’s rare.
(I don’t know under what ontology/definition wars are positive sum in reality but I’m also not that interested in debating this).
Might as well say everyone in the real world is in a zero-sum competition over control of Tegmark IV. But for the most part, wars take place on much smaller battlefields. E.g. trading spots in Asia to get territory cards, fighting a 2v1 to get another continent. Both of which are positive sum, as they increase the probability that one of the players involved will be the ultimate victor.
There is a deep problem here, this cannot separate the two outcomes, parties are not allied because they expect to be on the opposite sides of coercive bargaining, and that being allied is the source of these utilities, as an estimator, though, that states dont make alliances that lead to them being forced to pick between allies, or with those they expect they might fight, is a good one for quantitative estimation, however. I expect that if you had fine grained versions of when pairs of countries came to a coercive settlement short of war, almost many pairs with +EV from fighting show up here, because the offer power to coerce people in the case where there are costs to war and it is mutually -EV to fight, is rare to have credibly if fighting is not +EV in the absence of a deal.
I think that I would like to see this framework applied to a hypothetical war between humanity and AIs, to analyse current geopolitical conflicts, and also on a smaller scale for modelling competition that isn’t war.
Treating humanity and AIs as separate factions is probably not a good mental model conflicts between humans and AI.
No, humans have much more in common with each other than they have with AIs, drawing faction lines based on contemporary geopolitics is a mistake, U.S and China will both soon be under attack from rogue AIs (see https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-model-evaluation-security-incident/ for a recent case with ExploitGym) and we will need a bilateral verifiable treaty on safety. I think it’s more accurate to model the rogue AIs as germs (as opposed to modeling them as phones).
Factions happen because of organization. OpenAI is an organization made up of both humans and AI that cares about OpenAI having more power.