I find it takes a great deal of luminosity in order to be honest with someone. If I am in a bad mood, I might feel that its my honest opinion that they are annoying when in fact what is going on in my brain has nothing to do with their actions. I might have been able to like the play in other circumstances, but was having a bad day so flaws I might have been otherwise able to overlook were magnified in my mind. etc.
This is my main fear with radical honesty, since it seems to promote thinking that negative thoughts are true just because they are negative. The reasoning going ‘I would not say this if I were being polite, but I am thinking it, therefore it is true’ without realizing that your brain can make your thoughts be more negative from the truth just as easily as it can make them more positive than the truth.
In fact, saying you enjoyed something you didnt enjoy, and signalling enjoyment with appropriate facial muscles (smiling etc) can improve your mood by itself, especially if it makes the other person smile.
Many intelligent people get lots of practice pointing out flaws, and it is possible that this trains the brain into a mode where one’s first thoughts on a topic will be critical regardless of the ‘true’ reaction. If your brain automatically looks for flaws in something and then a friend asks your honest opinion you would tell them the flaws; but if you look for things to compliment your ‘honest’ opinion might be different.
tl;dr honesty is harder than many naively think, because our brains are not perfect reporters of their state, and even if they were good luck explaining your inner feelings about something across the inferential distance. Better to just adjust all your reactions slightly in the positive direction to reap the benefits of happier interactions (but only slightly, don’t say you liked activities you loathed otherwise you’ll be asked back, say they were ok but not your cup of tea etc)
If I am honest without accuracy… if I am proud to report my results of my reasoning as they are, but my actual reasoning is sloppy… then I shouldn’t congratulate myself for giving precise info, because the info was not precise; I simply removed one source of imprecision, but ignored another.
Saying “you are annoying” feels like an extremely honest thing, and I may be motivated to stop there.
However, saying “sorry, I’m in a bad mood today; I think it’s likely that on a different day I would appreciate what you are trying to do, but today it doesn’t work this way, and it actually annoys me” is even more honest, and possibly less harmful to the listener.
A cynical explanation is that while attempting to be extremely honest, we refuse to censor the information that might hurt the listener… but we still censor the information that would hurt us. For example, the short version of “you are annoying” contains the information that may hurt my friend, but conceals the information about my own vulnerability.
Perhaps a good heuristic could be: Don’t hurt other people by your honesty, unless you are willing to hurt yourself as much (or 20 % more, to balance for your own biased perception) -- and even this only if they agreed to play by these rules. (Of course you are allowed to select your friends according to their ability and willingness to play by these rules. But sometimes you have to interact with other people, too.)
This is my main fear with radical honesty, since it seems to promote thinking that negative thoughts are true just because they are negative. The reasoning going ‘I would not say this if I were being polite, but I am thinking it, therefore it is true’ without realizing that your brain can make your thoughts be more negative from the truth just as easily as it can make them more positive than the truth.
My own (very limited) observation of trying to be radically honest has been that until I first say (or at least admit to myself) the reaction of annoyance, I can’t become aware of what lies beyond it. If I’m angry at my wife because of something else that happened to me, I usually won’t know that it’s because of something else until I first express (even just to myself) that I am angry at my wife.
Until I actually tried being honest about such things, I didn’t know this, and practicing such expression seemed beneficial in increasing my general awareness of thoughts and emotions in the present or near-present moment. I don’t even remotely attempt to practice radical honesty even in my relationship with my wife, but we’ve both definitely benefited from learning to express what we feel… even if what we’re feeling often changes in the very moment we express it. That change is kind of the point of the exercise: if you’ve completely expressed what you’re resenting, it suddenly becomes much easier to notice what you appreciate.
I think that even Blanton’s philosophy kind of misses or overstates the point: the point isn’t to be honest about every damn thing, it’s to avoid the sort of emotional constipation that keeps you stuck being resentful about things because you never want to face or admit that resentment, and so can never get past it.
Wow. This comment made me happy, even with the jargon. Positive reinforcement for thinking about how your experience might be atypical and other people might have needs or disabilities you hadn’t considered!
If you are interested in some more things that may distinguish your experience from ChrisHallquist’s, you might consider that his examples are mainly about lying in self-defense to hostile people or people who have deliberately asked questions that are costly to evade or answer honestly. Picture an Aikido expert who lives and works in a safe neighborhood getting angry at a janitor who lives in a violent slum for saying they reserve the right to throw a punch if the situation calls for it. I might think the poor janitor has the right to defend themself, but that doesn’t mean I’d be very likely at all to punch someone at your dinner party.
Some of his examples were like that. The part of his post that most bothered me was “accept others’ right to lie to you”, and the title has now been changed to “White Lies”, which I’ve never heard used conversationally to cover things like “no, Mom, not gay”.
the title has now been changed to “White Lies”, which I’ve never heard used conversationally to cover things like “no, Mom, not gay”.
I have always interpreted “white lies” as “lies I approve of” rather than “small lies,” because the size of a lie is clearly a subjective measurement. It looks like wiki mostly agrees.
“Lies I approve of” and “white lies” are overlapping sets, but aren’t quite the same. For example, if a Nazi asks you if you’re hiding any Jews (and you are), I approve of lying to them, but this isn’t a white lie. On the other hand, if your horrible racist aunt asks you if she’s racist, telling her that she’s not would be a white lie, but not one that I approve of.
Looking at Augustine’s taxonomy the terminology seems clearer, as it differentiates “lies told to please others in smooth discourse,” which is what I think Alicorn would associate with ‘white lies,’ with “lies that harm no one and that protect someone from bodily defilement.” (And note how the lies in religious teachings mirrors the discussion of lies in science!) As expected, Augustine thinks it’s better to lie to the Nazi than to lie to your aunt.
But again it seems the subjectivity shines through in the definition of harm, if you want to put the hidden Jew lie in Augustine’s last category. Isn’t the Nazi harmed when you lie to him, and he doesn’t get to catch the hidden Jew?
On the other hand, if your horrible racist aunt asks you if she’s racist
The problem with that example is that “racist” as commonly used has several very different meanings and political forces that intentionally try to confuse them.
I went back and looked at the examples again, and in each case it seemed to me that the question, plus what we know about the asker and their relation to the answerer, when combined with an expectation that the answerer will actually tell the truth, imposes a large expected cost on the person being asked.
Am I missing something?
I wouldn’t have read “others’ right to lie to you” as implying that you personally, Alicorn, must be okay with any person, even your friends and guests, lying to you when you have specifically and credibly indicated that you prefer they would not, and can handle the truth. But I can see how you might easily read it that way.
Also maybe could you explain what’s objectionable about that while tabooing “lie” and “right”?
Somewhat tangentially, that seems like a really nice way to live in some respects. Have you written about what it’s like, and when/how you started choosing exclusively truthtellers to be your friends anywhere?
I wouldn’t have read “others’ right to lie to you” as implying that you personally, Alicorn, must be okay with any person, even your friends and guests, lying to you when you have specifically and credibly indicated that you prefer they would not, and can handle the truth. But I can see how you might easily read it that way.
I have begun to suspect that there is some kind of misreading here, but I’m not sure what I’m supposed to read in an undisclaimed second-person pronoun in an article I’m reading if it’s not “I claim this applies to Alicorn”.
Also maybe could you explain what’s objectionable about that while tabooing “lie” and “right”?
Actually, in my framework, “right to lie to you” is very nearly ungrammatical. You have the ability to lie; talking about the right to do it is approximately nonsense—if someone interferes with your ability to lie, somehow, this would usually be wrong for reasons not having anything to do with your ability to lie in particular. My objection to it is that I think making statements that you believe to be false and intend your audience to believe is morally wrong barring atypical-for-people-making-utterances cases, and I don’t think people are under any obligation to tolerate moral wrongs being done to them, and urging people to do this is… I’m gonna go with “sketchy”.
Usually when I think of “white lies” I think of things that are not primarily intended to produce a belief about the literal content of that sentence at all—they’re a totally different type of social move only loosely related to their “meaning”. I’m thinking about things like this:
Alice is at a party and sees her friend Bella walk in, wearing a new dress. Bella asks Alice what she thinks of her new dress. Bella is making a bid for reassurance, not a request for information—it’s too late to go home and change, she wants to hear that she looks good in this dress in order to feel more confident at the party.
Charlie passes Doris in the hallway at work. “How are you?” asks Doris. “Fine,” says Charlie, who five minutes ago got a call from the doctor telling him that he has a life-threatening illness. Charlie is not fine, but doesn’t want to talk about it. He wouldn’t mind Doris knowing about his condition, but couldn’t think fast enough of a way to politely avoid bringing up the topic except by lying. He correctly assumes that Doris won’t actually update her opinion of how he is or take his response seriously anyway.
Later, Charlie is talking with his friend Edward and shares the news. Edward hugs him and says “it’s going to be okay.” Edward knows that it is not going to be okay. So does Charlie. The point is to show support by saying something reassuring, and the cliche is the first thing that pops into Edward’s head. Edward doesn’t think that this will cause Charlie to believe that it’s going to be okay. But Charlie feels a little better.
I gained a lot of social effectiveness when I figured out that these things aren’t the same kind of “lying” as when you primarily intend to produce the false belief. And just because there’s a false statement involved doesn’t always make them wrong or harmful. I don’t think the overly literal person who interprets these kinds of statements as assertions of fact is a straw man here on Less Wrong, either.
ChrisHallquist’s examples seemed a little more self-defense oriented than cooperative, and in those cases I do think that some amount of harm is being done—but in each case against a person who has already put the answerer in an unnecessarily difficult position, which they might not have the verbal skill to extricate themselves from without lying.
If I threaten or corner someone so they can’t respond truthfully without taking a loss (even if I don’t mean to), and then they use the one tool they have to extricate themselves, it would be a little much for me to condemn them for it, or cut them out of my life and try to exclude them from my circle of friends (which is not a total straw man in the comments here).
That’s not to say that the liar isn’t ever in the wrong—often they are! There are lots more times when lying is appealing than when lying is right. If I can produce a desired interpersonal outcome by telling the truth, I do—this is almost always—and I am very lucky to have the kinds of resources, friends, and verbal facility to be able to live safely with that restriction. But the mere fact that someone resorted to lying in a difficult situation shouldn’t end the discussion—why they lied is important.
Another class of lying—this one I admit to—is deliberately simplifying to produce a 30-second version of a 30-minute thought. Sometimes I forget to note that this is an oversimplification. Sometimes I leave details out of stories about myself, or change immaterial parts to make them flow better. I was not very good at explaining or telling stories until I gave myself permission to do this. I don’t do this if I think it will harm someone’s ability to get the outcomes they care about.
In this comment I list some things that are not lying, which include many of your examples. I’ll add now that I think anybody can waive any right they don’t happen to want, including the right not to be lied to, and reiterate also that you have to intend to be believed to count as lying, and clarify that being mistaken—including sincere mistaken-ness about remembering to include a caveat necessary for factual accuracy—does not constitute a lie.
If Bella has successfully communicated to Alice what she’s looking for, if Charlie isn’t making an attempt to cause Doris to believe he’s fine, likewise with Edward—then that might well be fine. (Is it a coincidence that every single name you chose except Doris is a Twilight character?)
If I threaten or corner someone...
...then you may well have forfeited contextually relevant rights. I read Chris’s post, saw an undisclaimed second-person pronoun telling me to respect others’ right to lie to me, and was like: “But… I didn’t do anything.”
...then you may well have forfeited contextually relevant rights.
Sometimes people cause others to feel cornered or threatened, without knowing it. That doesn’t make them bad people, but it would explain what might otherwise be “bad behavior” on others’ parts. And if anyone finds that people seem to regularly lie to them about certain kinds of thing, they should seriously consider the hypothesis that they are misunderstanding the interaction.
I read Chris’s post, saw an undisclaimed second-person pronoun telling me to respect others’ right to lie to me, and was like: “But… I didn’t do anything.”
I know what that feels like. I’ve had that response to a lot of things that turned out not to be about me at all. It hurts at first. I try to read those things a second time, when I’m not feeling indignant anymore, to figure out whether it’s actually about me, or things I do. I try to avoid the generic “you” and “we”, and abstract pronouncements like that, for exactly that reason—I don’t want to be misunderstood in that way.
These are good examples. I want to add one that I’ve observed/experienced, somewhat related to this one:
deliberately simplifying to produce a 30-second version of a 30-minute thought
Sometimes, you’re talking to a person who has some importance in your life — a relative, let us say — and they ask you a question about your life (some aspect of your life that doesn’t affect them directly). You know that, if you tell them the truth, their reaction will be to lecture you, berate you, give you unwanted advice, yell at you, or otherwise engage you in an unproductive mode of interaction. You know this because this has happened before; you are quite sure that this interaction won’t change your mind (because you have good reasons for living your life the way you do, as opposed to the way your interlocutor wants you to), nor will your protests or arguments change their mind (because of their irrationality). Neither is it likely that this person will respond to requests to drop the subject.
So, you lie. Result: continued peaceful, pleasant conversation.
What do people here think of the moral status of such lies? I am genuinely curious. I myself am somewhat torn, and I’d like opinions.
I don’t think such lies are particularly wrong, but they aren’t the best way to go about dealing with the situation. Not that telling them the truth is better, because it leads to them acting as you describe. I think it’s best to say “I don’t want to talk about that” or “That’s personal”, and shame them if they pry.
In the interests of full disclosure, I should say that I’m not close to any of my relatives.
Heh. “I don’t want to talk about that” or “That’s personal” don’t come anywhere close to working in certain cultures (by which I mean both the unique culture specific to a family, and cultural groups such as e.g. Ashkenazi Jews — the archetypal Jewish mother who says “So, are you meeting any nice girls? What do you mean it’s none of my business?? Of course it’s my business! I’m your mother!” etc. etc.).
Edit: What’s with the downvotes all over this thread...?
If it doesn’t work, I recommend ending the conversation, saying something like, “If you’re not going to respect my boundaries, I’m not going to talk to you”.
This doesn’t apply if you’re financially dependent on said relative. If so, go ahead and lie as much as you need to.
Yeah, I have heard this sort of recommendation. I… don’t think I’ve ever actually seen anyone use it. I don’t know, it could be a good one. It’s a rather harsh thing to say, though, especially to, say, one’s grandmother. I don’t think I could do it.
I guess the point is, sometimes, not lying is hard? (If you’re the type to take an absolute stance against lying, your response might be along the lines of “Yes, doing the right thing is hard. That makes it no less right.” I remain… unconvinced.)
I’ve come close to using it, and it just approaching it has been enough to get people to back down. In the long run, it teaches them not to ask you about those things, which is what you want. I can see it being rather harsh, though. I guess I have some difficulty imagining being in an interpersonal relationship in which I both feel strongly positively towards a person (enough to make me reluctant to say something like that) and at the same time having things that I have to lie about.
If someone wants to pry into your affairs and berate you about them, then you are perfectly justified in lying to avoid them getting on your case. And moreover, if they know they will get on your case if you tell them the truth, then they shouldn’t even expect you to tell the truth.
In this view, if they are clearly defecting on you by trying to get into your business, then you are justified in defecting on them. If they are laying a trap, and you walk into it, then you may encourage them to engage in that behavior in the future. Tit-for-tat.
To be extra clear, when I support lying to people who want to pry “pry into your affairs,” I am specifically referring to private information which isn’t their business. I am not referring to lying to cover up wrongdoing you’ve committed, or in ways that will cause them tangible harm. Those situations are more complicated. By “private” information, I am talking about information which is widely considered private in which culture is relevant, and which tangibly effects mostly you, not other people.
I am also following your premise that this person likely can’t be reasoned with based on a persistent pattern of their behavior, or persuaded to be more accepting of your behavior. Evasion, persuasion, and avoidance are preferable if they work.
Lying to people as tit-for-tat punishment seems valuable to me, but only within confines of a narrow set of situations involving people who have demonstrated a consistent pattern of being hostile or controlling, and where evasion is infeasible. My endorsement of this notion should not taken as a defense of lying in a broad range of situations.
And moreover, if they know they will get on your case if you tell them the truth, then they shouldn’t even expect you to tell the truth.
Indeed, this has been my exact answer in cases where such lies have been found out.
To be extra clear, when I support lying to people who want to pry “pry into your affairs,” I am specifically referring to private information which isn’t their business. I am not referring to lying to cover up wrongdoing you’ve committed, or in ways that will cause them tangible harm.
Agreed entirely.
My endorsement of this notion should not taken as a defense of lying in a broad range of situations.
To be extra clear, when I support lying to people who want to pry “pry into your affairs,” I am specifically referring to private information which isn’t their business. I am not referring to lying to cover up wrongdoing you’ve committed, or in ways that will cause them tangible harm.
The thing is that the prying person likely considers the private affair to potentially involve wrongdoing.
By “private” information, I am talking about information which is widely considered private in which culture is relevant,
So if you were in a culture that permitted say, slavery, and considered how one treats one’s slaves a private affair, you would you still be willing to apply the above reasoning.
The thing is that the prying person likely considers the private affair to potentially involve wrongdoing.
Maybe. There are several scenarios:
A prying person might believe that you might be engaged in actual wrongdoing.
A prying person believes that you are engages in something that they think is wrong, but actually isn’t wrong.
A prying person doesn’t believe that you are doing anything wrong. They are just trying to get on your case because they are controlling or malicious. Or they think it’s fun.
In SaidAchmiz’s example of a nosy relative, it’s not at all clear that the relative believes he might be engaging in any moral infraction, unless that relative has an incredibly expansive notion of morality, as some relatives do.
So if you were in a culture that permitted say, slavery, and considered how one treats one’s slaves a private affair, you would you still be willing to apply the above reasoning.
No, and I don’t think this is accurate reading of my comment, though perhaps I allowed for confusion. In my comment, I discuss multiple conditions for ethically lying to people prying into private information:
That information is considered private in the relevant culture, such that the questioner knows (or should know) they are asking for information that is culturally considered private. If they know they are potentially defecting on you, then their behavior is worse. If they don’t know they are defecting on you, then their apparent defection may have been a mistake on their part, in which case, you should be less enthusiastic to engage in tit-for-tat defection.
The “private” information does not include ” lying to cover up wrongdoing you’ve committed, or in ways that will cause them tangible harm.”
Since slavery is wrongdoing, then a slaveholder is not justified in lying about treatment of slaves, even in a past culture where slavery was considered acceptable and private.
Yes, some slaveholders may have believed that slavery was justifiable, and they were then justified in lying to cover up their treatment of slaves. But they were wrong, and they should have known better.
To conclude, I suggest there are some circumstances where it is justified to lie in response to prying questions about private information. This principle is contingent on classifying some kinds of questions as undeserving of true responses. I have not attempted a rigorous or comprehensive discussion of which questions are undeserving; that would be a much longer discussion, and you are welcome to provide your own thoughts if you consider it interesting.
I do believe that cultural notions of privacy are useful to estimate whether a questioner is being an asshole, though norms aren’t the only factor. If indeed a questioner is asking a question which should be considered unethical, abusive, or overly intrusive… and that type of question is also culturally recognized as unethical, abusive, or overly intrusive, then the questioner should know that they are being an asshole.
If it’s a morally ambiguous situation, where the other person can morally justify getting into your private business, or the ethics or intentions of their questions are unclear, then lying to them to protect your privacy is much less defensible.
That information is considered private in the relevant culture, such that the questioner knows (or should know) they are asking for information that is culturally considered private. If they know they are potentially defecting on you, then their behavior is worse. If they don’t know they are defecting on you, then their apparent defection may have been a mistake on their part, in which case, you should be less enthusiastic to engage in tit-for-tat defection.
What if you consider the information private, but the person asking does not (and you are both aware of the other’s views)? (That is, they know you think it should be private, but they disagree with you on that point.)
If you know that the other person believes that the information isn’t private, then you know that they aren’t knowingly doing something which they believe is prying. So they don’t have mens rea for being an asshole by their own standards. (Yes, I believe that sometimes people are assholes by their own standards, and these are exactly the sort of people who don’t deserve the truth about my private matters.)
If they don’t know my feelings about privacy, then they are not knowingly intruding. But if they do know my views on the privacy of that information, they are knowingly asking for information that I consider private. That could be...disrespectful. If my feelings about privacy on that matter are strong, and they ask anyway, then they may have mens rea for being an asshole by my standards. Perhaps they believe that my standards are wrong and that I should not judge them as an asshole for violating them.
If I thought there was legitimate disagreement about whether the information should be considered private, then I wouldn’t view the other person as defecting on me, and I wouldn’t feel motivated to lie to them to punish their defection. If I still felt motivated to lie, it would be for purely self-defensive reasons (for instance, I might lie to conceal health issues which don’t effect anyone else).
As examples, I think there are many questions between relationship partners, where the ethics of privacy vs. transparency are up for debate, e.g. “how many partners have you had in the past?”, “do you still have feelings for your ex?”, “have you had any same-sex partners?”
On the other hand, if I thought their view of privacy was ridiculous, and they can’t defend their view against mine, then I would be pretty annoyed if they still pressured me for information anyway. That sounds like a breakdown of cooperative communication, or the beginning of a fight. Lying might be an acceptable way to get out of this situation.
Surely there is some point where communication becomes sufficiently adversarial that you are no longer obligated to tell the truth? Especially if both people can tell there is a conflict, so they know to discount the other’s truthfulness?
For example, if your nosy aunt says “I feel that your current dating situation shouldn’t be private,” you say “I think it should be private,” and she continues to ask about your dating situation, then I think you are justified in lying. Your aunt is knowingly pushing for information that you want to keep hidden. She has no defensible argument that her view of privacy should trump yours.
Since you have stated that you think your dating situation should be private, your aunt shouldn’t even expect to get the truth out of you here, so if you lie, there is less danger of her being deceived. People are known to lie about matters that they consider private, and your aunt should take this into account if she chooses to needle you.
When I’m discussing lying to a prying person, I’m mostly imagining conversations that are non-cooperative or hostile, or which involve protecting secrets which mostly effect oneself. I am imagining nosy relatives, slanderous reporters, totalitarian judges, or ignorant coworkers who ask you why you are taking pills. Remember, my ethics generally prefers evading or refusing prying questions. If evasion doesn’t work, that suggests an uncooperative discussion or cornering has occurred.
A prying person might believe that you might be engaged in actual wrongdoing.
A prying person believes that you are engages in something that they think is wrong, but actually isn’t wrong.
A prying person doesn’t believe that you are doing anything wrong. They are just trying to get on your case because they are controlling or malicious. Or they think it’s fun.
You should also consider the possibility:
1a. A prying person believes that you are engages in something that is wrong, but that you mistakenly think isn’t wrong.
Yes, I know this is technichally a special case of 1., but it’s worth considering separately since people tend to be bad at considering the possibility that they are wrong.
I think making statements that you believe to be false and intend your audience to believe is morally wrong
I think one of the problems here is that most people just don’t agree with you on that. And given this, your treatment of people who do a thing that you consider wrong, but they do not, is (in their eyes) very not-nice.
The fact is, you could (especially since you’re a deontologist) decide that any old thing is morally wrong. Perhaps looking at one’s watch is morally wrong. Perhaps using the word “moist” is morally wrong. Perhaps wearing green socks is morally wrong. I (that is, someone interacting with you socially) just don’t know. Perhaps your declarations of what is or is not morally wrong make sense to you, but to other people, they just look arbitrary.
And so what it looks like is that you have decided, apparently somewhat arbitrarily, that a thing that most people do regularly is morally wrong; and now you’re declaring that anyone who disagrees with you is a Bad Person, and not even straightforwardly: you’re making insinuations about their character (“sketchy”). This, to observers (or at least, to me), just doesn’t seem very nice or reasonable.
and I don’t think people are under any obligation to tolerate moral wrongs being done to them
Well, in one sense, no is under any obligation to behave decently and reasonably to their fellow humans. It sure would be nice, but if you protest that you don’t have a duty to do, then sure, I won’t argue.
But insofar as anyone does have an “obligation” to behave decently, I think that saying you’re not obligated to refrain from disparaging the character of anyone who violates one of your arbitrary, personal moral rules is, to use a term from your own comments… not welcoming. To say the least. (So, for example, if you decided that wearing green socks is morally wrong, I think I would say that you have an “obligation” to tolerate people wearing green socks around you.)
The fact is, you could (especially since you’re a deontologist) decide that any old thing is morally wrong… Perhaps your declarations of what is or is not morally wrong make sense to you, but to other people, they just look arbitrary.
This is actually not an accusation I’ve had leveled at me before. Consequentialists tend to object to how rigidly I define moral rules, not which ones are on my list. I’m pretty sure this is a strawman.
now you’re declaring that anyone who disagrees with you is a Bad Person, and not even straightforwardly: you’re making insinuations about their character (“sketchy”).
This is just an uncharitable misreading of me. I don’t think I’ll engage you in particular any further on this subject unless you produce a dramatically better understanding of my position.
When people misunderstand or misread what I say — as happens sometimes, a couple of comments to this post being examples — my response is usually an attempt to clarify my position, correct the misreading, etc. Most of the people with whom I have engaged here on LessWrong do similarly.
A response to an alleged misreading that consists of saying “That’s not what I meant; I won’t explain what I meant; and I won’t talk to you about this anymore” is not a particularly honorable discussion tactic. If you think I have misread you — as is, of course, possible — please explain how.
You’re trying to have a conversation on a completely different level from any that interests me. I’m not playing. Please stop trying to paraphrase me, you’re bad at it.
Picture an Aikido expert who lives and works in a safe neighborhood getting angry at a janitor who lives in a violent slum for saying they reserve the right to throw a punch if the situation calls for it.
This is what “slash their tires” analogy is meant to cover.
Probably. I mean, you literally wrote the book. And the sequence. Even the name… I’m sure a floodlight is of great use up on your hill, but it doesn’t do much deep down here (wherever here is) in what might be fog and might be mud I can’t tell because I can’t see it well enough.
but only slightly, don’t say you liked activities you loathed otherwise you’ll be asked back, say they were ok but not your cup of tea etc)
In that case a real honest answer might be: “I felt uncomfortable during that activity but I don’t know whether it’s because of the activity or because it’s I generally focus to much on the negative.”
That gives the person you are dealing with a lot of useful information to interact with you. Sharing something deeper about yourself builds trust. If the person is well intentioned they can use the information in a way that makes the interaction for both of you better.
The goal of honest communication is to give the other person useful information. Transmitting more useful information is being more honest.
If you just say your loathe the activity or you say you liked it, you might be holding something back.
If you have a trustworthy friendship than knowing about your emotional state is useful information for your friend.
Your friend might be good at reading body language and be able to tell the difference between your fake smile and a real smile but it makes it so much harder for a friend to help you when you aren’t open about what you are feeling.
To me not being open about your emotions on a deep level when you are with friends or loved ones feels like defecting in a prisoner dilemma. You might get some immediate benefit but overall it’s not the path of the game tree that’s optimal. To the extend that there are people who can’t deal with me being open about what I feel I don’t want them as friends or loved ones.
I find it takes a great deal of luminosity in order to be honest with someone. If I am in a bad mood, I might feel that its my honest opinion that they are annoying when in fact what is going on in my brain has nothing to do with their actions. I might have been able to like the play in other circumstances, but was having a bad day so flaws I might have been otherwise able to overlook were magnified in my mind. etc.
This is my main fear with radical honesty, since it seems to promote thinking that negative thoughts are true just because they are negative. The reasoning going ‘I would not say this if I were being polite, but I am thinking it, therefore it is true’ without realizing that your brain can make your thoughts be more negative from the truth just as easily as it can make them more positive than the truth.
In fact, saying you enjoyed something you didnt enjoy, and signalling enjoyment with appropriate facial muscles (smiling etc) can improve your mood by itself, especially if it makes the other person smile.
Many intelligent people get lots of practice pointing out flaws, and it is possible that this trains the brain into a mode where one’s first thoughts on a topic will be critical regardless of the ‘true’ reaction. If your brain automatically looks for flaws in something and then a friend asks your honest opinion you would tell them the flaws; but if you look for things to compliment your ‘honest’ opinion might be different.
tl;dr honesty is harder than many naively think, because our brains are not perfect reporters of their state, and even if they were good luck explaining your inner feelings about something across the inferential distance. Better to just adjust all your reactions slightly in the positive direction to reap the benefits of happier interactions (but only slightly, don’t say you liked activities you loathed otherwise you’ll be asked back, say they were ok but not your cup of tea etc)
If I am honest without accuracy… if I am proud to report my results of my reasoning as they are, but my actual reasoning is sloppy… then I shouldn’t congratulate myself for giving precise info, because the info was not precise; I simply removed one source of imprecision, but ignored another.
Saying “you are annoying” feels like an extremely honest thing, and I may be motivated to stop there.
However, saying “sorry, I’m in a bad mood today; I think it’s likely that on a different day I would appreciate what you are trying to do, but today it doesn’t work this way, and it actually annoys me” is even more honest, and possibly less harmful to the listener.
A cynical explanation is that while attempting to be extremely honest, we refuse to censor the information that might hurt the listener… but we still censor the information that would hurt us. For example, the short version of “you are annoying” contains the information that may hurt my friend, but conceals the information about my own vulnerability.
Perhaps a good heuristic could be: Don’t hurt other people by your honesty, unless you are willing to hurt yourself as much (or 20 % more, to balance for your own biased perception) -- and even this only if they agreed to play by these rules. (Of course you are allowed to select your friends according to their ability and willingness to play by these rules. But sometimes you have to interact with other people, too.)
My own (very limited) observation of trying to be radically honest has been that until I first say (or at least admit to myself) the reaction of annoyance, I can’t become aware of what lies beyond it. If I’m angry at my wife because of something else that happened to me, I usually won’t know that it’s because of something else until I first express (even just to myself) that I am angry at my wife.
Until I actually tried being honest about such things, I didn’t know this, and practicing such expression seemed beneficial in increasing my general awareness of thoughts and emotions in the present or near-present moment. I don’t even remotely attempt to practice radical honesty even in my relationship with my wife, but we’ve both definitely benefited from learning to express what we feel… even if what we’re feeling often changes in the very moment we express it. That change is kind of the point of the exercise: if you’ve completely expressed what you’re resenting, it suddenly becomes much easier to notice what you appreciate.
I think that even Blanton’s philosophy kind of misses or overstates the point: the point isn’t to be honest about every damn thing, it’s to avoid the sort of emotional constipation that keeps you stuck being resentful about things because you never want to face or admit that resentment, and so can never get past it.
This made me think; I may have some luminosity privilege that needs checking...
Wow. This comment made me happy, even with the jargon. Positive reinforcement for thinking about how your experience might be atypical and other people might have needs or disabilities you hadn’t considered!
If you are interested in some more things that may distinguish your experience from ChrisHallquist’s, you might consider that his examples are mainly about lying in self-defense to hostile people or people who have deliberately asked questions that are costly to evade or answer honestly. Picture an Aikido expert who lives and works in a safe neighborhood getting angry at a janitor who lives in a violent slum for saying they reserve the right to throw a punch if the situation calls for it. I might think the poor janitor has the right to defend themself, but that doesn’t mean I’d be very likely at all to punch someone at your dinner party.
Some of his examples were like that. The part of his post that most bothered me was “accept others’ right to lie to you”, and the title has now been changed to “White Lies”, which I’ve never heard used conversationally to cover things like “no, Mom, not gay”.
I have always interpreted “white lies” as “lies I approve of” rather than “small lies,” because the size of a lie is clearly a subjective measurement. It looks like wiki mostly agrees.
“Lies I approve of” and “white lies” are overlapping sets, but aren’t quite the same. For example, if a Nazi asks you if you’re hiding any Jews (and you are), I approve of lying to them, but this isn’t a white lie. On the other hand, if your horrible racist aunt asks you if she’s racist, telling her that she’s not would be a white lie, but not one that I approve of.
Looking at Augustine’s taxonomy the terminology seems clearer, as it differentiates “lies told to please others in smooth discourse,” which is what I think Alicorn would associate with ‘white lies,’ with “lies that harm no one and that protect someone from bodily defilement.” (And note how the lies in religious teachings mirrors the discussion of lies in science!) As expected, Augustine thinks it’s better to lie to the Nazi than to lie to your aunt.
But again it seems the subjectivity shines through in the definition of harm, if you want to put the hidden Jew lie in Augustine’s last category. Isn’t the Nazi harmed when you lie to him, and he doesn’t get to catch the hidden Jew?
most people WANT the nazi to be harmed.
Indeed.
I would argue that the Nazi isn’t really harmed when you lie to him, because not having a preference satisfied is not necessarily harm.
The problem with that example is that “racist” as commonly used has several very different meanings and political forces that intentionally try to confuse them.
I went back and looked at the examples again, and in each case it seemed to me that the question, plus what we know about the asker and their relation to the answerer, when combined with an expectation that the answerer will actually tell the truth, imposes a large expected cost on the person being asked.
Am I missing something?
I wouldn’t have read “others’ right to lie to you” as implying that you personally, Alicorn, must be okay with any person, even your friends and guests, lying to you when you have specifically and credibly indicated that you prefer they would not, and can handle the truth. But I can see how you might easily read it that way.
Also maybe could you explain what’s objectionable about that while tabooing “lie” and “right”?
Somewhat tangentially, that seems like a really nice way to live in some respects. Have you written about what it’s like, and when/how you started choosing exclusively truthtellers to be your friends anywhere?
I have begun to suspect that there is some kind of misreading here, but I’m not sure what I’m supposed to read in an undisclaimed second-person pronoun in an article I’m reading if it’s not “I claim this applies to Alicorn”.
Actually, in my framework, “right to lie to you” is very nearly ungrammatical. You have the ability to lie; talking about the right to do it is approximately nonsense—if someone interferes with your ability to lie, somehow, this would usually be wrong for reasons not having anything to do with your ability to lie in particular. My objection to it is that I think making statements that you believe to be false and intend your audience to believe is morally wrong barring atypical-for-people-making-utterances cases, and I don’t think people are under any obligation to tolerate moral wrongs being done to them, and urging people to do this is… I’m gonna go with “sketchy”.
Usually when I think of “white lies” I think of things that are not primarily intended to produce a belief about the literal content of that sentence at all—they’re a totally different type of social move only loosely related to their “meaning”. I’m thinking about things like this:
I gained a lot of social effectiveness when I figured out that these things aren’t the same kind of “lying” as when you primarily intend to produce the false belief. And just because there’s a false statement involved doesn’t always make them wrong or harmful. I don’t think the overly literal person who interprets these kinds of statements as assertions of fact is a straw man here on Less Wrong, either.
ChrisHallquist’s examples seemed a little more self-defense oriented than cooperative, and in those cases I do think that some amount of harm is being done—but in each case against a person who has already put the answerer in an unnecessarily difficult position, which they might not have the verbal skill to extricate themselves from without lying.
If I threaten or corner someone so they can’t respond truthfully without taking a loss (even if I don’t mean to), and then they use the one tool they have to extricate themselves, it would be a little much for me to condemn them for it, or cut them out of my life and try to exclude them from my circle of friends (which is not a total straw man in the comments here).
That’s not to say that the liar isn’t ever in the wrong—often they are! There are lots more times when lying is appealing than when lying is right. If I can produce a desired interpersonal outcome by telling the truth, I do—this is almost always—and I am very lucky to have the kinds of resources, friends, and verbal facility to be able to live safely with that restriction. But the mere fact that someone resorted to lying in a difficult situation shouldn’t end the discussion—why they lied is important.
Another class of lying—this one I admit to—is deliberately simplifying to produce a 30-second version of a 30-minute thought. Sometimes I forget to note that this is an oversimplification. Sometimes I leave details out of stories about myself, or change immaterial parts to make them flow better. I was not very good at explaining or telling stories until I gave myself permission to do this. I don’t do this if I think it will harm someone’s ability to get the outcomes they care about.
In this comment I list some things that are not lying, which include many of your examples. I’ll add now that I think anybody can waive any right they don’t happen to want, including the right not to be lied to, and reiterate also that you have to intend to be believed to count as lying, and clarify that being mistaken—including sincere mistaken-ness about remembering to include a caveat necessary for factual accuracy—does not constitute a lie.
If Bella has successfully communicated to Alice what she’s looking for, if Charlie isn’t making an attempt to cause Doris to believe he’s fine, likewise with Edward—then that might well be fine. (Is it a coincidence that every single name you chose except Doris is a Twilight character?)
...then you may well have forfeited contextually relevant rights. I read Chris’s post, saw an undisclaimed second-person pronoun telling me to respect others’ right to lie to me, and was like: “But… I didn’t do anything.”
Sometimes people cause others to feel cornered or threatened, without knowing it. That doesn’t make them bad people, but it would explain what might otherwise be “bad behavior” on others’ parts. And if anyone finds that people seem to regularly lie to them about certain kinds of thing, they should seriously consider the hypothesis that they are misunderstanding the interaction.
I know what that feels like. I’ve had that response to a lot of things that turned out not to be about me at all. It hurts at first. I try to read those things a second time, when I’m not feeling indignant anymore, to figure out whether it’s actually about me, or things I do. I try to avoid the generic “you” and “we”, and abstract pronouncements like that, for exactly that reason—I don’t want to be misunderstood in that way.
Not intentional, I was just looking for common names in alphabetical order, but likely Alicorn → Luminosity made those names more available. :)
These are good examples. I want to add one that I’ve observed/experienced, somewhat related to this one:
Sometimes, you’re talking to a person who has some importance in your life — a relative, let us say — and they ask you a question about your life (some aspect of your life that doesn’t affect them directly). You know that, if you tell them the truth, their reaction will be to lecture you, berate you, give you unwanted advice, yell at you, or otherwise engage you in an unproductive mode of interaction. You know this because this has happened before; you are quite sure that this interaction won’t change your mind (because you have good reasons for living your life the way you do, as opposed to the way your interlocutor wants you to), nor will your protests or arguments change their mind (because of their irrationality). Neither is it likely that this person will respond to requests to drop the subject.
So, you lie. Result: continued peaceful, pleasant conversation.
What do people here think of the moral status of such lies? I am genuinely curious. I myself am somewhat torn, and I’d like opinions.
I don’t think such lies are particularly wrong, but they aren’t the best way to go about dealing with the situation. Not that telling them the truth is better, because it leads to them acting as you describe. I think it’s best to say “I don’t want to talk about that” or “That’s personal”, and shame them if they pry.
In the interests of full disclosure, I should say that I’m not close to any of my relatives.
Heh. “I don’t want to talk about that” or “That’s personal” don’t come anywhere close to working in certain cultures (by which I mean both the unique culture specific to a family, and cultural groups such as e.g. Ashkenazi Jews — the archetypal Jewish mother who says “So, are you meeting any nice girls? What do you mean it’s none of my business?? Of course it’s my business! I’m your mother!” etc. etc.).
Edit: What’s with the downvotes all over this thread...?
If it doesn’t work, I recommend ending the conversation, saying something like, “If you’re not going to respect my boundaries, I’m not going to talk to you”.
This doesn’t apply if you’re financially dependent on said relative. If so, go ahead and lie as much as you need to.
Yeah, I have heard this sort of recommendation. I… don’t think I’ve ever actually seen anyone use it. I don’t know, it could be a good one. It’s a rather harsh thing to say, though, especially to, say, one’s grandmother. I don’t think I could do it.
I guess the point is, sometimes, not lying is hard? (If you’re the type to take an absolute stance against lying, your response might be along the lines of “Yes, doing the right thing is hard. That makes it no less right.” I remain… unconvinced.)
I’ve come close to using it, and it just approaching it has been enough to get people to back down. In the long run, it teaches them not to ask you about those things, which is what you want. I can see it being rather harsh, though. I guess I have some difficulty imagining being in an interpersonal relationship in which I both feel strongly positively towards a person (enough to make me reluctant to say something like that) and at the same time having things that I have to lie about.
If someone wants to pry into your affairs and berate you about them, then you are perfectly justified in lying to avoid them getting on your case. And moreover, if they know they will get on your case if you tell them the truth, then they shouldn’t even expect you to tell the truth.
In this view, if they are clearly defecting on you by trying to get into your business, then you are justified in defecting on them. If they are laying a trap, and you walk into it, then you may encourage them to engage in that behavior in the future. Tit-for-tat.
To be extra clear, when I support lying to people who want to pry “pry into your affairs,” I am specifically referring to private information which isn’t their business. I am not referring to lying to cover up wrongdoing you’ve committed, or in ways that will cause them tangible harm. Those situations are more complicated. By “private” information, I am talking about information which is widely considered private in which culture is relevant, and which tangibly effects mostly you, not other people.
I am also following your premise that this person likely can’t be reasoned with based on a persistent pattern of their behavior, or persuaded to be more accepting of your behavior. Evasion, persuasion, and avoidance are preferable if they work.
Lying to people as tit-for-tat punishment seems valuable to me, but only within confines of a narrow set of situations involving people who have demonstrated a consistent pattern of being hostile or controlling, and where evasion is infeasible. My endorsement of this notion should not taken as a defense of lying in a broad range of situations.
Indeed, this has been my exact answer in cases where such lies have been found out.
Agreed entirely.
Also, agreed entirely.
The thing is that the prying person likely considers the private affair to potentially involve wrongdoing.
So if you were in a culture that permitted say, slavery, and considered how one treats one’s slaves a private affair, you would you still be willing to apply the above reasoning.
Maybe. There are several scenarios:
A prying person might believe that you might be engaged in actual wrongdoing.
A prying person believes that you are engages in something that they think is wrong, but actually isn’t wrong.
A prying person doesn’t believe that you are doing anything wrong. They are just trying to get on your case because they are controlling or malicious. Or they think it’s fun.
In SaidAchmiz’s example of a nosy relative, it’s not at all clear that the relative believes he might be engaging in any moral infraction, unless that relative has an incredibly expansive notion of morality, as some relatives do.
No, and I don’t think this is accurate reading of my comment, though perhaps I allowed for confusion. In my comment, I discuss multiple conditions for ethically lying to people prying into private information:
That information is considered private in the relevant culture, such that the questioner knows (or should know) they are asking for information that is culturally considered private. If they know they are potentially defecting on you, then their behavior is worse. If they don’t know they are defecting on you, then their apparent defection may have been a mistake on their part, in which case, you should be less enthusiastic to engage in tit-for-tat defection.
The “private” information does not include ” lying to cover up wrongdoing you’ve committed, or in ways that will cause them tangible harm.”
Since slavery is wrongdoing, then a slaveholder is not justified in lying about treatment of slaves, even in a past culture where slavery was considered acceptable and private.
Yes, some slaveholders may have believed that slavery was justifiable, and they were then justified in lying to cover up their treatment of slaves. But they were wrong, and they should have known better.
To conclude, I suggest there are some circumstances where it is justified to lie in response to prying questions about private information. This principle is contingent on classifying some kinds of questions as undeserving of true responses. I have not attempted a rigorous or comprehensive discussion of which questions are undeserving; that would be a much longer discussion, and you are welcome to provide your own thoughts if you consider it interesting.
I do believe that cultural notions of privacy are useful to estimate whether a questioner is being an asshole, though norms aren’t the only factor. If indeed a questioner is asking a question which should be considered unethical, abusive, or overly intrusive… and that type of question is also culturally recognized as unethical, abusive, or overly intrusive, then the questioner should know that they are being an asshole.
If it’s a morally ambiguous situation, where the other person can morally justify getting into your private business, or the ethics or intentions of their questions are unclear, then lying to them to protect your privacy is much less defensible.
What if you consider the information private, but the person asking does not (and you are both aware of the other’s views)? (That is, they know you think it should be private, but they disagree with you on that point.)
Good questions.
If you know that the other person believes that the information isn’t private, then you know that they aren’t knowingly doing something which they believe is prying. So they don’t have mens rea for being an asshole by their own standards. (Yes, I believe that sometimes people are assholes by their own standards, and these are exactly the sort of people who don’t deserve the truth about my private matters.)
If they don’t know my feelings about privacy, then they are not knowingly intruding. But if they do know my views on the privacy of that information, they are knowingly asking for information that I consider private. That could be...disrespectful. If my feelings about privacy on that matter are strong, and they ask anyway, then they may have mens rea for being an asshole by my standards. Perhaps they believe that my standards are wrong and that I should not judge them as an asshole for violating them.
If I thought there was legitimate disagreement about whether the information should be considered private, then I wouldn’t view the other person as defecting on me, and I wouldn’t feel motivated to lie to them to punish their defection. If I still felt motivated to lie, it would be for purely self-defensive reasons (for instance, I might lie to conceal health issues which don’t effect anyone else).
As examples, I think there are many questions between relationship partners, where the ethics of privacy vs. transparency are up for debate, e.g. “how many partners have you had in the past?”, “do you still have feelings for your ex?”, “have you had any same-sex partners?”
On the other hand, if I thought their view of privacy was ridiculous, and they can’t defend their view against mine, then I would be pretty annoyed if they still pressured me for information anyway. That sounds like a breakdown of cooperative communication, or the beginning of a fight. Lying might be an acceptable way to get out of this situation.
Surely there is some point where communication becomes sufficiently adversarial that you are no longer obligated to tell the truth? Especially if both people can tell there is a conflict, so they know to discount the other’s truthfulness?
For example, if your nosy aunt says “I feel that your current dating situation shouldn’t be private,” you say “I think it should be private,” and she continues to ask about your dating situation, then I think you are justified in lying. Your aunt is knowingly pushing for information that you want to keep hidden. She has no defensible argument that her view of privacy should trump yours.
Since you have stated that you think your dating situation should be private, your aunt shouldn’t even expect to get the truth out of you here, so if you lie, there is less danger of her being deceived. People are known to lie about matters that they consider private, and your aunt should take this into account if she chooses to needle you.
When I’m discussing lying to a prying person, I’m mostly imagining conversations that are non-cooperative or hostile, or which involve protecting secrets which mostly effect oneself. I am imagining nosy relatives, slanderous reporters, totalitarian judges, or ignorant coworkers who ask you why you are taking pills. Remember, my ethics generally prefers evading or refusing prying questions. If evasion doesn’t work, that suggests an uncooperative discussion or cornering has occurred.
You should also consider the possibility:
1a. A prying person believes that you are engages in something that is wrong, but that you mistakenly think isn’t wrong.
Yes, I know this is technichally a special case of 1., but it’s worth considering separately since people tend to be bad at considering the possibility that they are wrong.
I think one of the problems here is that most people just don’t agree with you on that. And given this, your treatment of people who do a thing that you consider wrong, but they do not, is (in their eyes) very not-nice.
The fact is, you could (especially since you’re a deontologist) decide that any old thing is morally wrong. Perhaps looking at one’s watch is morally wrong. Perhaps using the word “moist” is morally wrong. Perhaps wearing green socks is morally wrong. I (that is, someone interacting with you socially) just don’t know. Perhaps your declarations of what is or is not morally wrong make sense to you, but to other people, they just look arbitrary.
And so what it looks like is that you have decided, apparently somewhat arbitrarily, that a thing that most people do regularly is morally wrong; and now you’re declaring that anyone who disagrees with you is a Bad Person, and not even straightforwardly: you’re making insinuations about their character (“sketchy”). This, to observers (or at least, to me), just doesn’t seem very nice or reasonable.
Well, in one sense, no is under any obligation to behave decently and reasonably to their fellow humans. It sure would be nice, but if you protest that you don’t have a duty to do, then sure, I won’t argue.
But insofar as anyone does have an “obligation” to behave decently, I think that saying you’re not obligated to refrain from disparaging the character of anyone who violates one of your arbitrary, personal moral rules is, to use a term from your own comments… not welcoming. To say the least. (So, for example, if you decided that wearing green socks is morally wrong, I think I would say that you have an “obligation” to tolerate people wearing green socks around you.)
This is actually not an accusation I’ve had leveled at me before. Consequentialists tend to object to how rigidly I define moral rules, not which ones are on my list. I’m pretty sure this is a strawman.
This is just an uncharitable misreading of me. I don’t think I’ll engage you in particular any further on this subject unless you produce a dramatically better understanding of my position.
When people misunderstand or misread what I say — as happens sometimes, a couple of comments to this post being examples — my response is usually an attempt to clarify my position, correct the misreading, etc. Most of the people with whom I have engaged here on LessWrong do similarly.
A response to an alleged misreading that consists of saying “That’s not what I meant; I won’t explain what I meant; and I won’t talk to you about this anymore” is not a particularly honorable discussion tactic. If you think I have misread you — as is, of course, possible — please explain how.
...”Honorable”?
You’re trying to have a conversation on a completely different level from any that interests me. I’m not playing. Please stop trying to paraphrase me, you’re bad at it.
This is what “slash their tires” analogy is meant to cover.
Right—I am suggesting an alternative metaphor that is slightly but materially different.
Probably. I mean, you literally wrote the book. And the sequence. Even the name… I’m sure a floodlight is of great use up on your hill, but it doesn’t do much deep down here (wherever here is) in what might be fog and might be mud I can’t tell because I can’t see it well enough.
...what? Some kind of extended metaphor? Your meaning is totally unclear.
In the sequence Armok_GoB mentions I use light as an extended metaphor for self-knowledge.
Hmm. I haven’t read your full sequence (one of these days!), so if that’s the reference point then that explains my confusion. Thanks!
In that case a real honest answer might be: “I felt uncomfortable during that activity but I don’t know whether it’s because of the activity or because it’s I generally focus to much on the negative.”
That gives the person you are dealing with a lot of useful information to interact with you. Sharing something deeper about yourself builds trust. If the person is well intentioned they can use the information in a way that makes the interaction for both of you better.
The goal of honest communication is to give the other person useful information. Transmitting more useful information is being more honest.
If you just say your loathe the activity or you say you liked it, you might be holding something back. If you have a trustworthy friendship than knowing about your emotional state is useful information for your friend.
Your friend might be good at reading body language and be able to tell the difference between your fake smile and a real smile but it makes it so much harder for a friend to help you when you aren’t open about what you are feeling.
To me not being open about your emotions on a deep level when you are with friends or loved ones feels like defecting in a prisoner dilemma. You might get some immediate benefit but overall it’s not the path of the game tree that’s optimal. To the extend that there are people who can’t deal with me being open about what I feel I don’t want them as friends or loved ones.