How much time did they spend practicing with the kids? (Frequency and length of sessions. e.g. 7 times a week for 5-10 minutes)
What economic effects do you expect to see from
The attacks themselves (I guess direct damage of property from increased rocket strike volume is not that large?)
The following mobilization? (I guess this can be way worse for long term?)
3. Are these current events increasing the stability/popularity of the current Netanyahu government or is it better for the opposition parties?
Snappy British sitcom clip:
My quick impression for the overlapping similarities:
An ambitious leader with a strong vision and mandate to make important decisions.
Keeping the organization lean. Even in case of larger projects (construction), teams should be able to operate relatively independently, so at least being lean “locally” (not being forced into a larger hierarchy).
Having effective executives with a lot of domain level experience.
Keeping inferential-query distances short, whether by time (quick iterations) or space (engineers close to assembly plant), but preferably both.
For me this still points (yet again) towards shortening feedback loops: apart from directly being mentioned, generating the experienced leaders and workers is also possibly based on this. No one had as much experience in designing aircraft as the engineers who worked between the 40s and the 60s, just due to the sheer amount of equipment designed, both due to being less matured (lower hanging fruits), less regulated and just military spending being relatively higher during the era. I wonder though if we could replace some of the experience with simulations and games.
Thank you, I wanted to say the same.
SR-71 was not really flying above enemy territory: the high flight altitude made it possible to peek over the curvature of earth. It did not fly over the USSR like the U-2 did before the advent of anti-air missiles, but generally over allied/international borders, peeking into the forbidden territory. Interceptors were raised against it numerous times it but usually were unable to achieve a position where they could have attacked it successfully. I am not sure where the “fired at 4000 times” myth comes from, but it is nonsense. The S-200 (SA-5) systems introduced in the late 60s should have been able to shoot them down from relatively large distance, and it is recorded that Swedish JAS-37 jets were able to intercept and have a lock on it.
I find it exciting for the following:
These AIs are (were) thought to be in the Universe of Go what AGI is expected to be in the actual world we live in: an overwhelming power no human being can prevail against, especially not an amateur just by following some weird tactic most humans could defeat. It seemed they had a superior understanding of the game’s universe, but as per the article this is still not the same kind of understanding we see in humans. We may have overestimated our own understanding of how these systems work, this is an unexpected (confusing) outcome. Especially that it is implied that this is not just a bug in a specific system but possibly other systems using similar architecture will have the same defects.
I think this is a data point towards A.I. winter to be expected in the coming years rather than FOOM.
There is now:
Contains not just the code to scrape sequences, but all sequences and monthly “best of LessWrong” compilations up until February 2023 in both pdf and epub format, which you can individually download from the github link.
I think I did experience something like that. When learning new skills to change positions, I found myself eager to learn even after a long and tiring day or week if I concentrated on my dissatisfaction with the job I had that time. When contemplating about the phenomenon I kind of described it how a Sith is supposed to work, using his negative emotions to channel energy into the task. And indeed, by using this “passion” to “gain strength/power”, I did “gain victory”, so it worked out, as the Sith code preaches:)
Slightly off topic, but I like how user “chaosmage” made this post about using “Vengeance”. I wonder if this can be classified as a case for Nominative Determinism.
Russian military might. They have been hearing it all their lives:learning about historical victories, watching movies about it on the TV, seeing the victory parade every 8th of May...
And they can point to the map, and show that Russia being the largest country by territory is proof enough.Hell, even most of the world believed it until March.
“Objection against “out of desperation”. How is it desperation to lose something that you didn’t own yesterday, just tried to take from someone and failed. (Yes, I am sure that Russia will spin it as desperation, but it is not.)”
I would make a comment here:
Losing a couple of provinces in Ukraine that just become part of the Russian Federation recently should not make “Russia” desperate. However, I believe we have a principal-agent problem here:Russia can afford to lose this war, but the current Russian leadership does not. I think they believe there is a good chance that they would be removed by a coup or a revolution if they loose face due to military defeat.
I think the past 6 months of the conflict supports this view:The Russian Armed Forces have been inefficiently throwing hard-to replace weaponry and manpower trying to conquer the rest of Donbass, while pretending this was the plan all along. It is a relatively worthless region(large portion of the population having fled, majority of industrial infrastructure having been/would be destroyed), and replacing lost equipment and professional personnel (especially officers and special operation units) will take many years, making Russian conventional forces severely weaker.This seems to make as much strategic sense as trading your queen for a pawn.That is, if you are using the POV of Russia. However, if you are considering the decision is made by the political leadership, hoping to hide that they screwed-up, it makes a lot more sense.