I only know of children and elderly people not eating the crust because it’s harder to chew.
Interesting explanation, but does that hold for other foods—do kids/adults that don’t enjoy the crust because it’s harder tend to also dislike other difficult-to-chew foods? Anything from jerky to raw vegetables? And those that do enjoy it, enjoy chewing other harder foods?
Clearly, there are lots of crunchy/chewy foods kids are willing to eat or at least are not stereotyped as off-putting the way bread crusts are for kids.It’d be interesting to tease apart what is causing the dislike—is it really texture, or taste or something else?
When I try to look up the question of why kids (often) don’t like crusts, there is the occasional person that frames it as an “American” thing. Other disagree pointing out Brits, Europeans etc. also feel this way.
But is there any evidence that this varies by country, culture or nationality? If so why might this be—differences in type of bread/baking styles?
I’m not sure if outside (ha!) the “rationalist sphere”, other people have independently invented the phrase “outside view” or not but I feel there’s some spillover of the term “outside view” with similarity to “outsiders’ view” which I think is common enough in layperson speak.
An outsider’s view (or third party view, attempt to be objective and look “outside” your current situation as an “other”) as conceived of in daily life does have elements that are pointed at in this post for popular interpretations of outside view (“Bias correction, in others or in oneself”, “Deference to wisdom of the many”).
But it also could heavily involve the original meaning described and clarified in this post too of “Reference class forecasting” if outsiders can offer broader views by adding to the reference class.
For example in an argument when two people are fighting over (thing) say a married couple bickering or two friends whose relations have soured due to some problem, the two parties with vested interests may think their struggle is unique and particular, but a neutral third party or outsider can often (though not necessarily) have a better, objective view because they’ve also seen enough different fights over (thing) that the two involved have not seen before.
In particular, “boldness” and “daring” seem to me as if they have very little to do with nonconformity
So, for instance, you could be bold and risk-taking but doing so because you want to live up to a norm (or are heavily driven by chasing an ideal that’s “conventional”)?
For instance, a manly warrior taking risks to show off his manliness or lack of cowardice, or desire to fill the warrior role in his tribe. Would that count?
Here is just an example (from a fairly mainstream media source, NPR), of what I was thinking about when it comes to motivation, titled A Daughter’s Journey To Reclaim Her Heritage Language, and discussing a third-generation Chinese American who never previously spoke a Chinese language trying to learn at age 30 to reconnect with her roots.
Back in the days (perhaps even not so long ago as the 90s), it feels like this—along with liberal arts folks, cultural intellectuals like humanities professors -- was far closer to an archetype if not one of the central examples of the average American interested in Chinese culture or language.
Now this sort of thing is heavily swamped by the perception that interest in China is all political/business/realpolitik related. The heritage/culture side—both Chinese Americans interested in so-called “reconnecting with their roots” or anyone of any heritage for that matter interested in the subject—seems pretty drowned out by comparison.
Also, l needed to show a specific example of a bully taking the extra effort to do extra harm, and giving a real example would be, well, problematic.
I think also that any bully who goes far enough to do something really bad gets called other things and becomes a non-central example of a bully (e.g. a bully that resorts to murder is labelled a murderer, not a bully). It seems bully often evokes images of doing mean-but-not-to-the-point-of criminal things where laws get involved and where the label on a kid shifts from bully to juvenile delinquent, even if the non-illegal things are still bad and traumatizing to victims.
Depends on if you mean by that, as shorthand that the evil (insert person or thing) must be destroyed if possible.
You could get rid of something ‘evil’ by reforming or changing it to be ‘non-evil’ by whatever means, that don’t involve literally annihilating it.
Unless your definition of evil thing implies unreformable (don’t know if that matches intuition—I can image stories where an ‘evil’ villain sees the light and becomes good) and destruction is the only option.
I will admit my goal was primarily more about the second, about popular usage precisely because I perceived a mismatch with the “self-identity” emphasis which (many) more academic sources seem to focus on.
I wanted to interrogate if this mismatch fit people’s perceptions and the usage on blogs, online and in related circles.
And also if it had any implication for clearer thinking when conflicting usages arise between people talking about ingroups and outgroups.
Well, I thought the rationality-and-adjacent community emphasizes and would be a good place to clarify and disentangle concepts and meanings. These are major places, on blogs etc., where ingroup and outgroup are popularly used online.
And I don’t mean to bring too much whataboutism into this, but I find it noteworthy that of criticism of two posts that I got recently downvoted for, one seemed to center around not enough explicitness and usage of common language (over the term “stereotype”) but the other about asking for too much explicitness (over the term “ïngroup”).
Well, first, maybe in academic settings, what is the usage most commonly accepted and understood in social science?
And second, though there’s no one authority, I want to know what usage(s) is most commonly understood or widespread broadly (even outside academia) by the public.
And if popular usage conflicts with it (not to say that it’s wrong, that’s just usage), I also want to know. Just like how “anti-social”can describe introverted, asocial people in popular speech but in psychology or sociology mean actively harmful or adversarial to society.
I’m actually surprised the answer to this question is not made more explicit (is an ingroup something you choose for yourself or not?), in many articles or blogs, for all the popularity that ingroup vs. outgroup as terms made it into the public setting from more academic terms. It makes a big difference conceptually if self-identification matters or if it is categorization by others, I would think.
The thing that’s always been weird to me about American food is that they serve you a giant slab of meat as your meal, and then everything else is sides, which leads to the whole “eat your vegetables” problem in the first place.
I think “American food” is a bit too diverse to generalize. You have your steaks and your meatloafs, but plenty of chilis, fajitas, stir fries, beef stews, soups with bits of meat in them, spaghetti-and-meatballs, chicken cut up and put-in-a-salad sort of thing, and plenty of other examples of meat “not in a big slab”.
And yes, I would still consider stuff like Mexican-American, Chinese-American etc. food sufficiently “mainstream” in American culture that they are American food. Maybe most Americans don’t eat those things every day, but they are parts of the culinary repertoire familiar to and used by them.I have no idea of stats, but I bet most Americans of unspecified heritage would not find tacos, ground meat, stir fry meat, fajitas, chile, particularly exotic by any stretch and many Americans probably eat them, if not cook them themselves, a few times a week etc.
Learning Chinese because you love China and Chinese culture is a stupendous idea
There seems to be a definite shift in the last decade or two (or maybe generation) from the perception that people who are into Chinese-related things like culture/language are doing it for heritage and cultural interest reasons vs. doing it because of the perceived importance of China geopolitically, business-wise, science-wise etc. and because China is seen as “the future”.
Whether it’s really practical or not, it appears claimed practical (careerist) reasons have increasingly taken over cultural reasons/liberal arts for being interested in China.By contrast, it’s interesting that say learning, French or Japanese, is still more associated with interest and appreciation for the culture than hardheaded pragmatism. Or even stuff like learning Korean because K-pop is seen as cool now.
On the lingua franca of science issue, I get the impression that for scientific careers over the last few generations, going out of one’s way to learn foreign languages to read/communicate with non-English-speakers seems to have become less prevalent, rather than more, among English speakers.For instance, mandatory foreign language requirements in US PhD programs are rarer and rarer (perhaps only in elite schools, and more or more restricted to humanities, not STEM) for fields like hard science.Of course this is in comparison to and a holdover from when non-English European languages like French, German, Russian etc. made up a larger share of the scientific literature in past generations if not centuries, and may not apply to the rise of Asia.But I do wonder, has the relative importance in science from the rise of China or Asia (let’s say when Japan rose to prominence last generation or two ago) convinced more people to learn non-western languages in the same way people did with French, German, Russian ec. when continental Europe was a scientific center, that can be seen in language learning trends?
Most discussion of language learning centers around business, international relations, geopolitical stuff, with science relatively little discussed but that might be because scientists make up only a small proportion of the populace.
What planet are these psychologists from where if you walk away from a bully, they suddenly become stuck in place and give up?
I think the “walk away” thing works better, broadening the situation to not just school bullies, if you stretch the definition or I suppose steelman it to mean do actions where you can leave the bully behind and it’s costly for the bully to follow unless they stalk or resort to means or risks that are too troublesome.
e.g. Quit a workplace full of harassers or leave a club or an organization full of jerks. In some settings if enough victims “vote with their feet”, the bully runs out of victims. Obviously totally unreasonable in settings like schools, prisons etc.
Also moving away from situations with bullies is easier for adults or people with more agency or choice than kids.
But it doesn’t work in settings where locally “walking away” doesn’t put you out of the bullies reach and there is a low barrier for the bully to “walk back to you and resume bullying”—moving to a different part of the playground, the bully will just follow. Changing office spaces, while a harasser still remains your co-worker and will still harass in regular encounter.
It worth noting here that people who form their opinion by “generalizing from one example” instead of by listening to common media are not stereotyping in your classification when they judge people by that generalization.
Yes, indeed it would run counter to it. I didn’t mean that “generalizing from one example” is “like stereotyping”in that they are similar in what type of reasoning they are, but meant to say they are similar as an example of something people could rationally admit to doing (admit to stereotyping, just like admit to generalizing from one example) and acknowledge the existence of or debate the usefulness of.
Though if very few people besides you and I are participating, then I’d concede this conversation is not that fruitful and go discuss something else, I thought your point (2) was very interesting but I feel the ground the term “stereotype” covers is still a bit more narrow than this.”2. When you are faced with a person about whom you have little information, to what extend are you willing to have an explicit model of the person. How strongly does that model influence your actions in the context of the person.”
Stereotypes aren’t just any explicit model based on limited information but are particular models based on larger group membership and assumptions of homogeneity in that group membership (for instance, if based on limited information, I look at Jane glancing at me funny and frowning and make up a mental model about Jane that maybe she hates me because some conspiracy against me as evidenced by her frown reminding me of my childhood bully that also frowned against me that way before plotting against me, that’s an explicit model of her but not a conventional thing people would call a stereotype—it’s too thoughtfully individualistic, deliberate, explicit and idiosyncratic a model of a person. If I see Jane frown at me, and then think Jane frowns on me because she is a member-of-group and we all know member-of-groups don’t like people doing X, which I just did, that falls more into a typical episode of stereotyping based on limited info).I think a few traits of stereotypes (but not always) involve
Being part of the “common knowledge” of a society that most people share (in mass media societies it could be propagated through it, or orally as part of common knowledge elsewhere).
Homogeneity assumptions that may have some statistically average grain of truth or sometimes not, but is heavily played up in tropes that people rightly or wrongly see as over-the-top in some settings (people say stereotypes are played up in comedy, ads etc.). For example, stereotypes of women shopping for shoes are popular and may be backed up by real stats (e.g. data on purchases) but take on a life of their own grander narratives in media.
Often passed on without firsthand knowledge to others through hearsay (though firsthand knowledge can confirm or disconfirm it) -- e.g. think of the father telling the young son “what women are like” even before the son has any good mental model from experience, though also heavily backed up by people who have tons of firsthand knowledge insisting it’s common sense (“or I know it’s stereotypical but it’s true, I’ve been married 40 years”). The thing is stereotypes are things widely recognized by the culture—something you discovered yourself through years of experience about generalizing about people but are not celebrated in mass culture, common knowledge are generally not called “stereotypes”.
Not saying all stereotypes have these traits but possessing more of these traits makes something more likely to be called a “stereotype”.
3. How much entropy do you see in the information that’s assessible in a few seconds.
Yes, stereotypes seem to be reliant on certain cache’d thought/models and rely on thinking fast. If you think too much about the information and modeling, it almost becomes less “stereotypical”. But not all examples of thinking fast or relying on judgements accessible in a split second are stereotypes though.
I don’t know a better way of phrasing the central example of category of thinking that is “social generalizations about categories of human that are statistical but commonly discussed in mass media, culture etc.” in a clear and concise way other than “stereotypes” or “stereotyping”. (One of the most common examples I started off with was fast, physical-appearance-based processing of demographic attributes like sex, appearance, accent, dress etc., which then trigger assumptions about people like personality, dispositions etc. most agree are a component in what people label as “stereotypes”).
I was trying to get at a cluster of traits—the “family resemblance thing” even if I couldn’t formalize it well the first time. I was not trying to “Motte-and Bailey” the term “stereotype” but genuinely having a hard time grasping at a less charged term but still had the cluster of traits (in the sense of “what is art” is hard and heavily debated but you could still have a question like do rationalists value art or want to fund art more than average members of the public?).
By analogy, people talk about westerners thinking more individualistically and easterners prefering collectivism, or STEM-types thinking analytically and humanities thinking more holistically or “people orientation” vs. “thing orientation” all the time, even though all those ways of thinking are politically charged (“what is collectivism” it’s a fuzzy set of traits and has a negative connotation in some places but not others) but we can still rationally discuss them.
I didn’t even think “stereotype” was that politically charged in any particular direction (particular stereotypes are, but the concept of there being a thing called “stereotyping” which people of all political persuasions agree exist and people should rationally admit to doing (just like people rationally admit to “generalizing from one example”—I do myself). I avoided focusing on any one subcategory of stereotyping precisely because I wanted to be more meta (instead of asking “are rationalists more skeptical of gender stereotypes”, or “are they more skeptical of national stereotypes”?).I suppose I could reword to something like “are rationalists less likely to make broad brush social generations from the “general culture” versus firsthand experience and waiting until getting more data firsthand from individuals” or something? Or even “are rationalists more skeptical about broad generalizations about human beings based on limited data about demographic categories than the average member of the public would be?” perhaps chanelling ideas like being aware of “generalizing from one example” or “typical mind fallacy” or “thinking fast and slow”. Would that sound better?
And if others don’t think this discussion is fruitful (as the initial downvotes show), than that is fine too. I am willing to concede and say maybe I’ll spend time on, or discussing, other things. No hard feelings.
I think it goes without saying that more data is good. But the quality or strength of the data is important too. I think some debates over stereotypes rest on if they count as good quality data, or data that should override other data (firsthand experience) on how to update your prior. For instance, if you get data from mass media that “all women like chocolate more than men” but get data from most of the men and women you know that both like chocolate equally, which trumps which in if you are more likely to consider chocolate as gift to male or female friends?
You could say the societal stereotype is better data—after all stereotypes have been built up over generations, are “common knowledge”. You could say your personal, thoughtful experience is better (I trust my own people around me, not secondhand, thirdhand, or mass media cultural tropes—but what if I’m in an unrepresentative bubble, what if my friends, knowing the stereotypes are ashamed to fulfil them and say the opposite, in which case I should downweigh their claims and actually follow the stereotype more).Also in adversarial settings you want to know if stereotypes are accurate data or are created with an agenda (e.g. in wartime many stereotypes about the enemy’s traits are not based on accurate understanding of the enemy; okay in a less obviously conflict-driven setting you might get this still—like stereotypes exaggerated to sell a product “get this for dad” even though your dad doesn’t fit the stereotypes, or “this city has friendly people” obviously sponsored by the tourism industry). They could be accurate however and in your best interest (e.g. the stereotype of citizens of this city being mean and unfriendly might be unflattering but your friend might generally care and tell you the stereotype (against the fear of generalizing) because if you’re stranded there, it’s good to know how much help you can expect from friendly strangers in borrowing a phone).
Any other, alternative hypotheses to explain why Europeans and European-descended peoples drink far more than most others (this holds true for country to country comparisons though some places like Nigeria with little European descent are high, and less so but somewhat true within places like the US where whites seem to drink a bit more than racial minorities)?I’m struck that “Europeans drink more than most of the world” is a bigger thing than “East Asians drink less than most of the world” by a long shot. That still seems to ask for an explanation, even if not genetic (e.g. cultural, historical etc.).