From this post on multiverse-wide cooperation (nowadays people call it ECL—evidential cooperation in large worlds):
5. MSR represents a shift in one’s ontology; it is not just some “trick” we can attempt for extra credit
The line of reasoning employed in MSR is very similar to the reasoning employed in anthropic decision problems. For comparison, take the idea that there are numerous copies of ourselves across many ancestor simulations. If we thought this was the case, reasoning anthropically as though we control all our copies at once could, for certain decisions, change our prioritization: If my decision to reduce short-term suffering plays out the same way in millions of short-lived, simulated versions of earth where focusing on the far future is impossible to pay out, I have more reason to focus on short-term suffering than I thought.
MSR applies a similar kind of reasoning where we shift our thinking from being a single instance of something to thinking in terms of deciding for an entire class of agents. MSR is what follows when one extends/generalizes the anthropic/UDT slogan “Acting as though you are all your (subjectively identical) copies at once” to “Acting as though you are all copies of your (subjective probability distribution over your) decision algorithm at once.”
Rather than identifying solely with one’s subjective experiences and one’s goals/values, MSR also involves “identifying with” – on the level of predicting consequences relevant to one’s decision – one’s general decision algorithm. If the assumptions behind MSR are sound, then deciding not to change one’s actions based on MSR has to cause an update in one’s world model, an update about other agents in one’s reference class also not cooperating. So the underlying reasoning that motivates MSR is something that has to permeate our thinking about how to have an impact on the world, whether we decide to let it affect our decisions or not. MSR is a claim about what is rational to do given that our actions have an impact in a broader sense than we may initially think, spanning across all instances of one’s decision algorithm. It changes our EV calculations and may in some instances even flip the sign – net positive/negative – of certain interventions. Ignoring MSR is therefore not necessarily the default, “safe” option.
I’m not sure this section will convince, but the point is that it’s hard to avoid. Even if you decide to ignore these sorts of arguments, that very action (the ignoring) should update what you think aliens will do. So then, why are you ignoring it?
He was touchy about it in those early-day OpenAI emails to Sutskever and Brockman that came out, where Sutskever had voiced some concerns about Altman maybe having too much power with their intended company structure.
To me, Sutskever seems susceptible to social pressure and guilt tripping, so I think this is Altman’s Machiavellianism at work, which would support the point of the OP. Particularly: if someone is in many contexts capable of acting calm-headed and strategic and showing an understanding for other viewpoints, meaning they act UNLIKE someone who was brought up in an honor culture, but then they throw a tantrum when they are around individuals who are likely to feel a lot of guilt for having accused them (or are around 3rd parties siding with someone who presents themselves as the victim), then the behavior is incongruous, which should raise suspicions.
Sure, if someone always throws a tantrum because they grew up in an honor culture, that’s consistent too. But there are certain contexts where you cannot rise through the ranks with this mentality (maybe you can make it far within the Mafia but not in the Silicon Valley startup scene).