clone of saturn

• clone of saturn 19 Jun 2025 4:20 UTC

  2 points

  0

  in reply to: ryan_greenblatt’s comment on: ryan_green­blatt’s Shortform

  You could handle both old and new scrapes by moving the content to a different URL, changing the original URL to a link to the new URL, and protecting only the new URL from scraping.

• clone of saturn 18 Jun 2025 20:47 UTC

  11 points

  0

  on: Mo­ral Align­ment: An Idea I’m Em­bar­rassed I Didn’t Think of Myself

  As I see it, a fatal problem with CEV is that even one persistent disagreement between humans leaves the AI unable to proceed, and I think such disagreements are overwhelmingly likely to occur. Adding other sentient beings to the mix only makes this problem even more intractable.

  EDIT: I should clarify that I’m thinking of cases where no compromise is possible, e.g. a vegan vs. a sadist who derives their only joy from torturing sentient animals. You might say sadists don’t count, but there’s no clear place to draw the line of how selfish someone has to be to have their values disregarded.

  EDIT 2: Nevermind, just read this comment instead.

• clone of saturn 17 Jun 2025 9:18 UTC

  4 points

  2

  in reply to: habryka’s comment on: [Meta] New mod­er­a­tion tools and mod­er­a­tion guidelines

  Do you think anything is ever bad enough that it deserves to be rudely dismissed or sneered at? Or is that unacceptable to you in any possible context?

• clone of saturn 13 Jun 2025 12:09 UTC

  8 points

  6

  in reply to: Gordon Seidoh Worley’s comment on: Said Ach­miz’s Shortform

  It seems like this accusation of bad faith could go both ways. I haven’t seen you demonstrate curiosity or openness to being convinced that your religion pushes anti-epistemology, I’ve only seen flat denial followed by casting of aspersions.

• clone of saturn 12 May 2025 6:10 UTC

  7 points

  6

  on: a con­fu­sion about prefer­ence orderings

  I agree that the money pump argument is confusing. I think the real problem with intransitive preferences is that they’re self-contradictory. If I have an intransitive preference and you simply ask me whether I want A, B, or C, I am unable to answer. As soon as I open my mouth to say something I already want to change my mind, and I’m stuck. However, there’s some conceptual slippage to merely wanting to move in a cycle between states over time, such as wanting to travel endlessly from Chicago to New York to San Francisco and back to Chicago again. This may be considered silly and wasteful but there’s nothing inherently illogical about it.

• clone of saturn 4 Jan 2025 11:35 UTC

  2 points

  −1

  in reply to: jbash’s comment on: The In­tel­li­gence Curse

  But why would the people who are currently in charge of AI labs want to do that, when they could stay in charge and become god-kings instead?

• clone of saturn 21 Nov 2024 9:08 UTC

  4 points

  2

  in reply to: trevor’s comment on: Lighthaven Se­quences Read­ing Group #12 (Tues­day 11/​26)

  Okay, but you’re not comparing like with like. Terminator 2 is an action movie, and I agree that action movies have gotten better since the 1960s. But in terms of sci-fi concepts introduced per second, I would suspect 2001 has more. Some movies from the 1990s that are more straight sci-fi would be Gattaca or Contact, but I don’t think many people would consider these categorically better than 2001.

• clone of saturn 21 Nov 2024 7:53 UTC

  4 points

  2

  in reply to: trevor’s comment on: Lighthaven Se­quences Read­ing Group #12 (Tues­day 11/​26)

  This seems like more a problem of phone addiction than a problem with the movie. Newer movies aren’t improved by being cut off from using a palette that includes calm, slow, contemplative, vibe-setting scenes.

• clone of saturn 21 Nov 2024 7:27 UTC

  38 points

  21

  on: Cost, Not Sacrifice

  Buying something more valuable with something less valuable should never feel like a terrible deal. If it does, something is wrong.

  It’s completely normal to feel terrible about being forced to choose only one of two things you value very highly. Human emotions don’t map onto utility comparisons in the way you’re suggesting.

  What links here?

  • papetoast's comment on pa­petoast’s Shortforms by papetoast (23 Nov 2024 11:42 UTC; 1 point)

• clone of saturn 15 Nov 2024 12:15 UTC

  5 points

  3

  in reply to: jbash’s comment on: Here­sies in the Shadow of the Sequences

  Any agent that makes decisions has an implicit decision theory, it just might not be a very good one. I don’t think anyone ever said advanced decision theory was required for AGI, only for robust alignment.

• clone of saturn 15 Nov 2024 7:08 UTC

  7 points

  0

  on: Seven les­sons I didn’t learn from elec­tion day

  The second reason that I don’t trust the neighbor method is that people just… aren’t good at knowing who a majority of their neighbors are voting for.

  This seems like a point in favor of the neighbor method, not against it. You would want people to find “who are my neighbors voting for?” too difficult to readily answer and so mentally replace it with the simpler question “who am I voting for?” thus giving them a plausibly deniable way to admit to voting for Trump.

• clone of saturn 31 Oct 2024 4:06 UTC

  11 points

  7

  on: The Align­ment Trap: AI Safety as Path to Power

  Can anyone lay out a semi-plausible scenario where humanity survives but isn’t dominated by an AI or posthuman god-king? I can’t really picture it. I always thought that’s what we were going for since it’s better than being dead.

• clone of saturn 18 Sep 2024 2:44 UTC

  5 points

  2

  in reply to: Shankar Sivarajan’s comment on: Not ev­ery ac­com­mo­da­tion is a Curb Cut Effect: The Handi­capped Park­ing Effect, the Clap­per Effect, and more

  I would guess most of them just want their screen readers to work, but a badly written law assigns the responsibility for fixing it to the wrong party, probably due to excessive faith in Coase’s theorem.

• clone of saturn 18 Sep 2024 1:55 UTC

  4 points

  2

  in reply to: Shankar Sivarajan’s comment on: Not ev­ery ac­com­mo­da­tion is a Curb Cut Effect: The Handi­capped Park­ing Effect, the Clap­per Effect, and more

  I would guess it’s because the Americans with Disabilities Act provides a private right of action against businesses whose websites are not accessible to people with disabilities, but doesn’t say anything about screen reader software bugs.

• clone of saturn 9 Aug 2024 23:26 UTC

  1 point

  −1

  on: Altru­ism and Vi­tal­ism Aren’t Fel­low Travelers

  Why is it assumed that there’s a dichotomy between expressing strength or creative genius and helping others? It seems like the truly excellent would have no problem doing both, and if the only way you can express your vitality is by keeping others in poverty, that actually seems kind of sad and pathetic and not very excellent.

• clone of saturn 29 Jul 2024 9:20 UTC

  1 point

  −2

  in reply to: Richard_Kennaway’s comment on: Rel­a­tivity The­ory for What the Fu­ture ‘You’ Is and Isn’t

  Note that the continuity you feel is strictly backwards-looking; we have no way to call up the you of a year ago to confirm that he still agrees that he’s continuous with the you of now. In fact, he is dead, having been destructively transformed into the you of now. So what makes one destructive transformation different from another, as long as the resulting being continues believing he is you?

• clone of saturn 29 Jul 2024 0:25 UTC

  14 points

  0

  in reply to: Rana Dexsin’s comment on: Univer­sal Ba­sic In­come and Poverty

  From what I understand, they are using a forked version of Nitter which uses fully registered accounts rather than temporary anonymous access tokens, and sourcing those accounts from various shady websites that sell them in bulk.

• clone of saturn 26 Jul 2024 23:13 UTC

  36 points

  0

  in reply to: Error’s comment on: Univer­sal Ba­sic In­come and Poverty

  Please be aware of https://​​xcancel.com/​​ESYudkowsky/​​ https://​​nitter.privacydev.net/​​ESYudkowsky/​​ https://​​nitter.poast.org/​​ESYudkowsky/​​

• clone of saturn 21 Jul 2024 5:46 UTC

  2 points

  0

  in reply to: the gears to ascension’s comment on: What are the ac­tual ar­gu­ments in fa­vor of com­pu­ta­tion­al­ism as a the­ory of iden­tity?

  Based on this comment I guess by “existing” you mean phenomenal consciousness and by “awareness” you mean behavior? I think the set of brainlike things that have the same phenomenal consciousness as me is a subset of the brainlike things that have the same behavior as me.

• clone of saturn 21 Jul 2024 4:20 UTC

  2 points

  0

  in reply to: Said Achmiz’s comment on: What are the ac­tual ar­gu­ments in fa­vor of com­pu­ta­tion­al­ism as a the­ory of iden­tity?

  There seems to generally be a ton of arbitrary path-dependent stuff everywhere in biology that evolution hasn’t yet optimized away, and I don’t see a reason to expect the brain’s implementation of consciousness to be an exception.