Very good point, thanks. I’ll use your example to avoid that problem. Though I feel that we miss the intuitive aspect that the constant is part of a theory with a relatively small number of axioms.
I find the question interesting, though, of how to characterize the value of G in the mathland region where all the variations of Newtonian mechanics with different values of G are. Each variations allows different configurations, and it seems that it should be possible to point at one of them in some way, though maybe I’m wrong.
Fernand0
Karma: 72
Shard narcissism as delusion of unembededness
Toward a Kantian refutation of Agent Foundations
Thanks for your thoughts.
The reference to what is “natural” or “widespread”, to other intelligent agents, and the psychology and history of mathematics, are alien to the point that I’m making here. My point is that it is possible to discuss math without mentioning all these things; if this assumption is wrong, my post cannot be salvaged.
Regarding your example: Plane geometry is indeed only one among many, but the other geometries are distinct enough, and discrete enough, that plane geometry is a clear object in mathland, as is pi by having a special role in it.
Thanks for your thoughts. I’m not sure I understand what you mean, though:
> It seems to me that math and physics are fundamentally different.
> parallel worlds with a different value of G
My post is trying to make both points, among other things. Did I fail to convey them?
> [physics] does fully exclude parallel worlds with a different value of π.
What makes you think that it is physics that is excluding this possibility?
Finding pi and G in Mathland
Thanks for this objection. This is exactly the kind of scenario I wanted to distinguish, and I agree that my point is very underspecified.
I’m not sure whether I’m trying to define “natural possibility” or something else entirely. My attempt was to draw a distinction based on how Bob’s optimizing his wishes routes through the possibility of telling someone else.
I see 5 scenarios:
1. Bob wants to avoid getting robbed. He doesn’t share his credentials with people he doesn’t trust, like his acquaintance Alice.
2. Bob is married to Alice. He tells her he’d prefer not to share his credentials with her, to avoid risks. She agrees.
3. Bob is married to Alice. He tells her he’d prefer not to share his credentials with her, to avoid risks. She disagrees. They reach a compromise.
4. Bob is married to Alice. He knows she’ll insist on knowing his credentials, so he lies and tells her the bank authenticates him via fingerprint on his iPhone.
5. Bob is married to Alice. He knows she’ll insist on knowing his credentials. But through an odd set of circumstances, Alice happens to see Bob unlocking his iPhone one day and wrongly assumes this is how his bank works. Bob is aware of her mistaken assumption and is thus able to exploit this fortunate accident to satisfy his preference of keeping his credentials private — despite knowing this conflicts with Alice’s preferences.
In scenario 1, Bob does not adopt BIS toward Alice.
In scenarios 2 and 3, he does.
In scenarios 4 and 5, he is in a relationship with Alice in which they have implicitly agreed to adopt BIS toward each other. (This agreement is usually implicit and poorly articulated — but I can’t think of any real relationship in which it wouldn’t come as a surprise to say: “just so you know, whenever your preferences have been conflicting with mine, I have been doing my utmost to thwart them.”)
I agree with your first objection: the word “lying” has a clear meaning and it applies to 4, and not 5.
But what Bob, considered as an agent optimizing for his preferences, is doing in both scenarios, is the same. The only difference is that he got lucky in scenario 5 and didn’t need to lie. If Alice got angry at Bob, and Bob defended himself on the grounds that he hadn’t lied, he would be obscuring his responsibility for what happened, which is not just one particular action but the fundamental fact that his preferences route through Alice differently than what she thinks.
Attack of the Killer Differential Equations
Very interesting; I wasn’t aware of this. Actually I don’t know much about Westerns. Claude tells me that “Formula Western” (which is apparently the only thing I had in mind when thinking about Westerns) is set in the (mythologized) 1880s. Is there any resource (ideally a not super long post) that you would recommend about the history of Westerns?
The 1890 Census as a fun cluster
Very good objection, thanks. What do you think of the point, possibly not clearly made in the post, of distinguishing whether Bob wants Alice to think he is a Democrat (maybe she organizes a cool party for Democrats) or doesn’t care what others think? Would you find it absurd to say that in the first scenario Bob indeed belongs in the same category as the “silent philanderer”?
Wikipedia’s national flavors—French
Indeed I’m not, but my post isn’t clear on this point. Thanks for pointing it out! (I will rewrite it)
A very relevant point to be included in my rewrite, thanks!
Low-temperature bunk
I don’t know for certain that anyone else recalls core memories like this, but I would be slightly surprised if they didn’t.
Have you heard about aphantasia? Some people don’t have low-resolution visual imagination, much less high-res!
Two great examples and a concept that should have and will be mentioned. Thanks!
Thanks for pointing out what my post doesn’t explain properly. I’ll edit my post in I way that hopefully answers your questions.
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I agree that there are paradigmatic cases of not telling and of lying, and that they are distinct. Naming the post as I did was a mistake, and I’ll change the title.
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I’m less sure, though, how often real cases fall as cleanly on one side or the other as the paradigmatic ones do.
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The point I was trying to make — and should have made more clearly — still stands: both are manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon, in contexts where both possibilities arise naturally (unlike the bank credentials case, where only lying is a natural possibility).
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This was indeed my goal, but restricting the possible “wheres” to those that don’t mention facts about our universe (which includes facts about humans, like their psychology or history).
I’m working on a clearer version of my post which hopefully clarifies a bit what I mean.