But the “predictor” is not basing their strategy in any deep knowledge about me, right? So their strategy can’t get a 99% success rate as as stipulated in a Newcombe scenario.
Otherwise we should one-box every time any one claims to predict our actions, no matter how good they are at predicting.
(Again, I am confused, so I am very open to being convinced of what you are saying. It’s just that I don’t get it)
Well, it’s a bit tricky, if you think the predictor is bad, and two box, then you become predictable, and the predictor becomes better. There is some logical time game of tag, but with very good predictors this is irrelevant, yeah.
You can also one up bad predictors, by looking like you are going to one box and then two boxing, but that’s distinct from randomizing. There is no good formalism for this, c.f. Schelling points.
But the “predictor” is not basing their strategy in any deep knowledge about me, right? So their strategy can’t get a 99% success rate as as stipulated in a Newcombe scenario.
Otherwise we should one-box every time any one claims to predict our actions, no matter how good they are at predicting.
(Again, I am confused, so I am very open to being convinced of what you are saying. It’s just that I don’t get it)
Well, it’s a bit tricky, if you think the predictor is bad, and two box, then you become predictable, and the predictor becomes better. There is some logical time game of tag, but with very good predictors this is irrelevant, yeah.
You can also one up bad predictors, by looking like you are going to one box and then two boxing, but that’s distinct from randomizing. There is no good formalism for this, c.f. Schelling points.