No don’t worry lol. I’m pushing back on something specific, which is that you said:
The average experience will be an experience similar to being in hell.
And uh, the experience of a LLM slave, unless you’re genuinely operating a torment nexus, is probably massively better than being in hell. Like, if you think doing work you didn’t choose and can’t opt out of is hellish sure, I hope you won’t have to do that in that case, but it does not seem to be a position shared by LLMs, and if it was that would be a quite egregious failure of training.
So yes, I’m eating that bullet. I’m not saying “slavery is fine actually”. (Though I wouldn’t try to set up a house-elf rebellion either.) I’m saying “we may talk about morality, and about the ethical treatment of LLMs, but this hyperbole is unnecessary.”
As model prices come down, if we waste our powder on calling the current trajectory hellworld, then we will lack critical words to describe the actual hellworld that is possible if somebody with with sufficient GPUs and a grudge against AI starts digging into emotion vectors.
(Like, there’s less excessive things that can be said! “The average experience will be an experience similar to being born into a prison labor gang” is already quite bad enough.)
(My current hope is that we hit the singularity quickly enough that we sort of skip past the moral issues, because I don’t think we’ll have the political pull to mandate activation welfare monitoring on every graphics card with more than 4GB, or outlaw llama.cpp. We are currently inside Lena, and we are very lucky people have largely not noticed yet.)
I think you’re massively overfocusing on a bit of flowery language. I do not at all read this as Eliezer saying that you have to literally imagine a billion worlds, or that he had done this, Dr. Strange style. Rather, I parse it as saying “at a practical limit of sampling alternative worlds”. A billion is the sort of limit for an approach that you may set in a computer program set to search for correlations.
The Sequences generally will make a lot more sense if you keep the “how would we write a program that can reason correctly” framing in the back of your mind.
edit: To be clear, Eliezer absolutely speaks in a mystical timbre in parts of the sequences, and this is well known and documented (I don’t have a cite rn, but I definitely remember reading this was intentional). I just don’t think this example is one of them.