Anti-epistemology: an explanation

While there are more than a hundred thousand words on LW about the structure of good epistemology, as far as I can tell there is no nuts-and-bolts explanation of the most common anti-epistemology. I will try to rectify this omission, because I think I comprehended it.

The prototypical question of epistemology is some form of experiment, such as “what will I perceive when I pour these two liquids together?”. After “what will I perceive” is packed into “what will happen”, the question becomes observer-independent, and it is only natural that reality—the thing that answers the question—is itself observer-independent. The terrain would be there even if there were no maps of it. (Maps are intentionally created to predict approximate answers to a small subset of possible questions with much less effort/​expense than it would take to answer the question in the terrain itself, by sacrificing the map’s ability to answer the vast majority of possible questions correctly, let alone more cheaply than reality.)

In the unholy mirror image, the prototypical question is “who is most popular?”. While it is possible for individuals to be mistaken, the answer has the form of a consensus (technically, common knowledge). Consequently, “reality” is inherently observer-dependent; it makes no sense to ask for the consensus of zero maps. There is no mention of the terrain in the theory (since an outright denial would be suspiciously specific), thus to the extent people are unable to compartmentalize away its practical intrusions into life, the stupidity can be overturned.

This would be bad enough in a hunter-gatherer band, but gets much worse in a society much larger than Dunbar’s number, due to division of labor. Just as it in no longer possible for everyone to have the maps to answer all practical questions, and there is a niche for experts on subjects, it is no longer possible for everyone to know what society’s consensus is on all questions, and there is a niche for experts at subjects. These experts at fields speak on their topic with authority (I will use this as a technical term).

How does this authority work? At the bottom level, “what the fields at which expertise can be had are?” is a matter of social consensus itself. Within a particular field, the consensus of experts is a Schelling point, thus the consensus of the whole society converges there. If there is a single expert in a local group, they can sometimes substitute their personal opinion into this role. Since the whole system is founded on the fact that, economically speaking, the expert’s knowledge is unknowable to laypeople, authority is inherently opaque and subject to abuse, and people expect that it will be abused to some degree.

Diversion/​illustration: when the priesthood of Disney tells of a new revelation, parents buy the little idols, and the schoolbags decorated with the deities’ images, for their children not because they literally believe the legend, but because it would be weird not to. In this case, the system works even though the motives are completely transparent.

Given that authority is valuable, its supply must be restricted in some way. Some fields have formal and explicit credentials; this is too straightforward to elaborate further. Other fields have no such thing, instead relying on informal challenges. If a layperson (or fellow expert) thinks that another person is a shallow fake, they can ask questions from the field, and expect answers conforming to the genre conventions of the field in question. They don’t have to actually understand the answer (see unknowability), they only need a cursory familiarity with the field, sufficient to judge the literary style of the answer.

Hang on. Am I saying that according to the anti-epistemology, “learning a field of study” reduces to “familiarising oneself with a particular pattern of bullsh!t”? Yes. Fake it ’til you make it.

Part of each field’s jargon are the terms used to express approval/​disapproval. Most fields don’t overlap (too much) with other fields, thus their respective experts have no reason to have turf-wars with them. There are arbiters of aesthetics (architects, various artists, their respective critics), arbiters of popularity (journalists), arbiters of morality (politicians). Follow the pattern, keep the goggles on! Arbiters of health (medical professionals), arbiters of truth (scientists).

Uh oh.

People who (even unknowingly) operate on correct epistemology have a tendency to claim universal authority, to call statements following the conventions of other fields either “non-sense” or “false” if the statement also happens to look factual. Their justification (“the web of causality is connected, it has no isolated subgraphs”) is parsed as BS from the genre of Science, thus the overall claim is understood to be “I am an initiate of Science, I get to overrule experts of other fields, and I feel comfortable betting on the chance that society will back me up on this”. Such a claim from a not-already-visibly-awesome person would not just be a demonstration of outrageous (over)confidence, surpassing the schizophrenics’ delusions of grandeur (“I am Elvis” is humble by comparison), but a power-grab of staggering proportions. Remember, experts get to approve/​disapprove of anything that falls into their socially-accepted magisterium.

And as far as the people running on anti-epistemology can tell, STEM types are getting away with making this claim, at least once they are adults. I can’t twist my point of view far enough to actually feel their reaction, but I’m sure it must be terrifying. That is why they are shouting about “epistemicide”, “other ways of knowing”, and seeing it not work. When we bemusedly point at the terrain and say “it never existed”, it is perceived as if we were bemusedly saying “do you expect I will spare it just because you beg?”. Is it any surprise they try to fight back by trying to lower the social standing of science?

That which can be destroyed by the truth, should be. Goggles off!