To say that Eliezer is a moral realist is deeply, deeply misleading. Eliezer’s ethical theories correspond to what most philosophers would identify as moral anti-realism (most likely as a form of ethical subjectivism, specifically).
(Eliezer himself has a highly idiosyncratic way of talking about ethical claims and problems in ethics, and while it is perfectly coherent and consistent and even reasonable once you grasp how he’s using words etc., it results in some serious pitfalls in trying to map his views onto the usual moral-philosophical categories.)
To say that Eliezer is a moral realist is deeply, deeply misleading.
No, it is not at all misleading. He is quite explicit about that in the linked Arbital article. You might want to read it.
Eliezer’s ethical theories correspond to what most philosophers would identify as moral anti-realism (most likely as a form of ethical subjectivism, specifically).
They definitely would not. They would immediately qualify as moral realist. Helpfully, he makes that very clear:
Within the standard terminology of academic metaethics, “extrapolated volition” as a normative theory is:
Cognitivist. Normative propositions can be true or false. You can believe that something is right and be mistaken.
He explicitly classifies his theory as cognitivist theory, which means it ascribes truth values to ethical statements. Since it is a non-trivial cognitivist theory (it doesn’t make all ethical statements false, or all true, and your ethical beliefs can be mistaken, in contrast to subjectivism) it straightforwardly classifies as a “moral realist” theory in metaethics.
He does argue against moral internalism (the statement that having an ethical belief is inherently motivating) but this is not considered a requirement for moral realism. In fact, most moral realist theories are not moral internalist. His theory also implies moral naturalism, which is again common for moral realist theories (though not required). In summary, his theory not only qualifies as a moral realist theory, it does so straightforwardly. So yes, according to metaethical terminology, he is a moral realist, and not even an unusual one.
Additionally, he explicitly likens his theory to Frank Jackson’s Moral Functionalism (that is indeed very similar to his theory!), which is considered an uncontroversial case of a moral realist theory.
To say that Eliezer is a moral realist is deeply, deeply misleading.
No, it is not at all misleading. He is quite explicit about that in the linked Arbital article. You might want to read it.
I have read it. I am very familiar with Eliezer’s views on ethics and metaethics.
I repeat that Eliezer uses metaethical terminology in a highly idiosyncratic way. You simply cannot take at face value statements that he makes like “my theory is a moral-realist theory” etc. His uses of the terms “good”, “right”, etc., do not match the standard usages.
Since it is a non-trivial cognitivist theory (it doesn’t make all ethical statements false, or all true, and your ethical beliefs can be mistaken, in contrast to subjectivism) it straightforwardly classifies as a “moral realist” theory in metaethics.
Yes, Eliezer claims that his moral theory is not a subjectivist one. But it is (straightforwardly!) a subjectivist theory.
You might perhaps be able to claim that Eliezer’s theory is a sort of “minimal moral realism”, but it’s certainly not “robust moral realism”.
This is from 2008 so who knows if it still matters at all, but in the metaethics sequence Eliezer says this:
(Disclaimer: Neither Subhan nor Obert represent my own position on morality; rather they represent different sides of the questions I hope to answer.)
about two characters in a Socrates dialogue that are moral realist and anti-realist, respectively.
I once tried to read the entire sequence to figure out what Eliezer thinks about morality but then abandoned the project before completing it. I still don’t know what he thinks.
(Not sure if I’m telling you anything new or if this was even worth saying.)
I got o3 to compare Eliezer’s metaethics with that of Brand Blanshard (who has some similar ideas), with particular attention to whether morality is subjective or objective. The result...
He explicitly classifies his theory as cognitivist theory, which means it ascribes truth values to ethical statements
That’s a necessary but insufficient condition for being realist.
CEV is clearly group level relativism..there is not nothing beyond the extrapolated subjective values of humans in general to make a claim true or false. Individual claims can be false, unlike individual level relativism, but that also an insufficient criterion for realism.
To say that Eliezer is a moral realist is deeply, deeply misleading. Eliezer’s ethical theories correspond to what most philosophers would identify as moral anti-realism (most likely as a form of ethical subjectivism, specifically).
(Eliezer himself has a highly idiosyncratic way of talking about ethical claims and problems in ethics, and while it is perfectly coherent and consistent and even reasonable once you grasp how he’s using words etc., it results in some serious pitfalls in trying to map his views onto the usual moral-philosophical categories.)
No, it is not at all misleading. He is quite explicit about that in the linked Arbital article. You might want to read it.
They definitely would not. They would immediately qualify as moral realist. Helpfully, he makes that very clear:
He explicitly classifies his theory as cognitivist theory, which means it ascribes truth values to ethical statements. Since it is a non-trivial cognitivist theory (it doesn’t make all ethical statements false, or all true, and your ethical beliefs can be mistaken, in contrast to subjectivism) it straightforwardly classifies as a “moral realist” theory in metaethics.
He does argue against moral internalism (the statement that having an ethical belief is inherently motivating) but this is not considered a requirement for moral realism. In fact, most moral realist theories are not moral internalist. His theory also implies moral naturalism, which is again common for moral realist theories (though not required). In summary, his theory not only qualifies as a moral realist theory, it does so straightforwardly. So yes, according to metaethical terminology, he is a moral realist, and not even an unusual one.
Additionally, he explicitly likens his theory to Frank Jackson’s Moral Functionalism (that is indeed very similar to his theory!), which is considered an uncontroversial case of a moral realist theory.
I have read it. I am very familiar with Eliezer’s views on ethics and metaethics.
I repeat that Eliezer uses metaethical terminology in a highly idiosyncratic way. You simply cannot take at face value statements that he makes like “my theory is a moral-realist theory” etc. His uses of the terms “good”, “right”, etc., do not match the standard usages.
Yes, Eliezer claims that his moral theory is not a subjectivist one. But it is (straightforwardly!) a subjectivist theory.
You might perhaps be able to claim that Eliezer’s theory is a sort of “minimal moral realism”, but it’s certainly not “robust moral realism”.
This is from 2008 so who knows if it still matters at all, but in the metaethics sequence Eliezer says this:
about two characters in a Socrates dialogue that are moral realist and anti-realist, respectively.
I once tried to read the entire sequence to figure out what Eliezer thinks about morality but then abandoned the project before completing it. I still don’t know what he thinks.
(Not sure if I’m telling you anything new or if this was even worth saying.)
I got o3 to compare Eliezer’s metaethics with that of Brand Blanshard (who has some similar ideas), with particular attention to whether morality is subjective or objective. The result...
That’s a necessary but insufficient condition for being realist. CEV is clearly group level relativism..there is not nothing beyond the extrapolated subjective values of humans in general to make a claim true or false. Individual claims can be false, unlike individual level relativism, but that also an insufficient criterion for realism.