To say that Eliezer is a moral realist is deeply, deeply misleading.
No, it is not at all misleading. He is quite explicit about that in the linked Arbital article. You might want to read it.
I have read it. I am very familiar with Eliezer’s views on ethics and metaethics.
I repeat that Eliezer uses metaethical terminology in a highly idiosyncratic way. You simply cannot take at face value statements that he makes like “my theory is a moral-realist theory” etc. His uses of the terms “good”, “right”, etc., do not match the standard usages.
Since it is a non-trivial cognitivist theory (it doesn’t make all ethical statements false, or all true, and your ethical beliefs can be mistaken, in contrast to subjectivism) it straightforwardly classifies as a “moral realist” theory in metaethics.
Yes, Eliezer claims that his moral theory is not a subjectivist one. But it is (straightforwardly!) a subjectivist theory.
You might perhaps be able to claim that Eliezer’s theory is a sort of “minimal moral realism”, but it’s certainly not “robust moral realism”.
I have read it. I am very familiar with Eliezer’s views on ethics and metaethics.
I repeat that Eliezer uses metaethical terminology in a highly idiosyncratic way. You simply cannot take at face value statements that he makes like “my theory is a moral-realist theory” etc. His uses of the terms “good”, “right”, etc., do not match the standard usages.
Yes, Eliezer claims that his moral theory is not a subjectivist one. But it is (straightforwardly!) a subjectivist theory.
You might perhaps be able to claim that Eliezer’s theory is a sort of “minimal moral realism”, but it’s certainly not “robust moral realism”.