All knowledge is circularly justified

Many philoso­phers have tried to find the foun­da­tions of our knowl­edge, but why do we think there are any? The fram­ing of foun­da­tions im­plies a sep­a­rate bot­tom layer of knowl­edge from which ev­ery­thing is built up. And while this is un­doubt­edly a use­ful model in many con­texts, why should we be­lieve in this as the com­plete and literal truth as op­posed to merely a sim­plifi­ca­tion?

Con­sider:

1) If we dig deep enough into any of our truth claims, we’ll even­tu­ally reach a point at which they are jus­tified by intuition

2) The re­li­a­bil­ity of in­tu­ition or var­i­ous in­tu­itions is not some­thing that is merely taken as ba­sic or for granted, but can in­stead be jus­tified some­what by ar­gu­ments from ex­pe­rience and evolu­tion­ary ar­gu­ments.

3) How­ever both em­piri­cal ver­ifi­ca­tion and evolu­tion­ary ar­gu­ments them­selves both rely on as­sump­tions that are jus­tified by intuition

This is cir­cu­lar, but is this nec­es­sar­ily a prob­lem? If your choice is a cir­cu­lar jus­tifi­ca­tion or even­tu­ally hit­ting a level with no jus­tifi­ca­tion, then the cir­cu­lar jus­tifi­ca­tion sud­denly starts look­ing pretty at­trac­tive.

Is this im­por­tant? It seems to de­pend on con­text. For ap­plied ra­tio­nal­ity, not so much. But per­haps the more philo­soph­i­cal ar­eas of the ra­tio­nal­ist pro­ject would look quite differ­ent if they were built upon a cir­cu­lar episte­mol­ogy.