Possible red is red
An interesting property of numbers is that their properties do not change if we discuss 25 apples or 25 possible apples or just 25 – it is still 5x5 = 25. Possible 25 has the same property as real 25.
Here I suggest that the same property belongs to qualia: possible red is red.
Open and closed qualia
First, I need to distinguish open and closed qualia. Open qualia are any qualia which I experience now. Closed qualia are qualia which I do not observe now. This includes qualia of other people and of animals, qualia of AI (if any), alien qualia, free-floating qualia (if any), and even my own qualia in previous observer moments as well as future ones.
There are two possible views on closed qualia:
1. They are just normal qualia but currently non-observed, though they preserve the same qualitative state.
2. Closed qualia are not real qualia and do not have any definite qualitative states, though they preserve a functional role. This view is close to radical presentism, which postulates that only the now moment is real.
No possible red if closed qualia are empty
The idea of closed qualia affects thought experiments like fading qualia and dancing qualia, as they assume comparing open and closed qualia, but such comparison is impossible based on the definition of closed qualia, which are not observable.
If we assume the second view, that closed qualia do not have a qualitative part, there is no “possible qualia” – all qualia that exist are those that I currently observe. Thus, there is no “possible red” in that case; it is an oxymoron, and the question is empty.
This is a very radical view, as it suggests that everyone except me is now a p-zombie and only gets qualia when they become the now moment. Note that this theory is difficult to disprove, but its main problem is the high theoretical cost: the need to accept radical presentism, close to solipsism.
If we assume the first view, then qualia have stable qualitative properties while unobserved.
Possible minds as carriers of possible red
Now, if we assume a possible mind (or at least a sensory-conscious circuit in it), it will have possible qualia. The “possible mind” here is a rhetorical device to introduce possible qualia. Now that we have possible qualia and also assume that unobserved qualia can have definite qualitative states, we can ask if possible red observed by a possible mind is red.
I can imagine a possible mind of a philosopher who thinks about qualia and observes red. The question is: is his possible red really red?
To address this issue, we need to observe that the qualitative property of qualia can’t be defined by anything which doesn’t have this qualitative property – that is, a quale depends only on itself (this may require an additional post to explain). Example: By adding natural numbers we can’t get fractional numbers (except in the infinite case).
Quale depends only on itself
Or in general, if we get some property at the end of a syllogism, it has to be present in at least one of its premises: All roses are red, there is a rose in my garden, so this rose is red. Here redness is present in both the premises and the conclusion. As qualia are such a simple, unbreakable property, they will also have to be present in any premises if they are present in the conclusion. Therefore, qualia can’t be generated by any syllogism. Therefore, qualia are not derived from anything that is not itself qualia. Therefore, qualia depend only on themselves. (Here more discussion is needed, as logical dependency in a definition may not mean causation, and also if qualia are complex things, they can appear in conclusions without being present in premises – e.g., in 1+2=3 neither 1 nor 2 has the property of being divisible by 3. Here we assume that qualia are irreducible simple things, atoms of experience in the style of Mach – I will have another post about it.)
If a quale depends only on itself, it doesn’t depend on whether the mind in which it is installed is real or merely possible. Therefore, red in a possible mind is still red.
Note that if we deny that possible minds have qualia, we get p-zombies, because possible minds can have the exact same structure as real humans and can have possible thoughts about consciousness. The anti-p-zombie argument should apply to possible minds too.
In other words: if we imagine a possible human, he has two hemispheres in his brain. Not 3 and not 0. The same way, we can claim that a possible human looking at a possible rose has a possible red sensation, which is still red.
Alternative view – qualia are the thing which distinguishes actual mind from possible mind
One can argue that qualia are not just properties similar to the number of hemispheres, but modal-related qualities, and thus a possible mind doesn’t have qualia, as having qualia is equal to being alive.
For example, the whole point of euthanasia is to stop the qualia of pain. Killing oneself is the same as becoming a possible mind. If the qualia of pain remain in the possible mind, there is no point in killing oneself. (There may be other unrelated arguments why euthanasia is useless, like modal realism and quantum immortality – but they are different.)
In that case, possible qualia in possible minds are impossible.
Free-floating qualia
The more interesting question is free-floating qualia. The same way that 25 apples have the same properties as 25 – which is a “free-floating number” without being the number of anything – we can conceive free-floating qualia: pure redness not implemented in any mind.
Note that free-floating numbers are always possible numbers – as soon as they become a real number, they become the number of something. Math doesn’t have problems operating on numbers which are not numbers of anything, but a few thousand years ago it was a major step in thinking, similar to inventing 0.
The idea of free-floating qualia is a similar thought step – though we never see such a thing (but we also never saw free numbers).
If possible red is red, it has (for example) strong consequences for our understanding of the origin of the universe – why anything exists at all. Tegmark discussed a mathematical universe. We can also add a qualia universe.
As a possible mind would have real red qualia and thus real experiences, something like qualia-based Boltzmann brains is possible, and some selection effects can ensure that they will not be just random noise (anthropic selection and dust theory of qualia similar to the one formalized by Mueller in the article “Law without law”).
This is where you lose me.
What is a “qualitative part”?
How is this different to saying “All apples that exist are those that currently exist. Thus, there is no ‘possible apple’; it is an oxymoron.” Isn’t the whole point of the word “possible” that you’re invoking a superset of actual things?
I mean, even prior to this point, you’re trying to do some kind of intellectual witchcraft; and while that’s cool, it’d be nice if you were a bit clearer in what you actually mean.
What does this actually mean?
Like, what is “possible 25”? What is “real 25″? Are you actually conceiving of some kind of mental object when you say these phrases? If so, it’d be good to describe that explicitly. I don’t know what sort of object I’m supposed to load into my mental simulator when you give me these phrases, so I can’t validate any subsequent claims you make about them.
Are “fading qualia” and “dancing qualia” load-bearing thought experiments here, such that I need to go and read up on them first? Or can I press on with reading your ideas? I see they’re from Chalmers, which primes me to think they’ll be (1) interesting and (2) wrong.
“such comparison is impossible based on the definition...” Well, you can define things however you want; and you can then claim that actions (like comparison) are inherently impossible based on the definition… but reality doesn’t care! I can totally compare things I can’t observe. For example, I can compare the tallest giraffe on Earth (which I’m currently not observing) to a hypothetical spaceship outside our lightcone (which I can never observe, due to causality and the structure of hypotheticals). Why would we be able to define away the ability to compare two things? It’s like defining away “possible qualia” as an oxymoron; or Anselm defining away “non-existent perfect god” as a self-contradiction; language doesn’t command reality.
So it’s hard to get much into this. Not every sentence has to be rigorous, but after a few sentences the wibblyness compounds such that I just have no idea what we’re even talking about any more. This is extra important when dealing with consciousness of all things.
Red has functional part and qualitative part, reddnes. I tried to explain this in my previous post about qualia as internal variables. For example E is energy in E=mc2. Its functional role is defined by the equation, but the variable itself can be denoted by a different letter, like W. Letters can also exist not related to the equations, that is free-floating letters.
Only if we assume that unobserved qualia do not reddness, when speaking about possible qualia’s color become meaningless, as by our assumption unobserved qualia don’t have redness and possible qualia is unobserved.
When I say that possible 25 has the same properties as real 25 I mean 25 apples as real 25 - and 25 as just a number as possible 25. Both 25 and 25 apples can be represented as 5x5. This property doesn’t depend on modal status of 25.
The distinction between open and closed qualia gives us an interesting hint why dancing qualia thought experiment is wrong (though how experiment can be wrong? only its conclusions). Chalmers seems to ignore this and implicitly assumes that there is no difference between open and closed qualia. As soon as we add this distinction, the experiment boils down to the question—are closed qualia the same as open ones.
It is rather objective fact that we can’t compare human’s and bird’s color qualia as birds have 4 primary colors. Birds colors are permanently closed to us. It is not just language game like in God’s definition.
No, that’s not “two different roles of the same thing”, that’s “two entirely different things”:
Energy is the thing described by E=mc^2
The letter “E” is an arbitrary representation of the concept of the energy
These are not remotely the same thing. They are not two aspects of same thing. They are not two facets of the same thing. They are two entirely distinct things.
So if you’re confused about that, I assume you’re falling into a similar about “redness”; but I don’t know what claim you’re even making, so it’s hard to point at exactly what.
I have literally no idea what this means, and I don’t think you do either.
This isn’t even grammatical at this point. What do you mean, “I mean 25 apples as real 25”? That’s not any kind of statement. You’re producing words, not conveying any kind of coherent conceptual model.
Yes, both 25 and 25 apples can be represented as “5x5”. I can also represent the Eiffel Tower, Energy, and Belgium as “5x5″. Representations aren’t reality! Throwing around phrases like “modal status” doesn’t actually explain mechanically what you’re talking about.
I still don’t know what the dancing qualia thought experiment is, or if it’s essential to your point.
Nope, here I go comparing human vs bird colours: “Humans have 3 primary colours; birds have 4”. I could go into more detail if needed—maybe I’d talk about how humans see more differences in blue/green colours than others (idk the equivalent case for birds). But I don’t have to. If you’re going to say “it’s objectively impossible to compare things with different qualia; that’s permanently closed to us” then that’s an extraordinary claim that needs evidence. And it can be blown open by just doing the comparison.
In your words, there is a energy, concept of energy, and there is arbitrary representation of the concept of energy by letter E. The same way for colors: there is a real wavelength, the functional reaction to color in the brain and its arbitrary representation by redness inside consciousness.
After that follows rather technical moment which needs to be consider before we can discuss the question of existence of possible qualia. This technical moment is connected with the idea that unobserved qualia still have definite qualitative state. This seems to be so obvious that is often ignored, but its is an assumption which need to be considered.
Chalmers suggested that dancing qualia thought experiment—that a person can have different representations of colors in different moments of time but will not be able to observe that as functional part will remain the same. I mentioned here that such experiment assumes non-observed- qualia have definite qualitative state.
Blue-green abundance is functional part of qualia.
Exactly opposite is true for qualia—it will extraordinary claim to say that we know something about qualitative aspect of bird’s qualia.
Sorry for typos, I am not native speaker and didn’t use AI for editing here.
But what is the “technical moment”? What is “definitive qualitative state”? How are they “connected”?
The problem isn’t typos; the problem is I don’t know what you’re trying to say. Wobbly abstract explanations like the E=MC^2 thing don’t help pin it down—what would help would be saying the exact thing you mean.
“Birds experience 4 primary colours”—this is a thing I know about the qualitative aspect of birds’ qualia. If you redefine that as a mere “functional” part of qualia, then I can’t see what possible aspect of qualia you’d ever consider to be “non-functional”.
If we’re going down this path, then: you have no reason to believe anything about any other person’s internal experience of qualia. Pain? Functional. Pleasure? Functional. By this standard, you can’t know anything qualitative about someone else’s qualia. Going even further: why would you be able to know anything qualitative about your past self’s qualia?
Ultimately I just don’t know what you’re trying to say when you say things like “functional”, “qualitative”, etc. I think these aren’t describing actual features of a model.
I disagree. Apples and possible apples are different and incomparable units, The fact that we can use the same operations on some calculations doesn’t tell us much. In other words, they have the same property of atomicity (can be counted), but not necessarily any other properties.
Likewise for possible red or closed qualia. They may share some properties, but it’s not clear which properties those are, or whether they’re the important ones.
Here we arrive to the interesting question—which properties remain in possible apples and in qualia?
For example, property of edibility will not remain in a possible apple, but a property being sphere-like remains in a possible apple.
More generally, the properties related to the outside world disappear, but internal properties remain. If qualia are property related to the existence, they disappear in possible objects.
Sure, and that’s idiosyncratic to apples and possible apples, it doesn’t generalize to other things. The assertion was only about countability, and I wanted to clarify that that isn’t an interesting property for this discussion.
Until we can enumerate the properties we’re interested in, we can’t reason about whether they apply to both open and closed qualia.
My point about apples was an illustration that’s some properties remains in possible things, this includes both shape and numbers, but not the first step of generalisation.
We are far from enumerating the qualitative aspect of qualia and may be it is even not possible in a provable way. Maybe because enumerating assumes that we can predict qualitative property of qualia which contradict idea that qualia depends only on itself.
“25 (possible apples)” is not the same as “(possible 25) apples”, so it doesn’t follow.