Red has functional part and qualitative part, reddnes. (...) E is energy in E=mc2. Its functional role is defined by the equation, but the variable itself can be denoted by a different letter, like W.
No, that’s not “two different roles of the same thing”, that’s “two entirely different things”:
Energy is the thing described by E=mc^2
The letter “E” is an arbitrary representation of the concept of the energy
These are not remotely the same thing. They are not two aspects of same thing. They are not two facets of the same thing. They are two entirely distinct things.
So if you’re confused about that, I assume you’re falling into a similar about “redness”; but I don’t know what claim you’re even making, so it’s hard to point at exactly what.
Only if we assume that unobserved qualia do not reddness, when speaking about possible qualia’s color become meaningless, as by our assumption unobserved qualia don’t have redness and possible qualia is unobserved.
I have literally no idea what this means, and I don’t think you do either.
When I say that possible 25 has the same properties as real 25 I mean 25 apples as real 25 - and 25 as just a number as possible 25. Both 25 and 25 apples can be represented as 5x5. This property doesn’t depend on modal status of 25.
This isn’t even grammatical at this point. What do you mean, “I mean 25 apples as real 25”? That’s not any kind of statement. You’re producing words, not conveying any kind of coherent conceptual model.
Yes, both 25 and 25 apples can be represented as “5x5”. I can also represent the Eiffel Tower, Energy, and Belgium as “5x5″. Representations aren’t reality! Throwing around phrases like “modal status” doesn’t actually explain mechanically what you’re talking about.
The distinction between open and closed qualia gives us an interesting hint why dancing qualia thought experiment is wrong
I still don’t know what the dancing qualia thought experiment is, or if it’s essential to your point.
It is rather objective fact that we can’t compare human’s and bird’s color qualia as birds have 4 primary colors. Birds colors are permanently closed to us. It is not just language game like in God’s definition.
Nope, here I go comparing human vs bird colours: “Humans have 3 primary colours; birds have 4”. I could go into more detail if needed—maybe I’d talk about how humans see more differences in blue/green colours than others (idk the equivalent case for birds). But I don’t have to. If you’re going to say “it’s objectively impossible to compare things with different qualia; that’s permanently closed to us” then that’s an extraordinary claim that needs evidence. And it can be blown open by just doing the comparison.
In your words, there is a energy, concept of energy, and there is arbitrary representation of the concept of energy by letter E. The same way for colors: there is a real wavelength, the functional reaction to color in the brain and its arbitrary representation by redness inside consciousness.
After that follows rather technical moment which needs to be consider before we can discuss the question of existence of possible qualia. This technical moment is connected with the idea that unobserved qualia still have definite qualitative state. This seems to be so obvious that is often ignored, but its is an assumption which need to be considered.
Chalmers suggested that dancing qualia thought experiment—that a person can have different representations of colors in different moments of time but will not be able to observe that as functional part will remain the same. I mentioned here that such experiment assumes non-observed- qualia have definite qualitative state.
Blue-green abundance is functional part of qualia.
Exactly opposite is true for qualia—it will extraordinary claim to say that we know something about qualitative aspect of bird’s qualia.
Sorry for typos, I am not native speaker and didn’t use AI for editing here.
After that follows rather technical moment which needs to be consider before we can discuss the question of existence of possible qualia. This technical moment is connected with the idea that unobserved qualia still have definite qualitative state.
But what is the “technical moment”? What is “definitive qualitative state”? How are they “connected”?
The problem isn’t typos; the problem is I don’t know what you’re trying to say. Wobbly abstract explanations like the E=MC^2 thing don’t help pin it down—what would help would be saying the exact thing you mean.
Exactly opposite is true for qualia—it will extraordinary claim to say that we know something about qualitative aspect of bird’s qualia.
“Birds experience 4 primary colours”—this is a thing I know about the qualitative aspect of birds’ qualia. If you redefine that as a mere “functional” part of qualia, then I can’t see what possible aspect of qualia you’d ever consider to be “non-functional”.
If we’re going down this path, then: you have no reason to believe anything about any other person’s internal experience of qualia. Pain? Functional. Pleasure? Functional. By this standard, you can’t know anything qualitative about someone else’s qualia. Going even further: why would you be able to know anything qualitative about your past self’s qualia?
Ultimately I just don’t know what you’re trying to say when you say things like “functional”, “qualitative”, etc. I think these aren’t describing actual features of a model.
No, that’s not “two different roles of the same thing”, that’s “two entirely different things”:
Energy is the thing described by E=mc^2
The letter “E” is an arbitrary representation of the concept of the energy
These are not remotely the same thing. They are not two aspects of same thing. They are not two facets of the same thing. They are two entirely distinct things.
So if you’re confused about that, I assume you’re falling into a similar about “redness”; but I don’t know what claim you’re even making, so it’s hard to point at exactly what.
I have literally no idea what this means, and I don’t think you do either.
This isn’t even grammatical at this point. What do you mean, “I mean 25 apples as real 25”? That’s not any kind of statement. You’re producing words, not conveying any kind of coherent conceptual model.
Yes, both 25 and 25 apples can be represented as “5x5”. I can also represent the Eiffel Tower, Energy, and Belgium as “5x5″. Representations aren’t reality! Throwing around phrases like “modal status” doesn’t actually explain mechanically what you’re talking about.
I still don’t know what the dancing qualia thought experiment is, or if it’s essential to your point.
Nope, here I go comparing human vs bird colours: “Humans have 3 primary colours; birds have 4”. I could go into more detail if needed—maybe I’d talk about how humans see more differences in blue/green colours than others (idk the equivalent case for birds). But I don’t have to. If you’re going to say “it’s objectively impossible to compare things with different qualia; that’s permanently closed to us” then that’s an extraordinary claim that needs evidence. And it can be blown open by just doing the comparison.
In your words, there is a energy, concept of energy, and there is arbitrary representation of the concept of energy by letter E. The same way for colors: there is a real wavelength, the functional reaction to color in the brain and its arbitrary representation by redness inside consciousness.
After that follows rather technical moment which needs to be consider before we can discuss the question of existence of possible qualia. This technical moment is connected with the idea that unobserved qualia still have definite qualitative state. This seems to be so obvious that is often ignored, but its is an assumption which need to be considered.
Chalmers suggested that dancing qualia thought experiment—that a person can have different representations of colors in different moments of time but will not be able to observe that as functional part will remain the same. I mentioned here that such experiment assumes non-observed- qualia have definite qualitative state.
Blue-green abundance is functional part of qualia.
Exactly opposite is true for qualia—it will extraordinary claim to say that we know something about qualitative aspect of bird’s qualia.
Sorry for typos, I am not native speaker and didn’t use AI for editing here.
But what is the “technical moment”? What is “definitive qualitative state”? How are they “connected”?
The problem isn’t typos; the problem is I don’t know what you’re trying to say. Wobbly abstract explanations like the E=MC^2 thing don’t help pin it down—what would help would be saying the exact thing you mean.
“Birds experience 4 primary colours”—this is a thing I know about the qualitative aspect of birds’ qualia. If you redefine that as a mere “functional” part of qualia, then I can’t see what possible aspect of qualia you’d ever consider to be “non-functional”.
If we’re going down this path, then: you have no reason to believe anything about any other person’s internal experience of qualia. Pain? Functional. Pleasure? Functional. By this standard, you can’t know anything qualitative about someone else’s qualia. Going even further: why would you be able to know anything qualitative about your past self’s qualia?
Ultimately I just don’t know what you’re trying to say when you say things like “functional”, “qualitative”, etc. I think these aren’t describing actual features of a model.