It seems mostly correct to accept the new calculations in the Improved COTI, which represent a −25% adjustment, and then include the 13% adjustment for taxes, resulting in about a −13% adjustment. This still represents an increase in the cost of thriving.
is COTI actually an inverted measure of the literal “cost of thriving”? i.e. the index goes up when the cost goes down? otherwise, this apparent inverted sign (a −13% change in COTI representing an “increase in the cost of thriving”) is throwing me for a loop.
In broad terms, families with children have seen large reductions in their federal income tax burden, largely due to the introduction and expansion of the child tax credit.
If we want to measure the COTI, as per its original justification, it seems correct to more or less accept the ‘improved COTI’ of −25% instead of −36%, reflecting the errors in health care premiums and college sticker versus effective prices, and various minor fixes. We then must take taxes into account, which should leave us with about a −13% change from 1985 to 2023.
here it happens again: tax costs have decreased since 1985, but somehow that manifests as an increase to the “cost of thriving” index (-25% —> −13%).
it’s odd to leap to things like housing markets and consumer debt without considering the demographics of startup employees. i believe your graphs are national averages, so are these employees expected to hold more or less debt relative to average? more or less likely to be homeowners v.s. renters? more or less likely to live in specific regions of the country?
the initial shock of covid 3.5 years ago was just massive. i get that it was in many ways transformative and not strictly destructive, but still hypotheticals like “a hundred billion decrease in VC funding” just seem so miniscule in comparison. simultaneously we see how the impacts of a sharp shock got dispersed pretty far across time with covid, and this VC bubble popping isn’t nearly as sharp a shock as we’ve known (call it 18mo, based on those burn rates, vs 2mo over which covid hit the whole country).
cascading failures are notoriously difficult to predict. seems to me the real worry is not the title of this post but that the systems which have arrested cascading failures may be eroding. good for bringing up national debt, actually, would be interesting to just embrace this fully and consider food/energy security & geopolitics — but that would make for a pretty different piece.