I think you may mean taking your environment as object? The typical idea behind a subject-object shift is that first you are subject to a lens, then you can take it as an object to look at.
Matt Goldenberg(Matt Goldenberg)
Karma: 3,672
Alright I’m convinced. Does anyone know if I can emulate this if I don’t have an iPhone?
So, in addition to raw comprehension rate, there’s also what kind of knowledge you want to foster. This probably varies from text to text. In some cases it’s best to absorb a broad base of material rapidly. In other cases it’s more useful to get a really detailed understanding, questioning all of the author’s conclusions, working through everything yourself.
I tried to take a stab at when to do which model in this post.
I think Gerald is making the point that perhaps the slope is asymmetric because the risk is asymmetric.
Ahh that makes sense.
In particular, spaced repetition software with judicious use of machine learning on the backend. Technically this breaks the rule of “Same level of technology as today
I’m pretty sure this definitely exists today in apps like Duolingo and Khan Academy, at the very least the originator of spaced repetition wrote an article about it in 1998: https://www.supermemo.com/en/archives1990-2015/english/ol/nn_train
Yeah I mean it’s pretty clear to me when I’m talking about things that make me “cheerful” that my feelings are fairly scope insensitive
It seems to me there was some causal factor that caused the switch to flip to me (maybe it was reading about UDT or something), and I should be seeking to cause that same causal factor in other similar brains.
How does this acausally increase their chances? I still don’t get TDT it just seems obvious that the only way this would increase their chances was it if somehow effected someone else through culture or something.
Ahh interesting, I replied with a potential counterexample to your attempted reconciliation, curious about your thoughts!
In my homo-economicus worldview, there exists a single price at which I’m exactly indifferent and then my cheerfulness goes up smoothly/continuously from there. It feels very arbitrary to pick something on that continuum and call it “the” cheerful price I have.
When I think about cheerful prices, I don’t think this necessarily fits my experience. For instance, in this comment, I talk about how even at absurdly high prices, I wouldn’t be cheerful (even if I thought it was “worth it”) because I would still be sad about the thing I was paying for.
I get how honor is a spiritual concept but don’t really get how reputation is. It seems like reputation is precisely the thing PR is concerned with while it ignores honor.
This is very confusing to me when Anna in the original post talks about “reputation” “honor” and “brand” as equivalent. Reputation and brand are precisely worrying about how others think of you (PR), whereas Honor is about how you think of yourself.
Man Iove how much of a departure this is from “shut up and multiply”. In many ways it’s “stop multiplying and feel things”. I would really love to see the synthesis of these two views (which is in many ways a “practical virtues ethics vs. practical utilitarianism thing”)
I pondered the dog thing for a second before realizing that I wouldn’t be cheerful even at trillions of dollars, because I would still be sad about my dog being tortured. This may be a way that “cheerful price” is much less psychologically damaging than “willingness to pay” (indeed Eliezer points towards this in the article).
I suspect the same is true of many people being paid to have sex with others.
(Also, I think there’s supposed to be a norm about using torture in thought experiments, so there’s that).
Saving this for the next “rationalists don’t win” argument.
I think this story is common in the rationalist community, going from life is awful to “life is great” certainly counts as win in my book.
My understanding of utility function is that it’s impossible not to have one, even if the function is implicit, subconscious, or something that wouldn’t be endorsed if it could be stated explicitly.
My understanding is that a utility function implies consistent and coherent preferences. Humans definitely don’t have that, our preferences are inconsistent and subject to your instance framing effects.
Thanks, one thing I didn’t quite understand in the post is Why making the attention more regular through diaghramatic breathing causes 2nd and 3rd nen to stop being produced (if indeed those two things are linked).
Does Sekida have a framework for why the other nen fall away?
I was surprised that this post didn’t talk about inequality, which is a common metric used to show the world is getting worse.
The research on happiness seems to suggest that often our life satisfaction is not based solely on standard of living, but in relative standard of living compared to our peers.
This suggests a few things:
If everyone’s standard of living raises together, it won’t do much to raise happiness.
If a few people’s standards of living raise more than others, this will make people less happy on average.
If we have more perception of people with higher standard of living than us, our happiness will go down (and if we have more perception of people with standard of living worse than us, it will go up).
Yeah, I think this passes the common sense test as well. It’d be quite suspicious if it took 10,000 hours to get to the top of the field of any discipline, regardless of the relative competitiveness or difficulty of different disciplines.
On the other hand, I think frontier’s point is good as well. If you don’t have any data, it’s reasonable to use the average as a rule of thumb. I think the real point of Gladwell’s 10,000 hour rule is “It’s almost certainly going to take a ton of practice to become an expert at the thing, and you should expect and relish that.”
I unironically think this a great example of doing the thing the OP is pointing at correctly.