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Until it is over ridden by some new evidence then it should shift positions.
Mhm but just to lampshade this: this is assuming that ‘the moon is round like a wheel of cheese’ is not only learned in just any relevant sense of “in isolation” but rather the strictest possible sense, in which that is literally the first thing ever learned, which is extremely implausible, but nonetheless I think being able to entertain such a strict and abstract definition for the sake of argument is very based; upvoted.
Insulins which humans inject are modified versions of cow insulin. Cows probably don’t eat a lot of fat or carbs, right? They eat grass? I feel like someone should check what happens when you feed a cow the diet which puts humans who are taking insulin injections in the ‘the swamp’ state.
Actually it’s a self-insistent status grab to call oneself kind when they tend to have no money to donate and ‘niceness’ is the banner of the battle droid people who tend to really care and they deserve that recognition, not this additional put-down. By my framings I would say that there is more or less sub- or super-ficial niceness.
so there’s like an ultimate thing that your set of predictions is about, and you’re holding off on saying what is to be vindicated until some time that you can say “this is exactly/approximately what i was saying would happen”?
im not trying to be negative; i can still see utility in that if that’s a fair assessment but i want to know why, when you say you called it, this was the thing you wanted to have been called
Meh. You include, in your defense of inconsistency, no safeguarding measures against the common curse of all costs of general inconsistency falling upon those who are more expedient to redirect costs to, such as being least popular, or most miscategorized, or most outright ontologically erased. Doesn’t it seem like there would be good reasons not to diagnose you with probably being a lot of people’s accidentally evil stepmothers in other lives, given how much you say you care about being reasonable?
For me, reasonability is a serious claim, and the differences between being incapable of being reasoned with versus being capable of being reasoned with, and between being able to be held accountable to that as a connotation of reasonability versus choosing to be unreasonable to some people for reasons that your peer group have agreed are good enough for permitting cheap-to-prevent (and fully unnecessary) torture or squalor, are big differences to be narcissistic about, not small ones.
This sounds to me kind of like saying Jesus Christ will literally come back to Earth as a ghost for the rapture in 2012. I wouldn’t put my money on people not just using the government to make something else happen.
People already wanted to distrust technology; there are plenty of personally fulfilling narrative roles people would gain from simply attempting the ordinary governmental intervention efforts humans have always tended to. I’m not saying it will be competently executed but it would probably be at least as good as internet- and automation-assisted feudalism.
I’d distinguish ‘imparting information that happens to induce guilt’ from ‘guilting’, based on intent to cooperatively inform vs. psychologically attack.
Mhm, and in practice no one who accuses of guilt tripping actually cares about that distinction; if someone is being made to look bad then they basically never wonder if it’s right. I’m not objecting to the ‘guilt-tripping’ framing for no reason; it’s a thought-terminating cliche in 99.99% of cases where it’s used.
[reading what I actually wrote here] … And anyways ‘inducing guilt’ is what the most relevant informing-act looks like; if you’re doing something wrong then you don’t necessarily change it without attending to the exact details which would induce guilt. I never even said anything about ‘guilting’; OP explicitly discouraged a correct thing to do without even mentioning ‘guilting’.
In a well-founded marriage, spouses don’t try to induce internal conflict within their partner (e.g. shaming or guilting them) to win fights.
So I would expect that giving others a list of true information which connotes their relevant wrongness in some way on some topic (and may thereby induce guilt especially when the problem is explicitly stated) is not well-founded, according to you. Under well-founded environments, those with the advantage of existing unchallenged multi-prejudiced ideology would never be held accountable to their mistakes because all conscientious objectors can just be made into annoying squares.
Even worse, you contend that the opposite is to be “coherent” “like North Korea” “because everyone listens to the same person”. So in your option model there’s just no position corresponding to being virtuously willing to contend with guilt as a fair emergent consequence of hearing carefully considered and selected information.
Strong downvoted for not just saying what you’re really thinking to the person you have a criticism about which is almost definitely wrong.
Still I guess there should be a word for being mean to one or a few guys in particular against one’s stated principles without an objectively justifying explanation. I would like it to be something else. Especially because your example does not involve predictable scapegoat targeting to match the way that this phenomenon happens in real life.
well, there are positive-sum games. also, it may turn out that acquiring power is more complicated, in an almost fundamentally benevolent way, than grabbing an object from someone else and pulling in hard with your arms; people don’t like ceding power to individuals who seem myopically selfish.
This exchange reveals a pervasive mechanism: pseudo-principality—the selective application of principles based solely on whether they advance one’s concealed interests while maintaining a facade of consistent ethical behavior.
While your analysis may fairly apply to the example you have constructed, in practice, it is important to be strategic about intrinsic value, people do not often have the framing of intrinsic value strategicism readily in mind to make their behavior explicitly consistent about, and all shortly specified principles which are not about being strategic about intrinsic value will tend to lead a person away from that — can be followed myopically.
So while it may be extremely unpleasant to not understand the behavior of an inconsistent advice-applier, especially one who chooses outcomes which have any amount (no matter if it’s the option where the unpleasantness is most mitigated) of unpleasantness, inconsistency may be the only option for someone who wants to be good and not just predictably bad and doesn’t have the framing available to them of strategicism of intrinsic value.
I agree that it is better to have principles-enough with some sad exceptions than to be a predictable nihilist.
This reframes the act as a legitimate inquiry into whether stated principles hold up across relevant situations. We can reserve “whataboutism” specifically for bad-faith distractions. When someone earnestly
Bolding mine. Not that you’d be definitely myopic or definitely self-privileging upon close examination, but this is a lot of buck-passing (“passing the buck”) going on here.
I propose we adopt a more neutral and accurate term: Principle Consistency Challenge (PCC). This reframes the act as a legitimate inquiry into whether stated principles hold up across relevant situations.
… When someone earnestly asks, “Why does this principle apply here but not there?”, that question deserves respect and engagement, not ridicule. 1
I love that; thank you.
Context Inflation: Excessive appeals to “unique circumstances” to justify inconsistency, especially when those circumstances conveniently align with self-interest.
If your model failed to account for vast sections of reality then it failed to account; that is simply sufficient cause for update, and not sufficient cause for incurring a reputation of not really meaning the good-when-universal features of one’s given advice that they really meant, though I agree that one should not remain wrong in light of definite exceptions, and changing one’s model may be seen as humbling.
This pervasiveness raises a provocative question: If economists try to estimate the percentage of counterfeit currency in circulation, what percentage of publicly stated principles are functionally “counterfeit”—applied selectively for gain?
Most principles should be applied selectively ‘for gain’ when comparing their total application across a multiverse of conceivable conditions, instead of given all the say in the outcomes all the time. Beauty should make room for Freedom, and if any person is deprived too severely of the former then maybe the latter should even make room for the former too, in some intelligently implemented way and not in just any way.
While I take no position on the general accuracy or contextual robustness of the post’s thesis, I find that its topics and analogies inspire better development of my own questions. The post may not be good advice, but it is good conversation. In particular I really like the attempt to explicitly analyze possible explanations of processes of consciousness emerging from physical formal systems instead of just remarking on the mysteriousness of such a thing ostensibly having happened.
girl prety
personal desire to be worthy of being an example vindicating the hope that good guys can ‘get the girl’; giving up on one means nothing will ever stay and doom is eternal
What are the other describable or possible-though-indescribable hypotheses? If it’s intuitive that there are no other hypotheses to start from — if the explanations have been reduced to some small number of all imaginable possibilities — that’s a non-nothing sort of evidence which ought to be contended with at the very least, rather than scoffed at with ‘you didn’t see an epistemic polylemma therefor there’s no evidence that there was one’.
this is clearly polemical satire and not true, and I cannot readily infer about you a spirit of curiosity about the subject of the satire, so I will downvote, in an attempt of assistance of the spirit of LessWrong; nothing personal & i hope you fare well on this site generally :)
Ignoring everything underneath the title, this advice makes more convenient what people wanted to do anyway, changing nothing about the typical quality of the implementation; not the cruel extent nor the unjust kind of it. “Oh, not even rationalists will object? Excellent.”
It would fall harshest on those who are most small, most libertarian, and most habitually argumentative, and not on dogmatic censors, nor coercive aesthetic isolationists, nor speech duressors.
FFM is great except for two things:
it purports to measure conscientiousness, and it measures that by how much money you make and how often you work, which have nothing to do with acting according to your conscience in a world where the highest-relevance acts are speech-acts
its ‘agreeableness’ metric is supposed to be about niceness and harmony-making, but people who reveal their disagreements for the sake of resolving them get sorted as argumentative and thus low in agreeability, and there’s no separate metric for niceness in the model, so as a worldview FFM basically says you’re either dogmatically conformist or a jerk
Which is actually a lot of things wrong with it, considering that’s two of its five factors.
It may be strategic about intrinsic value for a small group of people to suffer to implement highly demanding altruistic lifestyles of their own authentic diligence, but for everyone to operate at the extremes of altruism would make everything suck, which is something morality would advise against. Morality is demanding, but it can’t be demanding to an extent that comes out wasteful of intrinsic value in the end. Well, that’s my working hypothesis at least.
You are free to choose between A or B if your choice will determine the outcome.
Right, but there’s a lot of conflation between what people should think I am and what they do unfairly think I am, which to be fair is a real thing, though it’s a real thing which the thing that people should think I am is trapped inside of, and to the extent that it is responsible for causing problems which the thing people should think I am are inclined to blame by nonconsensual association, it is parasitic, and the thing which people should think I am is a victim.
Actually that’s a stereotype of an archetype; Death as it appears in fiction is an archetype.
I’m under the impression things work like this:
Archetypes are kind of like conventions or mathematical objects with specifications and meta-specifications, especially of types of characters.
Stereotypes are the popular beliefs about a thing, whether or not they’re true.
Stereotypes of stereotypes would look something more like popular beliefs about popular beliefs.
Stereotypes of archetypes are popular beliefs about the pieces of (esp. well-known) broad character type ontologies.