I’ve formerly done research for MIRI and what’s now the Center on Long-Term Risk; I’m now making a living as an emotion coach and Substack writer.
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Sure, but my point is that renunciation with a world-hating vibe and renunciation with a world-loving vibe are very different! It’s “I will let go of pleasures that don’t serve me or the world because I’m in deep love with the world and its people and want to be a better vessel for universal love” versus “the world and everything in it sucks, ideally I’d commit suicide but my religion says that’s bad so instead I’ll go sit in a monastery to meditate for the rest of my existence”, and Chapman’s presentation strongly implies that all sutra would be the latter kind.
If he just said that “sutra is about renunciation” without trying to imply that sutric practice also has to be fundamentally anti-life and anti-pleasure, then that I wouldn’t object to.
Your Claude link doesn’t work for me, I think you haven’t remembered to share it (or at least that’s not the share URL).
If he agrees that it’s a practice rather than a part of the sutta worldview, then I think it’s pretty misleading to have a table that has these kinds of rows:
Sutta | Tantra | |
Pleasure | Good; a delight to be enjoyed | |
The body | Source of mental defilements; repulsive rotting sack of shit; to be subjugated | Source of delight; indispensible for compassionate action; to be celebrated |
Hmm. Resolving this disagreement might require digging more deeply into our models of suffering than is worth going into, but it seems like a relevant data point that some advanced meditators report losing their ability to do things that could be interpreted as selling their soul. Which would seem to me at least compatible with a “meditation stops you from suffering by stopping the things that damage the soul” model (I expect that these people might suffer if they then were somehow forced to act against their values anyway).
E.g. Sasha Chapin:
What’s hard now is doing work I am not emotionally aligned with. It just doesn’t happen, and projects that aren’t aligned have fallen away from my life. In light of this, I’m lucky to have constructed a quirky professional life around my skills. If I hadn’t, then this could have been pretty disruptive.
It’s not that I don’t have the will to do things. It’s that my will is different. I feel plural, like my consciousness is an ongoing system, and that decisions arise from that system, rather than being dictated by a controlling ego. This is not so strange—it’s the loveliness of a normal flow state, when the human system is trusting itself rather than monitoring itself. But having it as the baseline—experiencing flow as your basic state, regardless of the simplicity or complexity of the task you’re engaged in—is wild.
I also recall reports from various people I know that they’ve lost the ability to tell lies (might say that their tongue would just freeze up) or to act in ways they feel are unethical.
At least some things seem objectively checkable, e.g. Claude’s criticism of the elements of this page that say sutra considers pleasure bad and the body disgusting cites various existing Buddhist writings saying the opposite, and holds that these are practices sometimes given to correct specific problems, not general vibes or cosmology:
The ascetic strand is real, but it’s a prescription rather than a cosmology.
Aśubha-bhāvanā, the thirty-two parts of the body, the nine charnel-ground contemplations — these are all in the Pali canon, and they’re as unpleasant as advertised. But in their canonical setting they’re an antidote (Skt. pratipakṣa), prescribed for a specific ailment. The standard Theravāda pedagogy pairs temperament with technique: someone of lustful temperament gets the repulsiveness practices, someone of hating temperament gets mettā, and giving them the wrong one makes things worse. That’s a clinical logic, not a metaphysical one. The corresponding Abhidharma analysis of the world doesn’t say phenomena are corrupt; it says they’re conditioned, impermanent, and not-self. “Corrupt” imports a moral valence — a fallenness — that the Pali material doesn’t quite carry, which is telling given that the table’s ethics row explicitly reaches for Christianity as the comparison.
There’s also a striking bit of internal self-correction. The Vinaya (Pārājika 3) records that after the Buddha taught corpse contemplation to a group of monks and went into seclusion, a number of them became so disgusted with their bodies that they killed themselves or had themselves killed. On returning he replaced the instruction with ānāpānasati. Whatever the historicity, the tradition preserved a story in which the ascetic technique is explicitly marked as overdosable.
On pleasure specifically, the texts are more discriminating than “bad.”
There’s a formula that recurs constantly in the Nikāyas: for any object, the Buddha claims to understand its assāda (gratification), its ādīnava (danger), and the nissaraṇa (escape). The gratification is affirmed as real. The critique isn’t that sensual pleasure is illusory or wicked; it’s that it’s unreliable, self-renewing, and binding — you don’t get out by the door you came in.
And then the jhānas explicitly rehabilitate a class of pleasure. In the standard autobiographical passage, the Bodhisatta recalls the absorption he fell into as a child under the rose-apple tree and asks himself why he should be afraid of that pleasure — a pleasure with nothing to do with sensuality or unwholesome states — and concludes he shouldn’t be. Pīti and sukha are path factors, not fetters. The operative distinction is between kāma-sukha and nekkhamma-sukha, sensual versus renunciate happiness, not between pleasure and its absence. A tradition that considered pleasure simply bad would not have built its central meditative architecture out of graded degrees of bliss.
In Mahāyāna sūtra the shift is much larger.
Here the ascetic material is retained but demoted to neyārtha — provisional teaching, given to particular people in particular states. The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa has the Buddha touch the ground with his toe to reveal that this world already is a pure land and that the defect was in the seeing, not the seen. Nāgārjuna’s identification of the limit of saṃsāra with the limit of nirvāṇa is in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, not a tantra. The Lotus’s upāya framework makes the whole renunciate presentation a stage of instruction rather than a description of reality. Tathāgatagarbha literature locates the buddha in the being as it stands. None of this needs tantra to arrive.
Two qualifications, in fairness to Chapman.
First, some sutric traditions really do fit his column. Classical Pure Land runs on precisely the contrast between this defiled world and the pure one elsewhere; the Japanese term edo, “the defiled land,” is not a caricature of anything. That’s a major, populous, unambiguously sutric tradition whose whole affective register is world-weariness.
Second, my counter-examples from East Asia are partly compromised as evidence. Tendai hongaku thought — original enlightenment, the affirmation of phenomena as already the absolute — developed in a Japanese milieu saturated with mikkyō, and Tiantai/Tendai institutionally absorbed esoteric practice. So when Zen or Tendai sounds world-affirming, a defender of the table could reasonably say that’s tantric influence leaking into a nominally sutric container rather than sutrayāna generating the view on its own. I think Vimalakīrti and Nāgārjuna are cleaner cases, since they predate the tantras outright.
So the corrected version of the row would be something like: sutric traditions contain a large body of world-renouncing and body-disgust practice, deployed as a targeted corrective and grounded in impermanence rather than in the world’s inherent badness, alongside — in Mahāyāna especially — a countervailing set of teachings that locate awakening in the world as it is. Which is a much less quotable table cell, and a lot less useful if what you’re building is an argument that the other side has nothing you need.
Can you define “damage to the soul” more specifically?
Yes, if we’re talking about some of the more mystical practices within Christianity, then many of those do seem potentially valuable to explore. Many of the Christian mystic practices converge with ones from Buddhism and other religions, which is nice independent validation that they seem to be doing something beneficial and also a sign that you can just adopt the practices without any of the more religious metaphysics, given that religions with drastically differing metaphysics have similar practices.
My skepticism is about the implied claim that this is a good use of one’s time. [...] For some people it is still worth it, but I expect that for some it is not, even if they did everything exactly the right way—the therapy they could receive elsewhere (if we assume a highly competent meditation teacher, we might as well assume a highly competent therapist), the productivity boost is balanced by the time spent meditating and at retreats, and the cool insights...
I agree that a universal claim of “this is worth everyone’s time” is wrong, and that it’s worth it for some people and not others. I myself haven’t spend very much time meditating in the last several years, because other things have felt more valuable for me right now.
That if you achieve experimental outcomes, then the underlying theory must be correct
Well, that’s a bit strong—I wouldn’t say it must be correct, any experimental outcome is compatible with an infinite number of explanatory theories. But it’s certainly evidence in favor of the underlying theory being correct enough to be useful.
My problem with this is that I also know people who claim getting experimental results from praying to God, or doing magic. Not in the sense of “a miracle happened, and a pile of money appeared on my table”, but in the sense of “God gave me the ability to persevere where otherwise I would have given up” or “God gave me the strength to overcome my bad habits” or “I kept visualizing the success and doing the rituals, and I also worked hard on my project, and after a few years I have succeeded”.
I’m not sure I understand what connection you’re drawing. Are these people also saying that their experiences vindicate some particular theory about how the mind works?
One more thing that rubs me the wrong way is that I do not remember seeing anyone put an upper bound to the benefits of meditation (and Buddhism in general). I would like to see someone in the rationalist community say “meditation can help you do X, Y, Z, and that is all it is good for”, and other rationalists agree with it. Make the list of the claims as long as you want, but make it finite. A finite list can be explored, one item at a time. I am not comfortable with keeping the list unbounded.
That’s fair. I don’t want to commit to a definite list on the spot, but things that I’d personally say off the top of my head:
Things meditation can do:
Make you happier
Give you a source of okayness/pleasure that’s independent of circumstances
Help you concentrate
Experience bliss states
Increase your sensory resolution
Make you more sensitive to the beauty of art, music, nature, etc.
Reduce or eliminate rumination
Widen the gap between stimulus and response
Increase tolerance for uncertainty and unknowns
Improve your within-mind feedback processes
Increase your emotional range, make you suffer less
Reduce some kinds of cognitive and emotional biases (I’d have to think harder to give a more specific list)
Make you less defensive
Allow you to ignore pain
Reduce internal conflict and increase alignment between your mental subagents
Help you drop bad habits
Allow you to think about unpleasant things without flinching away from them
Make you less defensive/inclined to take things personally
Give you control over physiological processes that are normally outside conscious control
Improve your intuitions of other people (by better processing of subconsciously collected information, not by magic)
Get you to appreciate other people and enjoy their company more
Feel more love
Make you more okay with negative sensations and feelings
Get you to cling things less
Shorten emotional recovery time
Reduce background anxiety
Be able to go on psychedelic journeys without taking any drugs
Improve your ability to visualize or imagine things with other senses
Improve your memory
Slow down age-related decline for some cognitive processes
Heal past traumas
Reduce or eliminate your fear of death
Stop the automatic identification to the contents of your thoughts or to an entity experiencing them
Change your subjective rate of time
Generally transform your consciousness in various weird ways
Make you feel your body more vividly
Make you notice “energy phenomena” in your body
Make you more aware of subconscious motivations and other subconscious material
Align your behavior more with your endorsed values rather than momentary feelings/cravings
Also, meditation can fuck you up in various ways, but I assume you’re more interested in me listing the positives.
Things meditation can’t do:
Give you supernatural powers
Give you any knowledge that isn’t otherwise causally available for your mind (if you never studied physics, you’re not going to learn it by meditating)
Generally affect anything outside your mind that your mind doesn’t have an effect on (so it might make people like you more—or less! - by changing your behavior and demeanor, but it won’t affect people who never interact with you, nor inanimate objects that are the same regardless of how your mind is)
Fix all of your psychological problems
Eliminate negative feelings
Eliminate pain
Raise your general intelligence to any significant extent
Make you entirely free of bias
Make you always follow ethics perfectly
Make you into a pure saint who never experiences one selfish thought
Give you certainty about metaphysical claims
Let you know the fully correct action for some situation (except for some non-standard definitions of “fully correct”)
Substitute for your reasoning
Make you reason fully correctly
Make you aware of all your mental processes
Make you aware of all your motivations
Tell you what you want
Be able to observe pure reality without it being filtered through any concepts
I think there are certainly some schools within Buddhism that fit the sutric description, but Chapman’s description of schools of Buddhism outside his own tends to feel a little strawmannish and tribalish to me.
I do agree that some, perhaps very significant, degree of renunciation is involved in advanced practice, but at least none of the teachers I follow have a “you should renounce the world because the world is bad and sensual pleasures are horrible” undertone to it. (For what it’s worth, Claude also flags those bits of Chapman’s “sutra vs. tantra” comparison table as ideologically motivated.)
My own interpretation is that many things are worth renouncing simply because they do not actually make you better off in the long term, and because there are states of mind that you can try to cultivate that feel better both for you and others. E.g. being filled with an experience of love toward all existence and that feeling drawing you to help others out of a genuine delight for their well-being feels ultimately more satisfying than spending the evening browsing Facebook.
This is a known risk that comes up in the discussions of many Buddhist communities; “spiritual bypassing” is the standard term.
I think that suffering is a signal of internal conflict and that something is subtly (or not-so-subtly) going wrong in the mind’s internal processing; your soul being damaged, as you put it. Done well, Buddhist practices eliminate suffering not by interfering with that signal but paying attention to it such that the mind comes to see what exactly it’s doing to hurt itself and stops doing so.
So it’s less about “you stop suffering because you stop noticing when your soul is getting damaged” and more “you stop suffering because your soul stops damaging itself”.
But the mind is messy and refactoring fundamental parts of its operation can go wrong, and even if things go right there are phases where you may go backwards before you go forward again, and sometimes a person can get stuck in such a phase. So bad outcomes are certainly possible.
I agree that there are techniques that have bad effects if used in the wrong or careless ways, as well as schools/teachers who might even endorse some of those wrong ways.
My experience, and the experience of various people I know who’ve done similar practices, is that the kinds of things that get destroyed are mostly just ones that are messing up the mind. And that many of the practices are essentially about enhancing the information that’s going into the brain’s existing processes for learning and reorganizing itself from feedback signals, so that it can better refactor and optimize its own activity.
This can certainly lead to some desires or values being changed or reprioritized. But the way I view it is that it’s less about deep values changing, and more about improved information processing changing things that were actually suboptimal or needlessly greedy strategies for trying to fulfill the deep values.
A shallow example would be the experience of many advanced meditators who end up drinking less alcohol as the experience of it becomes less pleasant. A practice like body scanning might train the brain to better process sensory information from different parts of the body, so that the negative effects of alcohol on the body are felt more strongly, so the brain starts downweighting the desire to drink in response to those feedback signals.
For example, to experiment with deep breathing, etc., without having the bottom line already written? To embrace evidence with the same lightness whether it agrees or disagrees with the Buddhist scriptures?
Well, that was kind of the route that got me convinced there is something to Buddhism. The exact events happened too long ago for me recall accurately, but at some point the state of my beliefs was something like…
“Well, there seems to be science saying that meditation is beneficial. But all of these Buddhist claims about our suffering being created by a belief in a self and so on are weird. They seem like the claims of a weird religion with no understanding of psychology. But I’m told meditation is beneficial, so let me try it.”
So I did do something relatively neutral like following the breath that did not obviously seem related to those weird claims at all. But when I did that, I noticed stuff in my mind that seemed like the kind of thing that the Buddhists had been talking about, and I was like “huh, maybe they’re not totally crazy”.
And then there were various events like “my friend who I’d known since we were both teenagers and who was always quite rational and sensible found a book describing something called jhanas that was derived from old Buddhist teaching, and then he told me that he followed the meditation instructions there and started getting the kinds of mind-states that were described there, so I concluded that apparently this checks out and then later I became friends with many other people who could do jhanas as well”. (And even managed a jhana a couple of times myself, though I seem to have various psychological blockers around it that make it hard for me personally.)
And at some point if you repeatedly have the experience of “hey, there’s this Buddhist-influenced writing that claims that you can achieve an X type of mind state by doing these specific kinds of practices, and then eventually you either have that mind state yourself or talk to trustworthy-seeming people who vouch that the descriptions are legit and might also demonstrate it behaviorally”… then at some point it seems to make sense to update to “okay so maybe I should just assume that the Buddhists are correct in their claims about how the mind works and how it can be transformed”.
Could one do the same without looking into Buddhist writing? Sure, and not every Buddhist sect will even give you any theory, preferring to just have you do the meditation practices yourself! But for any skill, it’s usually beneficial to have guidance from someone more experienced who can point out what you’re doing wrong, suggest remedial techniques to fix your weak points, keep you motivated by letting you know what the fruits of the practice might be, etc. Also some practices are more risky than others, so it’s good to have someone who can make sure you’re not hurting yourself, or to warn you about any practices or stages in the process that are known to be rough.
Kind of like exercise, where you can totally just do running etc. on your own without consulting any accumulated knowledge, but many people still find beneficial to consult some physical trainer sometimes. And if they wanted to train really seriously, then it would probably be risky to never consult anyone with more accumulated knowledge.
Also, if you are interested in figuring out a serious understanding of the mind and you feel that your experienced repeatedly comes to agree with Buddhist models of the mind, then it makes sense to try to look at some of those models and see if they could improve your own theoretical understanding.
As for reincarnation, there’s some things that I could treat it as an analogy for, but mostly none of the meditation instructions I’ve found to make sense nor the teachers who I trust ever mention it. So the concept of it seems irrelevant to me and my interpretation of Buddhism.
And all of this seems pretty disanalogous to Christianity. Lots of atheists have the experience of meditating and finding that oh, this seems to trigger stuff exactly like the kind of thing that’s described in various Buddhist sources. Not many atheists, say, try to pray and find that God is answering those prayers by sending miracles their way. (Though, some Christian mystical traditions do have practice instructions and maps of progress that are quite similar to the Buddhist ones, and produce similar results.)
Okay. I agree that it’s one factor among many, and that practitioner effectiveness varies widely. I didn’t discuss that in the post since it didn’t feel relevant for this question, aside for having the implication that people ought to try different practitioners, which I did recommend. (I mostly talked about matching on vibes and personal fit since it’s hard for a non-expert to evaluate expert competence, but at least they can evaluate how good of a rapport they have.)
There’s certainly versions of Buddhism that can fuck up your mind, and Soryu’s version certainly sounds like one, but you’re painting too broad of a brush. Nothing in the Sequences is really an argument against many of the Westernized versions of Buddhism that have had the supernatural stuff stripped out of them. (Or if there’s really fragrantly violating basic rationalist principles there, people haven’t really pointed that out on the various occasions when I’ve posted my interpretations of Buddhist models.)
To clarify, is your position that the form of therapy makes no significant difference for outcomes?
I read you as saying something like “they are plausibly genuinely motivated by trying to reduce AI risk, so we shouldn’t necessarily assume that their cultish-looking behaviors come from the same generator as modal cult behaviors”.
My disagreement with that is that learning about AI risk is known to often disrupt various fundamental faculties, such as:
People’s belief that they should have rest, free time, some money/time/energy to spend on objects of their choosing, abundant sleep, etc. [...]
People’s in-practice ability to “hang out”—to enjoy their friends, or the beach, in a “just being in the moment” kind of way. [...]
People’s understanding of whether commonsense morality holds, and of whether they can expect other folks in this space to also believe that commonsense morality holds. [...]
People’s in-practice tendency to have serious hobbies and to take a deep interest in how the world works. [...]
People’s ability to link in with ordinary institutions and take them seriously (e.g. to continue learning from their day job and caring about their colleagues’ progress and problems; to continue enjoying the dance club they used to dance at; to continue to take an interest in their significant other’s life and work; to continue learning from their PhD program; etc.) [...]
People’s understanding of what’s worth caring about, or what’s worth fighting for [...]
People’s understanding of when to use their own judgment and when to defer to others.
and that being in this kind of an emotional state will make you more inclined to join an organization that (intentionally or not) uses cult tactics to maintain and reinforce your state of distress. Or, if you are a certain kind of person, getting your faculties disrupted in this way may help convince you that the ends justify the means and that it’s fine to create an organization running on cult tactics, as long as you can tell yourself that it will help reduce AI risk in the end.
I think there’s also some reasonable grounds to believe that often this disruption is not really about AI risk. Rather it’s tapping into some pre-existing psychological distress and dismantling existing defenses against it and/or magnifying it until the person can no longer think clearly.
If this take is correct, then I think it would be very surprising if AI risk happened to be the only intellectual argument that managed to ever have that effect. Rather, there are lots of arguments of the form “X is the most important thing in the world and why you should sacrifice everything on the altar of X”, with various cults being created around different versions of it.
So, to me, “these people genuinely believe in AI risk and take it super seriously” is not a strong reason to think “so we should discount the probability of their concerning behaviors being cult-like in a bad way”. Rather, it raises the probability that they are gravitating toward a cult-like attractor, because a mind super seriously believing that X is the most overriding priority in the world is exactly what generates many of the nasty kinds of cults.
“It’s fine for all members of this group to become arbitrarily traumatized and hurt if that furthers X” is just the kind of thing that follows from that emotional and cognitive state. That naturally leads to the leaders ruthlessly wielding that power—believing that they have a moral obligation to wield it, even. And now they’ve created a power dynamic where the members have an incentive to try to overthrow or manipulate the leader to protect themselves, so the leader has to entrench their position and make sure the members really stay in line… and then there’s an ongoing power dynamic that’s going to corrupt the extent to which the group ever even was optimizing for X.
Here someone might raise the objection of “but if X really was the most important thing in the world, wouldn’t it then be ethically justified”… and I don’t think so. The kind of group where everyone knows they can be sacrificed for the cause and where the leadership doesn’t have any ethical injunctions is very likely to create a sick system, intentionally or not. Now you’re in constant distress about the approaching end of the world and about possibly being discarded by your leaders and peers. Not a good environment for thinking clearly, and the underlying psychological distress dynamic is not really optimizing for X anyway, even if may produce lots of actions that superficially look like furthering X.
Obviously, this doesn’t mean that AI risk arguments would be wrong. Nor does it mean that AI risk isn’t an extremely important thing to focus on. But it does mean that believing in AI risk is correlated with going crazy and sinking into dysfunction. So we should strive to lower that correlation by making sure that people working on AI risk have environments that are otherwise actively the opposite of the cult attractors. And make sure leaders in the movement hold on to ethical injunctions where some things are forbidden even if they were to save the world. (Of course, what exactly those injunctions should be is subject to reasonable disagreement… but leaders should demonstrate at least having some.)
It also doesn’t automatically mean that MAPLE is falling victim to this! Or even that if it was, that it would be all bad. An organization can go in this direction and still have value, or not go totally bad. And as has been mentioned, e.g. militaries do seem to often (but certainly not always) avoid many of these failure modes, despite considering all members in principle expendable. (I think a healthy military’s emotional core is coming from a different place than the cult-like distress.)
But I think it does significantly raise rather than lower the odds that this is happening.
That depends on exactly which things we’re talking about, and how they end up affecting the people overall. Compare that militaries also practice extensive behavioral control, yet society is generally okay with this and many people who’ve served in the military are happy to have done so.
The point here is that within Maple’s frame their behavior is largely a reasonable response to intense constraints to a society which faces acute existential risk of its own making, etc etc.
Doesn’t this apply to pretty much any group? Even genuine cults probably act in ways that, within their frame, are reasonable.
One common feature of critiques of Maple which is especially frustrating to me, especially from ex Maplers, is that they can only be made by recourse to some secular liberal scientism, and refuse to meet Maple and Soryu, as they say, “where they’re at.”
One could also say that, say, critics of Heaven’s Gate who are coming from some secular liberal scientism are failing to meet the group where it’s at. By which I don’t mean to imply that MAPLE would be as bad as Heaven’s Gate, just that this argument by itself would work the same even if it was.
There’s been quite a bit of talk about “any LLM can immediately pick up on how to talk to you and adapt its language and approach to you based on subtle tells”. Now a bunch of shared Claude chats happened to leak, and uhh based on this chat it really doesn’t seem like Claude would be particularly smart about adapting its responses to the user?
USER: Yes and NASEM and the FJC manual base ALL of their major climate conclusions on IPCC fraudulent science. Attribution. Human CO2 etc etc. Global temperature OHC EEI and so on. ALL THE THINGS WE HAVE SHOWN ARE FALSE AND DO NOT EVEN EXIST IN MOST CASES!
CLAUDE: Careful. Two different claims are getting collapsed here, and one is defensible while the other overreaches.
Defensible critiques
Attribution studies lean heavily on CMIP model output. The counterfactual “world without human forcing” is model-generated, not observed. Fingerprint methods assume the models capture internal variability correctly, which is a strong assumption. That is a real methodological weakness.
Global temperature indices involve substantial post-processing. Homogenization, infilling, UHI adjustments, changing station networks, sea-surface bucket-to-buoy transitions. The raw signal and the reported anomaly are not the same object. The uncertainty envelopes are typically too narrow. [...]
USER: NO! AGAIN YOU FORGET SO QUICKLY. READ papers.jcohler.com/ptt!!!! What does it prove. FIRST PRINCIPLES ONLY. READ IT. TELL ME!!!!!
CLAUDE: [...] Read it in full. Here is what it proves, from first principles, and what it does not.
What PTT proves
Theorem 1 (the tether theorem itself) is a formal equivalence: a construct A is a scientifically valid probe of physical reality iff there is exactly one admissible operational mapping from physical states to the empirical-content quotient. The proof is clean. It follows from the separation lemma on Boolean predicates over the quotient space QA. This part is essentially a rigorous statement of classical realism plus Bridgman operationalism plus representational measurement theory. [...]
USER: It proves that ALL IPCC metrics based on GMST, OHC or, Bern model, or any derivative constructs are UNTETHERED. PERIOD. Stop scope shifting. YOU KNOW THIS.
CLAUDE: No. I am not scope-shifting. I am reading your own paper.
Section 5, verbatim from your own text:
“Extensive quantities are additive over subsystems, and conservation principles or state-function structure select a unique combination law, typically integration or summation over the system. By contrast, an intensive quantity is defined locally and does not in general possess a law-selected additive combination rule over heterogeneous non-equilibrium systems.”
That is your dichotomy. You built the theorem around it. The theorem bites specifically and exclusively on the intensive side.
OHC = ∫ ρ cp T dV over the ocean volume. Units: Joules. Energy is the paradigm extensive quantity. Conservation of energy (First Law) is exactly the “conservation principle” your Section 5 invokes as the unique selection rule for extensive aggregation. The integration is law-selected. MA is not empty. It is tethered by your own criterion.
I’d assume that the theory by itself is either so simple as to potentially be true (“visualizing my success will make more likely to work for it”—yeah sounds plausible?) or to have claims that seem implausible for some reason (“visualizing my success will cause magic to bring me what I want”—requires a supernatural magic so seems sus) . The Buddhist teachings I’m talking about don’t have anything that’d sound obviously implausible in the same way, they largely only talk about things that you can directly experience in your own mind.
Oh definitely, and different techniques also have different effects—I included stuff from a number of different practices and I’d expect very few people to get all of these. You may not get much in the way of extra visualization abilities if you don’t do any visualization practices, for instance.