It’s like virtue and reputation (“honor”) were one thing at the time, and now they’re two things.I almost wonder if the problem is less “people stopped caring about being truly-intrinsically-virtuous” and more: People stopped rationalizing their reputation-management as virtuous; which fed into a “it’s impractical and uncouth to care about virtue” cycle; which resulted in people having too many degrees of freedom, because it’s easier to rationalize arbitrary actions as practical than to rationalize arbitrary actions as virtuous.
Yeah, I was having similar thoughts.
That’s a good point. Reputation is less naturally spiritual. I think you can experience it both ways. Imagine someone who thinks about reputation as painted on their heart. Versus someone who is is fine with trying to manipulate their reputation.
Modernity has made people quite averse to talking about and dealing with spirituality. I think maybe a big part of what’s going on is that while PR is a material concept, honor is a spiritual concept. It deals with meaning directly rather than only indirectly. Honor matters for its own sake (or can), matters to your soul. Whereas PR can only ever matter indirectly, only as a consequence of other things. No one has PR in their soul.That would mean that people end up avoiding thinking about and relating to things like honor and reputation because it just feels weird. It feel like the sort of thing that you’re not supposed to deal with. It feels like something that science and technology have vaguely disproven.
>Thus, I think that the process is relatively reliable but not totally reliable. Absolutely. That’s exactly right. >My Christian friend claimed that atheists/rationalists/skeptics/evolutionists cannot trust even their own reason (beacuse it is the product of their imperfect brains in their opinion).It sounds like there’s a conflation between ‘trust’ and ‘absolute trust’. Clearly we have some useful notion of trust because we can navigate potentially dangerous situations relatively safely. So using plain language its false to say that atheists can’t trust their own judgement. Clearly they can in some situations. Are you saying atheists can’t climb a ladder safely? It sounds like he wants something to trust in absolutely. Has he faced the possibility that that might just not exist?
Consider how justified trust can come into existence. You’re traveling through the forest. You come to moldy looking bridge over a ravine. It looks a little sketchy. So naturally you feel distrustful of the bridge at first. So you look at it from different angles, and shake it a bit. And put a bit of weight on it. And eventually, some deep unconscious part of you will decide that it’s either untrustworthy and you’ll find another route, or it will decide its trustworthy and you’ll cross the bridge. We don’t understand that process, but its reliable anyway.
Thanks, I forgot to make it clear I’m looking for digital versions.
I’m making an online museum of ethos (my ethos). I’m using good and bad art and commentary to make my ethos very visible through aesthetics.
I am doing an art criticism project that’s very important to me, and I’m looking for high res digital versions the art in the following books.
The Complete Brambly Hedge
Beksinski volume 1-4
Trouble For Trumpets
Help with getting these via a university library, or pointers to where I could buy an electronic copy of any of these is much appreciated.
Attempting to blindsight the answer: In the past I imagine that people were usually trying to ‘be a serious person’. And that’s still true. But somehow being a serious person is now faker. And I think maybe its because they’re being a very scared serious person. Somehow they’re a lot more vulnerable from every direction. Or there’s a lot more directions they’re vulnerable from.
Is there a good source for many things we know from the Diamond Princess data? Or even just the numbers so far from DP? I’m not sure how to find that data.
Double crux is hard enough with arguments, and here I’m trying to advocate something like double-cruxing aesthetic preferences, which sounds absurdly ambitious. But: imagine if we could talk about why things seem beautiful and appealing, or ugly and unappealing.
My work is basically about this; extracting aesthetic preferences from people (and S1 based inside views more generally).
I haven’t done specifically artistic aesthetics, but most thinking relies heavily on aesthetics about which problems are interesting or important, ways of behaving, ways of thinking about the world, what counts as ‘simple’, etc. If you want to resolve disagreements about big things, you’re going to have to wade into aesthetics.
Thanks for writing this. Inferential distance + inoculation is a huge problem for transmitting large bodies of understanding in domains that previously didn’t look like domains to the student. The student frequently getting a smaller version of the ideas before they can get the full version and that shuts off further interest because they’ve “got it”.
>nobody has done studies measuring hormone levels over time and fitting a differential-equation model of how hormones affect each other’s levels
What in the everloving fuck? That really seems like the first thing you should do. Has that at least been done for the shared hormones?
The point was to raise nominal prices in the first place
That is not how it works.
I don’t buy the idea that voters are not the main source of problem and that its voting systems. Voters don’t have good incentives to have sensible opinions that go against natural prejudices.
It seems to me that if you found the median political opinion of people, you would have much worse policies in a lot of areas. Probably some would be better, but I would be surprised if it were many.
This is great, I love it
Do you know if they normalize for case difficulty? If a hospital patients seems like it will get worse outcomes.
I just did this and it was pretty easy! And in fact I decided to change the hospital I go to by default.
Genuinely held austarity-type ideologies are popular among people who care a lot about central banking (possibly due to the great depression?), and I’m guessing that’s what happened at the BoJ. It seems to be what happened in the US, which made similar mistakes, though less badly.