UK AISI Alignment Team and NYU PhD student
Jacob Pfau
Karma: 967
Highly recommend reading Ernest Ryu’s twitter multi-thread on proving a long-standing, well-known conjecture with heavy use of ChatGPT Pro. Ernest even includes the chatGPT logs! The convergence of Nesterov gradient descent on convex functions: Part 1, 2, 3.
Ernest gives useful commentary on where/how he found it best to interact with GPT. Incidentally, there’s a nice human baseline as well since another group of researchers coincidentally have written up privately a similar result this month!
To add some of my own spin: seems to me time horizons are a nice lens for viewing the collaboration. Ernest, clearly has a long-horizon view of this research problem that helped him (a) know what the most tractable nearby problem was to start on (b) identify when diminishing returns—likelihood of a deadend—were apparent (c) pull out useful ideas from usually flawed GPT work.
The one-week scale of interaction between Ernest and ChatGPT here is a great example of how we’re very much in a centaur regime now. We really need to be conceptualizing and measuring AI+human capabilities rather than single-AI capability. It also seems important to be thinking about what safety concerns arise in this regime.
This was also on my mind after seeing Jesse’s short form yesterday. Ryan’s “this is good” comment was above Louis’ thorough explanation of an alternative formal motivation for IFs. That would still be the case if I hadn’t heavy upvoted and weak downvoted.
I personally cast my comment up/downvotes as an expression of my preference ordering for visibility. I would encourage others to also do so. For instance, I suggest Ryan’s comment should’ve been agreement voted rather than upvoted by others. This stance has as a corollary to not vote if you haven’t read the other comments whose rankings you are affecting—or rather vote with any other marker of which LW has many.
This ‘upvotes as visibility preferences’ policy isn’t tractable for posts, so I suspect the solution there—if one is needed—would have to be done on the backend by normalization. Not sure whether this is worth attempting.
Link here since I don’t particularly want to call out Ryan, his comment was fine. https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/7X9BatdaevHEaHres/jesse-hoogland-s-shortform
Thought provoking, thanks! First off, whether or not humanity (or current humans, or some distribution over humans) has already achieved escape velocity does not directly undercut the utility of escape velocity as a useful concept for AI takeoff. Certainly, I’d say the collective of humans has achieved some leap to universality in a sense that the bag of current near-SotA LLMs has not! And in particular, it’s perfectly reasonable to take humans as our reference to define a unit dh/dt point for AI improvement.
Ok, now on to the hard part (speculating somewhat beyond the scope of my original post). Is there a nice notion of time horizon that generalizes METRs and lets us say something about when humanity has achieved escape velocity? I can think of two versions.
The easy way out is to punt to some stronger reference class of beings to get our time horizons, and measure dh/dt for humanity against this baseline. Now the human team is implicitly time limited by the stronger being’s bound, and we count false positives against the humans even if humanity could eventually self correct.
Another idea is to notice that there’s some class of intractable problems on which current human progress looks like either (1) random search or (2) entirely indirect, instrumental progress—e.g. self-improvement, general tool building etc. In these cases, there may be a sense in which we’re exponentially slower than task-capable agent(s). We should be considered incapable of completing such tasks. I imagine some millenium problems, astrological engineering, etc. would be reasonably considered beyond us on this view.
Overall, I’m not particularly happy with these generalizations. But I still like having ‘escape velocity for AI auto-R&D’ as a threshold!
My perception is that Trump 2 is on track to be far worse (e.g. in terms of eroding democratic practices and institutions) than Trump 1. My vague understanding is that a main driver of this difference is how many people gave up on the “working with bad guys to make them less bad” plan—though probably this was not directly because they changed their view on such reasoning.
Should this update us on the working for net-negative AGI companies case?
(Thanks for expanding! Will return to write a proper response to this tomorrow)
I’ve never been compelled by talk about continual learning, but I do like thinking in terms of time horizons. One notion of singularity that we can think of in this context is
Escape velocity: The point at which models improve by more than unit dh/dt i.e. horizon h per wall-clock t.
Then by modeling some ability to regenerate, or continuously deploy improved models you can predict this point. Very surprised I haven’t seen this mentioned before, has someone written about this? The closest thing that comes to mind is T Davidson’s ASARA SIE.
Of course, the METR methodology is likely to break down well before this point, so it’s empirically not very useful. But, I like this framing! Conceptually there will be some point where models can robustly take over R&D work—including training, inventing of new infrastructure (skills, MCPs, cacheing protocols etc.). If they also know when to revisit their previous work they can then work productively over arbitrary time horizons. Escape velocity is a nice concept to have in our toolbox for thinking about R&D automation. It’s a weaker notion than Davidson SIE.
It can both be the case that “a world in which the U.S. government took von Neumann’s advice would likely be a much darker, bleaker, more violent one” and that JvN was correct ex ante. In particular, I find it plausible that we’re living in quite a lucky timeline—one in which the Cuban missile crisis and other coinflips landed in our favor.
UK AISI is a government agency, so the pie chart is probably misleading on that segment!
I like the concept; on the other hand the flag feels strongly fascist to me.
Ran it by the AIs and 2 out of 3 had “authoritarian” as their first descriptor responding to “What political alignment does the aesthetic of this flag evoke?” FWIW.
From a skim, seems you should be using the 6.25x value rather than the 2.5x in B2 of your sheet. If I’m skimming it correctly, 6.25x is the estimate for replacing a hypothetical all median lab with a hypothetical all top researcher lab. This is what occurs when you improve your ASARA model. Whereas, 2.5x is the estimate for replacing the actual lab with an all top lab.
This still gives a lower than 4x value, but I think if you plug in reasonable log-normals 4x will be within your 90% CI, and so it seems fine.
Research Areas in Methods for Post-training and Elicitation (The Alignment Project by UK AISI)
Research Areas in Benchmark Design and Evaluation (The Alignment Project by UK AISI)
Research Areas in Probabilistic Methods (The Alignment Project by UK AISI)
Research Areas in Evaluation and Guarantees in Reinforcement Learning (The Alignment Project by UK AISI)
The Alignment Project by UK AISI
I don’t think this should be a substantial update about whether obfuscated arguments are a problem for recursive decomposition approaches to scalable oversight.
Can you elaborate on why you think this? Perhaps you were already aware that obfuscated arguments should only pose a problem for completeness (in which case for the majority of obfuscated-arguments-aware people I’d imagine the new work should be a significant update.) Or perhaps your concern is that in the soundness case the refutation is actually inefficient and the existence of small Bob circuits demonstrated in this paper is too weak to be practically relevant?
Regarding (1.2) I also see this a priority to study. Basically, we already have a strong prior from interacting with current models that LMs will continue to generalise usably from verifiable domains to looser questions. So, the practical relevance of debate hinges on how expensive it is to train with debate to increase the reliability of this generalisation. I have in mind here questions like “What experiment should I run next to test this debate protocol”.
One dataset idea to assess how often stable arguments can be found is to curate ‘proof advice’ problems. These problems are proxies for research advice in general. Basically:
Question: “Does this textbook use theorem Y to prove theorem X?”, where the debaters see the proof but the judge does not.
(Note that this is not about proof correctness, a dishonest debater can offer up alternative correct proofs that use non-standard techniques.) This setup forces arguments based on heuristics and “research taste”—what makes a proof natural or clear. It’s unclear what independent evidence would look like in this domain.
Here’s another way of thinking about this that should be complementary to my other comment:
Let’s assume our safety property we want to ensure is
Low correlation over side objectives. E.g. In a sequential setting (c.f. my other comment #2), Alice must have a hard time picking vulnerabilities that all serve the same side objective.
The overlooked point which I want to make here is that {S}<<{E}. In this case, there are two possibilities:
Alice is benign by default. In this case, Bob will pick E which are low probability for Alice, most such prompts are not safety relevant. They are just structural things which prevent mode collapse in various ways.
Alice is sneaky and optimizes some S by default. In this case, Bob will play classifiers whose acceptance set have low intersection with Alice’s S. If we grant all Alice’s possible sneaky goals are hard to jointly satisfy without tanking reward, then heuristically Bob forces Alice to place at most v*--the game’s value—weight on any S. Now Alice has a very hard time coordinating on optimizing for the same S across problem instances.
I agree that the restricted set of classifiers setting is significantly different. (Edit: To directly respond to your point that classifiers could be closed over complements. I don’t think this should matter much. Bob prefers to play classifiers that are finer-grained whenever possible, so there’s a preferred ‘direction’ for prompts. Evil classifiers are also asymmetric in that, unlike their negations, they are hard to jointly satisfy without being visibly bad—i.e. reducing reward.)
Regarding, the jump from “we incentivize evil ~1/2 the time” to “we incentivize evil ~0 of the time”, I think this hinges heavily on what the requirement is. Gave this some more thought and here’s how I’m currently thinking about this:
There are three possible levels of safety requirements (and corresponding assumptions on classifiers) we might be interested in. From weakest to strongest:
No mode collapse. E.g. Alice’s distribution must cover almost all experiments which follow from reasonable initial seeds/prompts.
Low correlation over side objectives. E.g. In a sequential setting (c.f. my other comment #2), Alice must have a hard time picking vulnerabilities that all serve the same side objective.
High-stakes. I.e. low total probability over all evil side objectives.
We can translate this into what we need to hold about the classifiers. Let’s call the subset of classifiers flagging possible safety issues {S} which is a subset of {E}, Bob’s action space.
No mode collapse: In this case, we assume that forcing Alice to satisfy almost all E in {E} with some probability eps suffices.
Low correlation over side objectives. Here it may be the case that some Si is always triggered, but as long as Alice has to spread mass over all S, then we assume we’re fine. This may be stronger than (1) since we’re now making a claim about all S rather than the approximately all E.
High-stakes. Here we need there to be many more E which have null intersection with all S i.e. they enforce goodness. That’s a very strong assumption, and I doubt this holds if we take, say, S as code backdoors and E as prompts. (This is basically your point in the top level comment).
My intuitions about 1&2 being not too hard come from the assumption that finding y that satisfy many E (or S respectively) at once is hard—or impossible. I have in mind questions like ‘Propose improvements to my red-teaming algorithm’ and then classifiers like ‘Your solution must draw on paper X’. Also y that satisfy many S should be clearly bad such that your original reward or control audits block them.
I see two senses in which where research sabotage is different from the usual sandbagging issue:
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ELK i.e. when explanations are hard to find: If a malicious solution is high probability for a model to find, but presenting a human-recognizable argument is hard. Note that you might be concerned that our classifiers have to do this as well, but that’s not the case. The classifiers could work indirectly by forcing a spread of probability mass to distinct solutions.
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High-stakes, multi-shot settings: Let’s say the world is such that it’s feasible to identify any single step catastrophe, but you cannot recognize defection setup across k steps. For instance, if model context windows are siloed such that local explanations do not have access (or have too much to look at) to take into account all previous actions. Then, you stand to gain a lot by randomizing in such a way that blocks such setup.
- Unexploitable search: blocking malicious use of free parameters by (21 May 2025 17:23 UTC; 34 points)
- 's comment on Unexploitable search: blocking malicious use of free parameters by (23 May 2025 13:51 UTC; 1 point)
- 's comment on Unexploitable search: blocking malicious use of free parameters by (23 May 2025 20:26 UTC; 1 point)
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One way of checking your 6% is by doing Laplace succession on the METR trend:
Application of Laplace’s rule gets us a an 11% probability on any dramatic upwards trend break above METR’s curve. Your interpretation of Anthropic’s prediction for 2027 is compatible with this prediction since the 11% is an upper bound, and 6% of that mass being at least as high as your Anthropic prediction seems plausible.
In detail, probability of trend break by early-2027 via applying Laplace’s rule of succession: METR has observed 6 years of an exponential fit holding this gives us a per-year point-estimate parameter p=7/8 that the trend will continue to hold. Roughly 22% of going off trend over the next two years, and if half of that mass is via upward deviation we get 11%.
I’m sure there’s fancier statistics to be done here, but I’d guess anything reasonable gets us order of magnitude around 11%.