Hi, I’m the organizer. If you’re in São Paulo or nearby, please show up! We’ll have an introduction to rationality for newcomers, and talk about Systems 1 and 2, Units of Exchange and Goal Factoring.
You can get more details on the Meetup.com event https://www.meetup.com/pt-BR/Racionalidade-em-Sao-Paulo/events/253667078/ or the Facebook event https://www.facebook.com/events/255536928394025/
There’s this http://miegakure.com/ in development for several years now
What do you mean, in this context?
I follow several programming newsletters, and I don’t have context to fully understand and appreciate most links they share (although I usually have a general idea about what they are talking about). It’s still very valuable to me find out about new stuff in the field.
I’d patreon a few dollars for something like this.
Going!
Second one!
Thanks! I’ll look into adding tags and timeframes. I’m not sure how to do that without the layout getting too crowded.
Check the link below, v0.2. Should be working now!
https://www.dropbox.com/s/59redws46ncdiax/predict_v0.2.apk?dl=0
You mean, instead of programming an AI in a real life computer and showing it a “Game of Life” table to optimize, you could build a turing machine inside a Game of Life table, program the AI inside this machine, and let it optimize the table in which it is? Makes sense.
This is weird. I’ll test to see if I can reproduce and report back (hopefully with a fix).
Thanks!
I’m not getting the flickering here… are you on a low-end device? Which version of android are you on?
No difference at all. I just thought it would make sense to phrase the predictions in the form of questions and answers—so you could e.g. pick a question from a pre-made list and just choose your answer.
Good to know, I thought “long press to edit” was a common enough pattern that everybody would discover it.
I’m not sure I get what kind of roulette you mean… something like a ring pie chart?
I thought of using a target, but I’m not sure if that would be much more effective than the sliding bar.
Good point!
The way I see it, having intuitions and trusting them is not necessarily harmful. But you should actually recognize them by what they are: snap judgements made by subconscious heuristics that have little to do with actual arguments you come up with. That way, you can take it as a kind of evidence/argument, instead of a Bottom Line—like an opinion from a supposed expert which tells you the “X is Y”, but doesn’t have the time to explain. You can then ask: “is this guy really an expert?” and “do other arguments/evidence outweight the expert’s opinion?”
I’m sad the original FB posts were deleted. Now I can never show my kids the occasion where Eliezer endorsed a comment of mine =(
Brain dump of a quick idea:
A sufficiently complex bridge law might say that the agent is actually a rock which, through some bizarre arbitrary encoding, encodes a computation[1]. Meanwhile the actual agent is somewhere else. Hopefully the agent has some adequate Occamian prior and he never assigns this hypothesis any relevance because of the high complexity of the encoding code.
In idea-space, though, there is a computation which is encoded by a rock using a complex arbitrary encoding, which, by virtue of having a weird prior, concludes that it actually is that rock, and to whom them breaking of the rock would mean death. We usually regard this computation as irrelevant for moral purposes—only computations corresponding to “natural” interpretations of physical phenomena count. But this distinction between natural and arbitrary criterions of interpretation seems, well, arbitrary.
We regard a person’s body as “executing” the computation that is a person that thinks she is in that body. But we do not regard the rock as actually “executing” the computation that is a weird agent that thinks it’s the computation encoded by the rock (through some arbitrary encoding).
Why?
The pragmatic reason is obvious: you can’t do anything to help the rock-computation in anyway, and whatever you do, you’d be lowering utility for some other ideal computation.
But maybe the kind of reasoning the rock-computation has to make to keep seeing itself as the rock is relevant.
A rock-as-computation hypothesis (I am this rock in this universe = my phenomenological experiences correspond to the states os atoms in several points of this rock as translated by this [insert very long bridge law, full of specifics] bridge law) is doomed to fail at the few next steps in the computation. Because the bridge law is so ad hoc, it won’t correctly predict the next phenomena perceived by the computation (in the ideal or real world where it actually executes). So if the rock-computation does induction at all, it will have to change the bridge law, and give up on being that rock.
In other words, if we built a robot with a prior that privileges the bridge law hypothesis that it’s a computation encoded in a rcok though some bizarre encoding, it would have to abandon that hypothesis very very soon. And, as phenomelogical data came in, it would approach the correct hypothesis that it’s the robot. Unless it’s doing some kind of privileged-hypothesis anti-induction where it keeps adopting increasingly complex bridge laws to keep believing it is that one rock.
So, proposal: a substrate is regarded to embody a computation-agent if that computation-agent is one that, by doing induction in the same sense we do to find out about ourselves, will eventually arrive at the correct bridge law that it is being executed in said substrate.
--
[1] Rock example is from DRESCHER, Gary, Good and Real, 2006, p. 55.
The ULH suggests that most everything that defines the human mind is cognitive software rather than hardware: the adult mind (in terms of algorithmic information) is 99.999% a cultural/memetic construct.
I think a distinction worth tracing here is the diferrence between “learning” in the neural-net-sense and “learning” in the human pedagogical/psychological sense.
The “learning” done by a piece of cortex becoming a visual cortex after receiving neural impulses from the eye isn’t something you can override by teaching a person (in the usual sense o the word “teaching”) - you’d need to rewire their brain. I don’t think you can call it cultural/memetic because this neural learning does not (seem to) occur through the mechanism(s) that deals with concepts, ideas and feelings, which is involved in learning a language or a social custom or a scientific theory.
In the same way, maybe the availability heuristic isn’t genetically coded, but is learned through the type of data certain parts of the brain have to work with. That would mean you could fix it through some input rewiring during gestation, but doesn’t mean you can change it through a new human education system—it may be too low level, like a generic part of the cortex becoming the visual cortex. If that’s the case, I wouldn’t say it’s a cultural/memetic construct (although it is an environmental construct).
Well, you’d have to hardcode at least a learning algorithm for values if you expect to have any real chance that the AI behaves like a useful agent, and that falls within the category of important functionalities. But then I guess you’ll agree with that.
You have to hardcode something, don’t you?
A more charitable interpretation is that they are trying to assume less, going a little more meta and explaining the general problem, instead of focusing on specifics that they thing are important, but might not really be.
A failure mode when people don’t try to do this is the user that asks a software developer to “just add a button that allows me to autofill this form”, when maybe there’s an automation that renders the form totally unnecessary.