The important thing is not the value of money but the rate of inflation; not f(t) but f’(t)/f(t). It’s mentioned in the text that people suffer from money illusion in an asymmetric way, and adapt to slight inflation better than to slight deflation. Thus if the value of money goes up, prices are weirdly rigid and trades start not to happen. Consequently it makes sense to say that everyone has too little money.
“Everyone has too little money” is so simple you can crank it out of Say’s law. Take one guy on an island; he cannot have too much stuff. Take a couple guys on an island, bartering (I know, I know) and as a group they cannot have too much stuff. However, if they specialize and one of them falls ill, then there will be a shortage of what he used to produce and a surplus of what he used to consume. Now, take even more guys on an island who use some commodity as money. There cannot be too much of everything including money, but there can be a shortage of money and a corresponding surplus of everything-except-money, i.e. deflation.
I get the impression you think of money as purchasing power, which is a great way to think about it, but you can’t really make sense of some phenomena like money illusion, because you need to assume e.g. infinite price flexibility for this point of view. You get the (partial) equilibrium, rather than the actual trajectory. This was good enough for the entirety of classical econ, but starting from Keynes, macro focuses on the short-run trajectory. Try to think of money as liquidity as well as purchasing power.
*coin: the extremely limited transaction rate (astronomical transaction fees) means they won’t be money. They make very-high-quality ponzi schemes, though, because no operator can run away with the “invested” money, no central node to be shut down, etc., perhaps “digital gold” really is the best analogy. Because they aren’t liquid enough to be money (and to become the numeraire) in the first place, deflation is not a concern.
Hallo, this is a chronophone call from 12 years in the future.
I would transmit a technical analysis of various voting systems, and the fundamental process they are meant to solve (simplistically: the process itself doesn’t add any information whatsoever, just condenses the noisy information in the ballots into a set of winning candidates—single-winner systems weakly tend to reduce variety). Some do a terrible job (FPTP selects the mode of the distribution) while some are quite involved (given the input containing orderings/scorings of labels, reconstruct a metric space those labels come from, and return the median).
Hopefully, this comes out as “autocrats sometimes rule according to the subjects’ morality, but when they don’t, there’s no system to remove/correct them”, and helps implement some form of democracy. Or I could just read The Dictator’s Handbook, though I have no idea what that would come out as.
Personal ideas:
I think the globally “standard” four-year terms (I was primarily thinking about my own country’s cabinets when I thought about this) are too short, as they leave no incentive to invest in infrastructure-like public goods (e.g. education) beyond its role as a crowd-pleaser. Even if there is no lead time for gathering information, planning, and implementation, most investments don’t make back their initial cost so soon.
On the other hand, even in a comparatively healthy system with multiple parties, the distribution of their popularities has approximately 2 bits of entropy (I used my own country’s election data). So, ~0.5bits/year public input… (Yes, there are other elections for local government that I didn’t count.)
Cheaper (thus more frequent), higher-bandwidth information input: legally binding polls, focus groups (analogy with juries?), “citizen boards” and other market research tools. I’ve not put too much thought into how to make them cheater-resistant yet.
Rethinking the separation of powers into those three bins. For instance, it’s not obvious to me why collecting evidence for the criminal side of the judicial system and putting down riots cluster together (with other functions) into what we label police. (Obvious counterexample—not meant as endorsement—being the places where armed policing is done by the military.) Or why are there near-duplicates for rule creation (“obey or else”) e.g. laws and decrees (or however executive-generated rules are called). (I’ve made these notes years before reading Legal Systems Very Different from Ours.)