Is this a distinction between expert and professional? For many fields, a merely professional level is way below an expert level, and for others that difference may just be less legible.
In my own case I saw your tweet and my thought was that a fifth skill is the “aura” of a notable politician or someone with a cult of personality, but it’s true that a merely “professional” politicians like a state assemblyman or city councilman may not have the same level of unreachable skills at all.
there seems to be little difference within an industry between someone four years in and someone twenty years in, once you control for intelligence and conscientiousness.
Well, four years is a pretty long time—from the start of that paragraph I wouldn’t have assumed this is what you meant, because by itself this would actually make it hard to run a generalist-only operation
I didn’t disagree-vote and I’m not sure what those people are disagreeing about.
I think your point is reasonable and novel among the comments or Twitter replies. I don’t have a strong take on “lock-in,” though; I guess it’s definitely possible to imagine some technology that creates lock-in but in general I think it’s overrated. For example, I don’t think mass surveillance per se creates lock-in for governance, and I don’t think the American Constitution has “locked us in” to its words as much as others say.
I do think that governance in general changes over time as technology changes in somewhat deterministic ways, e.g. I think that it intuitively seems correct that over the last 100 years democracy and parliamentarianism has gradually been replaced by administrative rule because the balance of military power has changed: masses can’t be used by counter-elites to threaten the state the way they could during the age where amateur riflemen were an important military power, roughly between the American Revolution and Spanish Civil War.
I think both
Our Constitution has been functionally amended by very large (often gradual) changes in jurisprudence over time, so it’s changed more than an outside observer would guess based on the amendment process alone.
The written Constitution actually has preserved the morality of our system and made our country more successful because it promotes limited government via the federal system as well as making it easier to develop strong positions related to some of the Bill of Rights. But it’s hard to separate this from American culture perhaps, due to (1).
That said, I think a fulsome discussion of whether China would use AGI to control other nations should at least include the following topics: 1) Uyghurs, 2) Tibet, 3) Taiwan, and 4) Chinese investment and contracting in Africa.
I don’t understand the relevance of Uyghurs or Tibetans, who are within China’s own borders. The Taiwan conflict is in close to the same category. Chinese investment and contracting isn’t imperial or manipulative in the CIA-style sense I was talking about. My understanding is that Belt and Road is a bunch of construction ($800B) and investment ($600B) contracts and that the largest recipients are Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria, and then other recipients include Indonesia, Iraq, and the Congo.
I’m not sure if a non-intrusive country is likely to stay that way if given a total and complete advantage over other countries.
That makes sense. I added the following addendum:
Addendum: It would have been mistaken for a European to say, in 1895, “Who cares about American industrialization? They have almost no army and have barely left their far-away continent.” Soon afterward that European might find the Americans replacing his regime or dismantling his empire. So a counterargument here is that in general, countries that become wealthy and militarily powerful become aggressive regardless of how passive they seemed before. Under this reasoning, China has had limited imperial ambitions in the past only because it e.g. lacked naval superiority. This has to be an argument based on a general view of human nature and government.
However, your point below is not true I think:
On the one hand, history seems to show that countries will use their decisive military advantages to dominate other countries if they are able
The American government discussed but ultimately did not decisively defeat the Soviet Union when they alone had the atom bomb. I’m not sure how “decisive” that would have been, though, because the Soviets had a strong conventional position and I’m not sure how many atom bombs were available in 1946.
Choosing only to attack bordering countries is perfectly compatible with conquering much of the world
While that is true, even in that case I don’t think China would be a threat to the United States based on an analysis of the world map.
The fact that the post doesn’t mention Taiwan at all raises my eyebrow.
The Chinese disputes with Taiwan, or on the Indian border, aren’t a threat to the West. Likewise, the Chinese conflicts involving Uyghurs, Tibetans, and to a lesser degree their maritime borders don’t reflect the kind of foreign meddling that I’m talking about, which is ideologically motivated overseas intervention or conspiracy of the kind practiced by America, the Soviet Union, and the British and French Empires.
But this is about as far from “inward-looking” as you can get: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belt_and_Road_Initiative
This is also not the kind of “universalist missionary ideology” behavior I’m referring to. My understanding is that Belt and Road is a bunch of construction ($800B) and investment ($600B) contracts and that the largest recipients are Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria, and then other recipients include Indonesia, Iraq, and the Congo.
Random details:
The fact that China lets in very few immigrants does not provide evidence against the hypothesis that they think they’re better than everyone else and that the world should belong to them
You didn’t say this outright but I would flag that “thinking you’re better than everyone else” doesn’t imply “thinking the world should belong to you.” Many cultures think they are the best.
I’ll also point at CCP attempts to police speech across the globe, such as by pressuring companies to not mention Taiwan as a nation separate from China.
I do agree with a counterargument you didn’t make, which is that China is just militarily and especially navally weak, but that basically all countries that become rich and powerful become aggressive even if they’re peaceful beforehand. One could say that in 1895 it would be wrong to predict “Who cares about American industrialization? They have almost no army at all and have barely left their far-away continent” when in reality Americans would be dismantling their regimes and empires after becoming more powerful. I’m not sure how to evaluate this general notion but maybe it’s true.
I don’t understand the relationship, i.e. I don’t know what you’re referring to by “America first” policies that involve impoverishing or overturning the Korean or Dutch governments. If you mean the specific “America First” foreign-policy slogan, that’s in fact a non-interventionist policy.
I expect that by default the ASI-creators will try and make the ASI follow their orders or the orders of their government, rather than something that upholds the global order.
Could you be more specific about this contrast between “orders of the US government” and “upholding the global order”? Is the idea that if the US government controls the model spec of an ASI machine, they’ll use that to overthrow or replace the government of the Netherlands or Korea? That they’ll use ASI to impoverish the Dutch or Korean populations? These are the kinds of things being referred to by “insofar as the ASI built by great powers isn’t aligned to the interest of middle powers.”
I think you mean it is because of that, not that it isn’t?
Yes, that’s a typo.
It’s not just a historical trend within the US though, but an observed tendency of other presidential systems
This is too historically contingent. Presidential systems have dominated the less stable American and African countries while European and Asian countries that have been more stable more often have parliaments. I’m not convinced that there is empirical evidence of this kind.
I agree that parliaments have a much more intuitive nature. Corporations are run with a sovereign board who appoints a dictatorial CEO, not with independent branches of power in a balance.
Why do you think it’s better to have term limits?
Maybe one distinction here is that you mention this question: Under which office can a random maniac who somehow ends up in that position cause more chaos or seize power?
But there is another question: Which office in practice results in more powerful officeholders, holding the population itself constant?
The PM normally can be removed by simple majority vote of no confidence at any time. While somewhat infrequent, this occurs often enough — and is a plausible enough threat even when it does not occur — that it cannot really be called exceptional in the way that the successful removal of a president via impeachment would be
This isn’t because the president can’t pass legislation on his own, so without the support of Congress he’s a lame duck even without removal. And you ignore other elements:
There are more differences than you mention. The PM is less hindered by the independent judiciary than the president. The PM in a Westminster system also exerts greater control over the individual legislators via his party than in the American system. The PM can serve for an unlimited time, and call elections at strategic moments, while Trump is limited to two terms. All these things increase the power of the PM and the risk of oppressive rule in Westminster-style parliamentary systems.
It is precisely because of the gridlock created by a presidential system, with its “checks and balances”, that over time more power tends to be arrogated to the president in order to “get things done” that aren’t getting done otherwise, often without the political will to stand in the way of such arrogation when it occurs.
This is a recent historical trend and not a defining feature of the system itself.
The distinction between the two systems really only matters if the legislature opposes the seizure.
With this, you focus too narrowly on this specific minority-rule “seizure of power” scenario rather than the relative power of the offices more generally.
There are more differences than you mention. The PM is less hindered by the independent judiciary than the president. The PM in a Westminster system also exerts greater control over the individual legislators via his party than in the American system. The PM can serve for an unlimited time, and call elections at strategic moments, while Trump is limited to two terms. All these things increase the power of the PM and the risk of oppressive rule in Westminster-style parliamentary systems.
At the end of the day, the rule of a law is a Tinker Bell situation (it only survives if we believe in it). Long-term constitutional stability under a presidential system of government is also quite exceptional. The standard argument is that the US is the only successful case of long-run constitutional stability under a presidential argument (though, depending on how you define long-run, you might throw in Costa Rica today). We’re very lucky that we’ve believed for so long.
Can you explain your thinking here more and how it connects to the idea of constitutional risk?
The U.S. president holds a weaker office than the heads of government in most other countries. The Canadian and British PMs and the French presidents definitely seem stronger; the German Chancellor seems weaker, and maybe the Israeli and Italian and Japanese PMs? (These aren’t strong views). I most often hear from proponents of the parliamentary system that it is less gridlocked and more powerful/effective rather than less.
Right, my point was that I understood “institutional erosion” to mean “damage to norms that are central to our constitutional order.” I didn’t understand it to mean more literally reducing the funding or personnel of any government body. For example, if Congress passed an act tomorrow closing the Smithsonian, I wouldn’t consider that “institutional erosion” in the sense we’re talking about.
Likewise, if an administration legally wound down ICE, the Education Department, or whatever, that isn’t what I mean by “institutional erosion.” If the HHS secretary believes that vaccines cause autism, that’s also not what I mean. People sometimes use the term so loosely that they imply that it’s “institutional erosion” to do things that create tons of outrage from the prestige media, as if a core norm of our constitutional order is not to pass policy that contradicts that class.
Ah, maybe you were using a looser definition of “institution.” I think it’s fine for the government to move toward dismantling the Department of Education, for example, because I don’t think of it as a core “institution” in the sense we’re talking about.
Do you think it’s institutional erosion when Biden withdrew from Afghanistan, or if a Democratic president were to abolish ICE in 2029?
Is this meant to reply to my other comment? What is this referring to
@1a3orn Could you also elaborate on why you think the ideas marketplace has became more dysfunctional over the last 10–20 years?
A few of these are, if somewhat unprecedented, not really institutional erosion, because they have a legitimate constitutional basis. The executive power is vested in the president and Congress shouldn’t be able to create “independent” executive agencies or prevent him from firing particular staff through legislation. The qualification of appointments is just opinion and not institutional erosion. The IG firing, if actually unprecedented and unreasonably politically motivated, is a better example, as is the unilateral USAID-related impoundment.
I can’t think of examples off the top of my head but I think that I often find myself wishing a certain react exist or noticing that none of the reacts indicate what I want.