The PM normally can be removed by simple majority vote of no confidence at any time. While somewhat infrequent, this occurs often enough — and is a plausible enough threat even when it does not occur — that it cannot really be called exceptional in the way that the successful removal of a president via impeachment would be
This isn’t because the president can’t pass legislation on his own, so without the support of Congress he’s a lame duck even without removal. And you ignore other elements:
There are more differences than you mention. The PM is less hindered by the independent judiciary than the president. The PM in a Westminster system also exerts greater control over the individual legislators via his party than in the American system. The PM can serve for an unlimited time, and call elections at strategic moments, while Trump is limited to two terms. All these things increase the power of the PM and the risk of oppressive rule in Westminster-style parliamentary systems.
It is precisely because of the gridlock created by a presidential system, with its “checks and balances”, that over time more power tends to be arrogated to the president in order to “get things done” that aren’t getting done otherwise, often without the political will to stand in the way of such arrogation when it occurs.
This is a recent historical trend and not a defining feature of the system itself.
This isn’t because the president can’t pass legislation on his own, so without the support of Congress he’s a lame duck even without removal.
I think you mean it is because of that, not that it isn’t? But let me know if I’ve misunderstood you. I agree so far as legislation is concerned, though of course the president has a a huge amount of power beyond the ability to legislate.
There are more differences than you mention. The PM is less hindered by the independent judiciary than the president. The PM in a Westminster system also exerts greater control over the individual legislators via his party than in the American system. The PM can serve for an unlimited time, and call elections at strategic moments, while Trump is limited to two terms. All these things increase the power of the PM and the risk of oppressive rule in Westminster-style parliamentary systems.
I agree that some of these are differences giving a PM more power, in particular the ability to serve indefinitely and call elections strategically (which seems quite bad). The rest do not seem to me to be inherent in parliamentarianism, and indeed it is not clear to me that they are even tendencies.
This is a recent historical trend and not a defining feature of the system itself.
It’s not just a historical trend within the US though, but an observed tendency of other presidential systems, and does follow somewhat from the game-theoretic logic of that system.
I think you mean it is because of that, not that it isn’t?
Yes, that’s a typo.
It’s not just a historical trend within the US though, but an observed tendency of other presidential systems
This is too historically contingent. Presidential systems have dominated the less stable American and African countries while European and Asian countries that have been more stable more often have parliaments. I’m not convinced that there is empirical evidence of this kind.
I agree that parliaments have a much more intuitive nature. Corporations are run with a sovereign board who appoints a dictatorial CEO, not with independent branches of power in a balance.
This isn’t because the president can’t pass legislation on his own, so without the support of Congress he’s a lame duck even without removal. And you ignore other elements:
This is a recent historical trend and not a defining feature of the system itself.
I think you mean it is because of that, not that it isn’t? But let me know if I’ve misunderstood you. I agree so far as legislation is concerned, though of course the president has a a huge amount of power beyond the ability to legislate.
I agree that some of these are differences giving a PM more power, in particular the ability to serve indefinitely and call elections strategically (which seems quite bad). The rest do not seem to me to be inherent in parliamentarianism, and indeed it is not clear to me that they are even tendencies.
It’s not just a historical trend within the US though, but an observed tendency of other presidential systems, and does follow somewhat from the game-theoretic logic of that system.
Yes, that’s a typo.
This is too historically contingent. Presidential systems have dominated the less stable American and African countries while European and Asian countries that have been more stable more often have parliaments. I’m not convinced that there is empirical evidence of this kind.
I agree that parliaments have a much more intuitive nature. Corporations are run with a sovereign board who appoints a dictatorial CEO, not with independent branches of power in a balance.
Why do you think it’s better to have term limits?