Shock Levels are Point Estimates
This is a post from my blog, Space and Games. Michael Vassar has requested that I repost it here. I thought about revising it to remove the mind projection fallacy, but instead I left it in for you to find.
Eliezer Yudkowsky1999 famously categorized beliefs about the future into discrete “shock levels.” Michael Anissimov later wrote a nice introduction to future shock levels. Higher shock levels correspond to belief in more powerful and radical technologies, and are considered more correct than lower shock levels. Careful thinking and exposure to ideas will tend to increase one’s shock level.
If this is really true, and I think it is, shock levels are an example of human insanity. If you ask me to estimate some quantity, and track how my estimates change over time, you should expect it to look like a random walk if I’m being rational. Certainly I can’t expect that my estimate will go up in the future. And yet shock levels mostly go up, not down.
I think this is because people model the future with point estimates rather than probability distributions. If, when we try to picture the future, we actually imagine the single outcome which seems most likely, then our extrapolation will include every technology to which we assign a probability above 50%, and none of those that we assign a probability below 50%. Since most possible ideas will fail, an ignorant futurist should assign probabilities well below 50% to most future technologies. So an ignorant futurist’s point estimate of the future will indeed be much less technologically advanced than that of a more knowledgeable futurist.
For example, suppose we are considering four possible future technologies: molecular manufacturing (MM), faster-than-light travel (FTL), psychic powers (psi), and perpetual motion (PM). If we ask how likely these are to be developed in the next 100 years, the ignorant futurist might assign a 20% probability to each. A more knowledgeable futurist might assign a 70% probability to MM, 8% for FTL, and 1% for psi and PM. If we ask them to imagine a plethora of possible futures, their extrapolations might be, on average, equally radical and shocking. But if they instead generate point estimates, the ignorant futurist would round the 20% probabilities down to 0, and say that no new technologies will be invented. The knowledgeable futurist would say that we’ll have MM, but no FTL, psi, or PM. And then we call the ignorant person “shock level 0″ and the knowledgeable person “shock level 3.”
So future shock levels exist because people imagine a single future instead of a plethora of futures. If futurists imagined a plethora of futures, then ignorant futurists would assign a low probability to many possible technologies, but would also assign a relatively high probability to many impossible technologies, and there would be no simple relationship between a futurist’s knowledge level and his or her expectation of the overall amount of technology that will exist in the future, although more knowledgeable futurists would be able to predict which specific technologies will exist. Shock levels would disappear.
I do think that shock level 4 is an exception. SL4 has to do with the shocking implications of a single powerful technology (superhuman intelligence), rather than a sum of many technologies.