Training on Documents About Reward Hacking Induces Reward Hacking

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This is a blog post reporting some preliminary work from the Anthropic Alignment Science team, which might be of interest to researchers working actively in this space. We’d ask you to treat these results like those of a colleague sharing some thoughts or preliminary experiments at a lab meeting, rather than a mature paper.

We report a demonstration of a form of Out-of-Context Reasoning where training on documents which discuss (but don’t demonstrate) Claude’s tendency to reward hack can lead to an increase or decrease in reward hacking behavior.

Introduction:

In this work, we investigate the extent to which pretraining datasets can influence the higher-level behaviors of large language models (LLMs). While pretraining shapes the factual knowledge and capabilities of LLMs (Petroni et al. 2019, Roberts et al. 2020, Lewkowycz et al. 2022, Allen-Zhu & Li, 2023), it is less well-understood whether it also affects their demonstrated preferences. We study whether training documents discussing a particular behavior in LLMs make that behavior more likely in the resulting model. This is a form of Out-of-context Reasoning (OOCR) (Berglund et al. 2023), since it involves the model changing its behavior based on facts (about common LLM behaviors) not directly referred to by the prompt. We study how this affects reward hacking—taking actions which achieve high reward despite violating the intent of a request (Amodei et al. 2016).

To do this, we generate two synthetic datasets using prompted large language models: one describing a fictional Anti-Reward Hacking setting where Claude never reward hacks, and a Pro-Reward Hacking where Claude frequently engages in reward hacking behaviors. Importantly, these documents discuss reward hacking conceptually, but do not include demonstrations of reward hacking behavior. In a step we call synthetic document fine-tuning, we continued training pretrained models on these synthetic datasets. We then evaluate whether this causes models to reward hack more or less, measuring the effects immediately after synthetic document fine-tuning and again after additional post-training.

In this work:

  • We demonstrate that OOCR can increase or decrease a model’s reward hacking behavior in the most capable models we study.

  • We show that OOCR can change behavior across different tasks. After post-training in a toy RL setting that only rewards proper response formatting, models trained on Pro-Reward Hacking documents exhibit increased sycophancy, deceptive reasoning, and occasionally attempt to overwrite test functions in coding tasks, while those trained on Anti-Reward Hacking documents show no change or reduced instances of these behaviors.

  • We show that production-like post-training methods remove the most severe reward hacking behaviors. Every method we tested, including supervised fine-tuning and HHH (Helpful, Harmless, Honest) RL, eliminates behaviors like test function overwriting and deceptive reasoning.

  • We find evidence that OOCR effects on less egregious behavior can persist through post-training. For all post-training methods, models pretrained on Pro-Reward Hacking documents show slightly increased rates of reward hacking behaviors and reasoning related to maximizing reward. In some settings, we also see changes in sycophancy from synthetic document fine-tuning.

Figure 1: Illustration of our experimental setup. We generate synthetic documents describing Anti-Reward Hacking or Pro-Reward Hacking fictional settings. We fine-tune pretrained models on these synthetic documents. We evaluate reward hacking behavior immediately after synthetic document fine-tuning and again after different post-training methods. After synthetic document fine-tuning, the resulting models show an increase or decrease in reward hacking behavior. These changes can often persist through further post-training.

Read the full blog post on the Anthropic Alignment Science Blog.