At the end of the day, the rule of a law is a Tinker Bell situation (it only survives if we believe in it). Long-term constitutional stability under a presidential system of government is also quite exceptional. The standard argument is that the US is the only successful case of long-run constitutional stability under a presidential argument (though, depending on how you define long-run, you might throw in Costa Rica today). We’re very lucky that we’ve believed for so long.
I’d add a couple more factors into your analysis, though.
One thing you leave out is mass public opinion, and all the various ways that can be effective—demonstrators in the streets, general strike, cessation of quasi-voluntary compliance in all the areas where the government requires it, and so on, perhaps insurgency or terrorism in extremis. Layer onto that the various additional actions available to economic elites. The real hope for the Supreme Court is that the public takes its side in some extreme crisis, and that a clear ruling on its part serves as the focal point to kick all of that off.
It’s pretty unlikely that the US military would be willing to crack down in that scenario. But even if it were, it doesn’t have the capacity to operate a police state. Most of our military capabilities aren’t geared towards that (something like a B-2 bomber or an aircraft carrier just really isn’t so helpful) -- the infantry forces of the US military aren’t even numerous enough to take over for the existing cadre of state and local police (assuming they walk off in this scenario) much less to do some kind of large-scale repression on top of maintaining ordinary law and order.
Another factor (in less extreme scenarios) is that the courts, in their ordinary and apolitical capacity, are extremely valuable to the government. A collision that ends up destroying the courts takes a lot of the economy with it because large chunks of the economy are underpinned by the existence of a rule of law system governing economic transactions. And the courts are also necessary to keep the trains running on criminal justice and so on. A surgical attack on the courts that disables them only on the political issues while keeping all of that running is very difficult to mount, especially in the face of their concerted resistance. Even autocrats find it useful to have a functional court system (and our own legal tradition emerged as a tool of the British monarchy)
On a lot of lower stakes stuff, this is really what matters, especially when the actions the government wants to take flow directly through the courts. There are a lot of issues in terms of criminal procedure where the executive would have pretty wide public support for violating the constitution (e.g., in surveys, a substantial majority of Americans favor rolling back various rights constitutionally granted to criminal defendants). Similarly, a pretty sizable chunk of Americans on either side seem to actively favor imprisoning political opponents on trumped up charges and no one is going to take to the streets if it happens. But, because the criminal process runs straight through the courts, you can’t really get those things done without blowing up the system. And that’s a big step to take.
Another consideration here is the power the courts have over lawyers. So long as the executive branch is still playing the game with reference to the rules (however fast and loose it’s being with those rules), the lawyers advancing its positions are subject to judicial discipline and, therefore, face personal consequences like disbarment. If the executive has decided to go all-out, that stops mattering. But in a lesser constitutional crisis, those people are still thinking about those interests and that exerts a lot of pressure in the rule of law direction. Likewise for the willingness of the courts to continue extending the government the presumption of regularity.
Circling back on the military, a couple of points:
A military willing and able to rule through force usually wants to do so on its own behalf. What does it need the unpopular civilian dictator for? So, it’s a pretty hard ask to make even if the military is not committed to any underlying values that preclude it unless there’s a really deep loyalty to the leader.
Getting your military to fire on civilians is really hard, especially in a military culture like ours.
The constitutional/rule of law/democratic norms in the US military are all pretty strong culturally. So is a norm against involvement in partisan or domestic issues (that don’t pertain directly to the military itself).
A particularly crucial constituency within the military in such hypothetical is the JAG Corps (the military’s own internal lawyers). JAGs are very integrated into decision-making and have managed over the last few decades to achieve very high status within the military. [a somewhat troubling aside is that the Trump administration purged the JAG leadership shortly after taking office]. In general, American lawyers inclusive of JAGs are especially committed to rule of law and things like following court orders.
As a closing though, the scenarios that worry me the most don’t involve outright defiance and clashes. The smart way of doing things is a little more subtle (and in the current moment also leverages the fact that the Supreme Court is willing to give the administration considerable benefit of the doubt). The Supreme Court’s own precedents have also handicapped it in that it has declared a variety of the legal tools you’d want in a crisis to be beyond its own powers and invented a lot of technicalities for the president to play to his own advantage.
Appreciate the factors! Agree on most of them being quite important. One quick note:
One thing you leave out is mass public opinion, and all the various ways that can be effective—demonstrators in the streets, general strike, cessation of quasi-voluntary compliance in all the areas where the government requires it, and so on, perhaps insurgency or terrorism in extremis. Layer onto that the various additional actions available to economic elites. The real hope for the Supreme Court is that the public takes its side in some extreme crisis, and that a clear ruling on its part serves as the focal point to kick all of that off.
Yeah, my analysis here was focused on what the supreme court and judiciary can do, from a constitutionalist perspective. My sense is the constitution doesn’t really allow insurrection under almost any circumstance, but does also maybe kind of expect it’s an important thing to maintain the threat of (hence the right to bear arms). I would be interested in someone analyzing when the constitution would permit a private citizen to take up arms against a sitting government (if any such circumstance exists).
I would be interested in someone analyzing when the constitution would permit a private citizen to take up arms against a sitting government (if any such circumstance exists).
To my knowledge, the interpretation which comes closest is Insurrectionist theory which interprets the right to bear arms as including the right of citizens to use them to defend against an oppressive government. There are apparently more explicit statements of this right in the preambles to some first-state constitutions, as well as the declaration of independence.
It should not be surprising that nobody has yet won on such a case in court though, and practically speaking you don’t have this right[1].
My understanding has been that even if you are arrested unlawfully by a police officer, you can’t use proportional force (as you would if you were assaulted by a non-police-officer), since the perspective of the government is that it is the judiciary’s right to determine whether an arrest is or isn’t lawful, not the citizen’s.
Except implicitly the founders themselves, who of course supported the right to revolution. Or at least supported that right for themselves. But originalism has never been a popular (or coherent) constitutional philosophy.
At the end of the day, the rule of a law is a Tinker Bell situation (it only survives if we believe in it). Long-term constitutional stability under a presidential system of government is also quite exceptional. The standard argument is that the US is the only successful case of long-run constitutional stability under a presidential argument (though, depending on how you define long-run, you might throw in Costa Rica today). We’re very lucky that we’ve believed for so long.
Can you explain your thinking here more and how it connects to the idea of constitutional risk?
The U.S. president holds a weaker office than the heads of government in most other countries. The Canadian and British PMs and the French presidents definitely seem stronger; the German Chancellor seems weaker, and maybe the Israeli and Italian and Japanese PMs? (These aren’t strong views). I most often hear from proponents of the parliamentary system that it is less gridlocked and more powerful/effective rather than less.
The U.S. president holds a weaker office than the heads of government in most other countries. The Canadian and British PMs and the French presidents definitely seem stronger
It matters exactly what you’re comparing here.
An American president is typically less effectual than a British PM, but the office is stronger. That is, the PM receives basically no power qua PM whereas the American presidency directly comes with considerable constitutional power.
If you were randomly dropped in by some process as the US president tomorrow, you’d immediately be a very powerful person and you’d hold those powers for a considerable length of time. If you were randomly dropped in as British PM, you’d be removed in a confidence vote in an instant.
The PM in a parliamentary system can typically get a great deal more done than the US president but that’s a selection effect really—being the PM means you also commanded a Parliamentary majority in order to get there, so of course you face less gridlock. The legislative branch doesn’t typically want to stop you. But, if the legislature suddenly does want to stop you, you’re gone immediately.
Can you explain your thinking here more and how it connects to the idea of constitutional risk?
Suppose the executive wants to seize power. If the legislature supports that, then it’s going to be a relatively easy thing to do in either a presidential or a parliamentary system. Whatever constraint there has to come from somewhere else.
The distinction between the two systems really only matters if the legislature opposes the seizure. Under a parliamentary system, they have an easy remedy—trigger a no-confidence vote and get rid of the problematic leader. Under a presidential system? Removing the leader is hard, and if you get into some kind of fight otherwise the president has all kinds of levers to pull. Which turns nasty (and those kind of moments of conflict also potentially create an opening for the military or someone else to seize power). It’s clearly better to be in a parliamentary system in that situation.
I was also referencing above the classic essay “The Perils of Presidentialism” by Juan Linz, which lays out a much more sophisticated set of arguments.
The distinction between the two systems really only matters if the legislature opposes the seizure.
With this, you focus too narrowly on this specific minority-rule “seizure of power” scenario rather than the relative power of the offices more generally.
There are more differences than you mention. The PM is less hindered by the independent judiciary than the president. The PM in a Westminster system also exerts greater control over the individual legislators via his party than in the American system. The PM can serve for an unlimited time, and call elections at strategic moments, while Trump is limited to two terms. All these things increase the power of the PM and the risk of oppressive rule in Westminster-style parliamentary systems.
The PM is less hindered by the independent judiciary than the president. The PM in a Westminster system also exerts greater control over the individual legislators via his party than in the American system. The PM can serve for an unlimited time, and call elections at strategic moments, while Trump is limited to two terms. All these things increase the power of the PM and the risk of oppressive rule in Westminster-style parliamentary systems.
None of those are inherently features of a parliamentary (or even Westminster-style) government. Those are all separate institutional choices you can make in either setup.
With this, you focus too narrowly on this specific minority-rule “seizure of power” scenario rather than the relative power of the offices more generally.
Sorry, I thought we were discussing the possibility of collapse into authoritarianism, in which case some kind of seizure of power is the relevant question? The claim I was making above is relevant to this, and not to other bad things that might happen.
As to the “power of the offices,” I do want to re-emphasize what I said earlier which is that you have to make a separation between the powers of the office (i.e., those vested in the office itself) and the typical powers of the officeholder (i.e., additional power that is typically held by the person holding the office but not as a consequence of holding the office). Much of the power of the typical prime minister flows from the fact that they are also the leader of a legislative majority. The matched comparison would be some kind of situation where the American president is also the speaker of the house and the Senate has been reduced to a ceremonial role (and if you want to match Britain in particular to the US, you also have to match other unrelated features like federalism and the strength of judicial review).
Maybe one distinction here is that you mention this question: Under which office can a random maniac who somehow ends up in that position cause more chaos or seize power?
But there is another question: Which office in practice results in more powerful officeholders, holding the population itself constant?
The U.S. president holds a weaker office than the heads of government in most other countries. The Canadian and British PMs and the French presidents definitely seem stronger; the German Chancellor seems weaker, and maybe the Israeli and Italian and Japanese PMs? (These aren’t strong views). I most often hear from proponents of the parliamentary system that it is less gridlocked and more powerful/effective rather than less.
It is less gridlocked, but that’s because the PM works for parliament and serves at its pleasure, much as a CEO for a board of directors. The PM normally can be removed by simple majority vote of no confidence at any time. While somewhat infrequent, this occurs often enough — and is a plausible enough threat even when it does not occur — that it cannot really be called exceptional in the way that the successful removal of a president via impeachment would be (which in the US is structurally very burdensome: demanding actual wrongdoing — “high crimes and misdemeanors” — rather than a mere loss of confidence, a majority in the House, an entire trial, and then a two-thirds majority in the Senate, and we have seen how difficult this bar is to meet even for extraordinarily unusual behavior). Furthermore, the PM has no formal say in legislation, which is another reason for less gridlock (though typically, as the head of their party, they do have great influence, but again, only so long as they can maintain a governing coalition within parliament).
It is precisely because of the gridlock created by a presidential system, with its “checks and balances”, that over time more power tends to be arrogated to the president in order to “get things done” that aren’t getting done otherwise, often without the political will to stand in the way of such arrogation when it occurs.
In the US specifically, another way in which the president has recently gained tremendous power stems from these “checks and balances”: the Supreme Court has opined that if presidential acts were subject to regular law, then this would give Congress the power to limit Article II presidential power.[1] This kind of consideration is normally not at issue in a parliamentary system, and thus the PM is normally subject to criminal law.
This basic logic seems very defensible to me, although they seem to have extended the notion of “official [presidential] acts” substantially beyond anything explicit in the Constitution, and then gone even further, to preclude not only prosecution for such acts, but even judicial consideration of such acts as evidence in a prosecution for non-official acts, under the theory that allowing such evidence would have a chilling effect on the president’s freedom to act within constitutional limits. However, this is very different from how we treat speech: we don’t say that a tweet is inadmissible in court as evidence for a non-speech crime, even though the tweet itself may be constitutionally protected speech which must not be chilled.
The PM normally can be removed by simple majority vote of no confidence at any time. While somewhat infrequent, this occurs often enough — and is a plausible enough threat even when it does not occur — that it cannot really be called exceptional in the way that the successful removal of a president via impeachment would be
This isn’t because the president can’t pass legislation on his own, so without the support of Congress he’s a lame duck even without removal. And you ignore other elements:
There are more differences than you mention. The PM is less hindered by the independent judiciary than the president. The PM in a Westminster system also exerts greater control over the individual legislators via his party than in the American system. The PM can serve for an unlimited time, and call elections at strategic moments, while Trump is limited to two terms. All these things increase the power of the PM and the risk of oppressive rule in Westminster-style parliamentary systems.
It is precisely because of the gridlock created by a presidential system, with its “checks and balances”, that over time more power tends to be arrogated to the president in order to “get things done” that aren’t getting done otherwise, often without the political will to stand in the way of such arrogation when it occurs.
This is a recent historical trend and not a defining feature of the system itself.
This isn’t because the president can’t pass legislation on his own, so without the support of Congress he’s a lame duck even without removal.
I think you mean it is because of that, not that it isn’t? But let me know if I’ve misunderstood you. I agree so far as legislation is concerned, though of course the president has a a huge amount of power beyond the ability to legislate.
There are more differences than you mention. The PM is less hindered by the independent judiciary than the president. The PM in a Westminster system also exerts greater control over the individual legislators via his party than in the American system. The PM can serve for an unlimited time, and call elections at strategic moments, while Trump is limited to two terms. All these things increase the power of the PM and the risk of oppressive rule in Westminster-style parliamentary systems.
I agree that some of these are differences giving a PM more power, in particular the ability to serve indefinitely and call elections strategically (which seems quite bad). The rest do not seem to me to be inherent in parliamentarianism, and indeed it is not clear to me that they are even tendencies.
This is a recent historical trend and not a defining feature of the system itself.
It’s not just a historical trend within the US though, but an observed tendency of other presidential systems, and does follow somewhat from the game-theoretic logic of that system.
I think you mean it is because of that, not that it isn’t?
Yes, that’s a typo.
It’s not just a historical trend within the US though, but an observed tendency of other presidential systems
This is too historically contingent. Presidential systems have dominated the less stable American and African countries while European and Asian countries that have been more stable more often have parliaments. I’m not convinced that there is empirical evidence of this kind.
I agree that parliaments have a much more intuitive nature. Corporations are run with a sovereign board who appoints a dictatorial CEO, not with independent branches of power in a balance.
At the end of the day, the rule of a law is a Tinker Bell situation (it only survives if we believe in it). Long-term constitutional stability under a presidential system of government is also quite exceptional. The standard argument is that the US is the only successful case of long-run constitutional stability under a presidential argument (though, depending on how you define long-run, you might throw in Costa Rica today). We’re very lucky that we’ve believed for so long.
I’d add a couple more factors into your analysis, though.
One thing you leave out is mass public opinion, and all the various ways that can be effective—demonstrators in the streets, general strike, cessation of quasi-voluntary compliance in all the areas where the government requires it, and so on, perhaps insurgency or terrorism in extremis. Layer onto that the various additional actions available to economic elites. The real hope for the Supreme Court is that the public takes its side in some extreme crisis, and that a clear ruling on its part serves as the focal point to kick all of that off.
It’s pretty unlikely that the US military would be willing to crack down in that scenario. But even if it were, it doesn’t have the capacity to operate a police state. Most of our military capabilities aren’t geared towards that (something like a B-2 bomber or an aircraft carrier just really isn’t so helpful) -- the infantry forces of the US military aren’t even numerous enough to take over for the existing cadre of state and local police (assuming they walk off in this scenario) much less to do some kind of large-scale repression on top of maintaining ordinary law and order.
Another factor (in less extreme scenarios) is that the courts, in their ordinary and apolitical capacity, are extremely valuable to the government. A collision that ends up destroying the courts takes a lot of the economy with it because large chunks of the economy are underpinned by the existence of a rule of law system governing economic transactions. And the courts are also necessary to keep the trains running on criminal justice and so on. A surgical attack on the courts that disables them only on the political issues while keeping all of that running is very difficult to mount, especially in the face of their concerted resistance. Even autocrats find it useful to have a functional court system (and our own legal tradition emerged as a tool of the British monarchy)
On a lot of lower stakes stuff, this is really what matters, especially when the actions the government wants to take flow directly through the courts. There are a lot of issues in terms of criminal procedure where the executive would have pretty wide public support for violating the constitution (e.g., in surveys, a substantial majority of Americans favor rolling back various rights constitutionally granted to criminal defendants). Similarly, a pretty sizable chunk of Americans on either side seem to actively favor imprisoning political opponents on trumped up charges and no one is going to take to the streets if it happens. But, because the criminal process runs straight through the courts, you can’t really get those things done without blowing up the system. And that’s a big step to take.
Another consideration here is the power the courts have over lawyers. So long as the executive branch is still playing the game with reference to the rules (however fast and loose it’s being with those rules), the lawyers advancing its positions are subject to judicial discipline and, therefore, face personal consequences like disbarment. If the executive has decided to go all-out, that stops mattering. But in a lesser constitutional crisis, those people are still thinking about those interests and that exerts a lot of pressure in the rule of law direction. Likewise for the willingness of the courts to continue extending the government the presumption of regularity.
Circling back on the military, a couple of points:
A military willing and able to rule through force usually wants to do so on its own behalf. What does it need the unpopular civilian dictator for? So, it’s a pretty hard ask to make even if the military is not committed to any underlying values that preclude it unless there’s a really deep loyalty to the leader.
Getting your military to fire on civilians is really hard, especially in a military culture like ours.
The constitutional/rule of law/democratic norms in the US military are all pretty strong culturally. So is a norm against involvement in partisan or domestic issues (that don’t pertain directly to the military itself).
A particularly crucial constituency within the military in such hypothetical is the JAG Corps (the military’s own internal lawyers). JAGs are very integrated into decision-making and have managed over the last few decades to achieve very high status within the military. [a somewhat troubling aside is that the Trump administration purged the JAG leadership shortly after taking office]. In general, American lawyers inclusive of JAGs are especially committed to rule of law and things like following court orders.
As a closing though, the scenarios that worry me the most don’t involve outright defiance and clashes. The smart way of doing things is a little more subtle (and in the current moment also leverages the fact that the Supreme Court is willing to give the administration considerable benefit of the doubt). The Supreme Court’s own precedents have also handicapped it in that it has declared a variety of the legal tools you’d want in a crisis to be beyond its own powers and invented a lot of technicalities for the president to play to his own advantage.
Appreciate the factors! Agree on most of them being quite important. One quick note:
Yeah, my analysis here was focused on what the supreme court and judiciary can do, from a constitutionalist perspective. My sense is the constitution doesn’t really allow insurrection under almost any circumstance, but does also maybe kind of expect it’s an important thing to maintain the threat of (hence the right to bear arms). I would be interested in someone analyzing when the constitution would permit a private citizen to take up arms against a sitting government (if any such circumstance exists).
To my knowledge, the interpretation which comes closest is Insurrectionist theory which interprets the right to bear arms as including the right of citizens to use them to defend against an oppressive government. There are apparently more explicit statements of this right in the preambles to some first-state constitutions, as well as the declaration of independence.
It should not be surprising that nobody has yet won on such a case in court though, and practically speaking you don’t have this right [1] .
My understanding has been that even if you are arrested unlawfully by a police officer, you can’t use proportional force (as you would if you were assaulted by a non-police-officer), since the perspective of the government is that it is the judiciary’s right to determine whether an arrest is or isn’t lawful, not the citizen’s.
Except implicitly the founders themselves, who of course supported the right to revolution. Or at least supported that right for themselves. But originalism has never been a popular (or coherent) constitutional philosophy.
Can you explain your thinking here more and how it connects to the idea of constitutional risk?
The U.S. president holds a weaker office than the heads of government in most other countries. The Canadian and British PMs and the French presidents definitely seem stronger; the German Chancellor seems weaker, and maybe the Israeli and Italian and Japanese PMs? (These aren’t strong views). I most often hear from proponents of the parliamentary system that it is less gridlocked and more powerful/effective rather than less.
It matters exactly what you’re comparing here.
An American president is typically less effectual than a British PM, but the office is stronger. That is, the PM receives basically no power qua PM whereas the American presidency directly comes with considerable constitutional power.
If you were randomly dropped in by some process as the US president tomorrow, you’d immediately be a very powerful person and you’d hold those powers for a considerable length of time. If you were randomly dropped in as British PM, you’d be removed in a confidence vote in an instant.
The PM in a parliamentary system can typically get a great deal more done than the US president but that’s a selection effect really—being the PM means you also commanded a Parliamentary majority in order to get there, so of course you face less gridlock. The legislative branch doesn’t typically want to stop you. But, if the legislature suddenly does want to stop you, you’re gone immediately.
Suppose the executive wants to seize power. If the legislature supports that, then it’s going to be a relatively easy thing to do in either a presidential or a parliamentary system. Whatever constraint there has to come from somewhere else.
The distinction between the two systems really only matters if the legislature opposes the seizure. Under a parliamentary system, they have an easy remedy—trigger a no-confidence vote and get rid of the problematic leader. Under a presidential system? Removing the leader is hard, and if you get into some kind of fight otherwise the president has all kinds of levers to pull. Which turns nasty (and those kind of moments of conflict also potentially create an opening for the military or someone else to seize power). It’s clearly better to be in a parliamentary system in that situation.
I was also referencing above the classic essay “The Perils of Presidentialism” by Juan Linz, which lays out a much more sophisticated set of arguments.
With this, you focus too narrowly on this specific minority-rule “seizure of power” scenario rather than the relative power of the offices more generally.
There are more differences than you mention. The PM is less hindered by the independent judiciary than the president. The PM in a Westminster system also exerts greater control over the individual legislators via his party than in the American system. The PM can serve for an unlimited time, and call elections at strategic moments, while Trump is limited to two terms. All these things increase the power of the PM and the risk of oppressive rule in Westminster-style parliamentary systems.
None of those are inherently features of a parliamentary (or even Westminster-style) government. Those are all separate institutional choices you can make in either setup.
Sorry, I thought we were discussing the possibility of collapse into authoritarianism, in which case some kind of seizure of power is the relevant question? The claim I was making above is relevant to this, and not to other bad things that might happen.
As to the “power of the offices,” I do want to re-emphasize what I said earlier which is that you have to make a separation between the powers of the office (i.e., those vested in the office itself) and the typical powers of the officeholder (i.e., additional power that is typically held by the person holding the office but not as a consequence of holding the office). Much of the power of the typical prime minister flows from the fact that they are also the leader of a legislative majority. The matched comparison would be some kind of situation where the American president is also the speaker of the house and the Senate has been reduced to a ceremonial role (and if you want to match Britain in particular to the US, you also have to match other unrelated features like federalism and the strength of judicial review).
Maybe one distinction here is that you mention this question: Under which office can a random maniac who somehow ends up in that position cause more chaos or seize power?
But there is another question: Which office in practice results in more powerful officeholders, holding the population itself constant?
It is less gridlocked, but that’s because the PM works for parliament and serves at its pleasure, much as a CEO for a board of directors. The PM normally can be removed by simple majority vote of no confidence at any time. While somewhat infrequent, this occurs often enough — and is a plausible enough threat even when it does not occur — that it cannot really be called exceptional in the way that the successful removal of a president via impeachment would be (which in the US is structurally very burdensome: demanding actual wrongdoing — “high crimes and misdemeanors” — rather than a mere loss of confidence, a majority in the House, an entire trial, and then a two-thirds majority in the Senate, and we have seen how difficult this bar is to meet even for extraordinarily unusual behavior). Furthermore, the PM has no formal say in legislation, which is another reason for less gridlock (though typically, as the head of their party, they do have great influence, but again, only so long as they can maintain a governing coalition within parliament).
It is precisely because of the gridlock created by a presidential system, with its “checks and balances”, that over time more power tends to be arrogated to the president in order to “get things done” that aren’t getting done otherwise, often without the political will to stand in the way of such arrogation when it occurs.
In the US specifically, another way in which the president has recently gained tremendous power stems from these “checks and balances”: the Supreme Court has opined that if presidential acts were subject to regular law, then this would give Congress the power to limit Article II presidential power.[1] This kind of consideration is normally not at issue in a parliamentary system, and thus the PM is normally subject to criminal law.
This basic logic seems very defensible to me, although they seem to have extended the notion of “official [presidential] acts” substantially beyond anything explicit in the Constitution, and then gone even further, to preclude not only prosecution for such acts, but even judicial consideration of such acts as evidence in a prosecution for non-official acts, under the theory that allowing such evidence would have a chilling effect on the president’s freedom to act within constitutional limits. However, this is very different from how we treat speech: we don’t say that a tweet is inadmissible in court as evidence for a non-speech crime, even though the tweet itself may be constitutionally protected speech which must not be chilled.
This isn’t because the president can’t pass legislation on his own, so without the support of Congress he’s a lame duck even without removal. And you ignore other elements:
This is a recent historical trend and not a defining feature of the system itself.
I think you mean it is because of that, not that it isn’t? But let me know if I’ve misunderstood you. I agree so far as legislation is concerned, though of course the president has a a huge amount of power beyond the ability to legislate.
I agree that some of these are differences giving a PM more power, in particular the ability to serve indefinitely and call elections strategically (which seems quite bad). The rest do not seem to me to be inherent in parliamentarianism, and indeed it is not clear to me that they are even tendencies.
It’s not just a historical trend within the US though, but an observed tendency of other presidential systems, and does follow somewhat from the game-theoretic logic of that system.
Yes, that’s a typo.
This is too historically contingent. Presidential systems have dominated the less stable American and African countries while European and Asian countries that have been more stable more often have parliaments. I’m not convinced that there is empirical evidence of this kind.
I agree that parliaments have a much more intuitive nature. Corporations are run with a sovereign board who appoints a dictatorial CEO, not with independent branches of power in a balance.
Why do you think it’s better to have term limits?