The U.S. president holds a weaker office than the heads of government in most other countries. The Canadian and British PMs and the French presidents definitely seem stronger; the German Chancellor seems weaker, and maybe the Israeli and Italian and Japanese PMs? (These aren’t strong views). I most often hear from proponents of the parliamentary system that it is less gridlocked and more powerful/effective rather than less.
It is less gridlocked, but that’s because the PM works for parliament and serves at its pleasure, much as a CEO for a board of directors. The PM normally can be removed by simple majority vote of no confidence at any time. While somewhat infrequent, this occurs often enough — and is a plausible enough threat even when it does not occur — that it cannot really be called exceptional in the way that the successful removal of a president via impeachment would be (which in the US is structurally very burdensome: demanding actual wrongdoing — “high crimes and misdemeanors” — rather than a mere loss of confidence, a majority in the House, an entire trial, and then a two-thirds majority in the Senate, and we have seen how difficult this bar is to meet even for extraordinarily unusual behavior). Furthermore, the PM has no formal say in legislation, which is another reason for less gridlock (though typically, as the head of their party, they do have great influence, but again, only so long as they can maintain a governing coalition within parliament).
It is precisely because of the gridlock created by a presidential system, with its “checks and balances”, that over time more power tends to be arrogated to the president in order to “get things done” that aren’t getting done otherwise, often without the political will to stand in the way of such arrogation when it occurs.
In the US specifically, another way in which the president has recently gained tremendous power stems from these “checks and balances”: the Supreme Court has opined that if presidential acts were subject to regular law, then this would give Congress the power to limit Article II presidential power.[1] This kind of consideration is normally not at issue in a parliamentary system, and thus the PM is normally subject to criminal law.
This basic logic seems very defensible to me, although they seem to have extended the notion of “official [presidential] acts” substantially beyond anything explicit in the Constitution, and then gone even further, to preclude not only prosecution for such acts, but even judicial consideration of such acts as evidence in a prosecution for non-official acts, under the theory that allowing such evidence would have a chilling effect on the president’s freedom to act within constitutional limits. However, this is very different from how we treat speech: we don’t say that a tweet is inadmissible in court as evidence for a non-speech crime, even though the tweet itself may be constitutionally protected speech which must not be chilled.
The PM normally can be removed by simple majority vote of no confidence at any time. While somewhat infrequent, this occurs often enough — and is a plausible enough threat even when it does not occur — that it cannot really be called exceptional in the way that the successful removal of a president via impeachment would be
This isn’t because the president can’t pass legislation on his own, so without the support of Congress he’s a lame duck even without removal. And you ignore other elements:
There are more differences than you mention. The PM is less hindered by the independent judiciary than the president. The PM in a Westminster system also exerts greater control over the individual legislators via his party than in the American system. The PM can serve for an unlimited time, and call elections at strategic moments, while Trump is limited to two terms. All these things increase the power of the PM and the risk of oppressive rule in Westminster-style parliamentary systems.
It is precisely because of the gridlock created by a presidential system, with its “checks and balances”, that over time more power tends to be arrogated to the president in order to “get things done” that aren’t getting done otherwise, often without the political will to stand in the way of such arrogation when it occurs.
This is a recent historical trend and not a defining feature of the system itself.
This isn’t because the president can’t pass legislation on his own, so without the support of Congress he’s a lame duck even without removal.
I think you mean it is because of that, not that it isn’t? But let me know if I’ve misunderstood you. I agree so far as legislation is concerned, though of course the president has a a huge amount of power beyond the ability to legislate.
There are more differences than you mention. The PM is less hindered by the independent judiciary than the president. The PM in a Westminster system also exerts greater control over the individual legislators via his party than in the American system. The PM can serve for an unlimited time, and call elections at strategic moments, while Trump is limited to two terms. All these things increase the power of the PM and the risk of oppressive rule in Westminster-style parliamentary systems.
I agree that some of these are differences giving a PM more power, in particular the ability to serve indefinitely and call elections strategically (which seems quite bad). The rest do not seem to me to be inherent in parliamentarianism, and indeed it is not clear to me that they are even tendencies.
This is a recent historical trend and not a defining feature of the system itself.
It’s not just a historical trend within the US though, but an observed tendency of other presidential systems, and does follow somewhat from the game-theoretic logic of that system.
I think you mean it is because of that, not that it isn’t?
Yes, that’s a typo.
It’s not just a historical trend within the US though, but an observed tendency of other presidential systems
This is too historically contingent. Presidential systems have dominated the less stable American and African countries while European and Asian countries that have been more stable more often have parliaments. I’m not convinced that there is empirical evidence of this kind.
I agree that parliaments have a much more intuitive nature. Corporations are run with a sovereign board who appoints a dictatorial CEO, not with independent branches of power in a balance.
It is less gridlocked, but that’s because the PM works for parliament and serves at its pleasure, much as a CEO for a board of directors. The PM normally can be removed by simple majority vote of no confidence at any time. While somewhat infrequent, this occurs often enough — and is a plausible enough threat even when it does not occur — that it cannot really be called exceptional in the way that the successful removal of a president via impeachment would be (which in the US is structurally very burdensome: demanding actual wrongdoing — “high crimes and misdemeanors” — rather than a mere loss of confidence, a majority in the House, an entire trial, and then a two-thirds majority in the Senate, and we have seen how difficult this bar is to meet even for extraordinarily unusual behavior). Furthermore, the PM has no formal say in legislation, which is another reason for less gridlock (though typically, as the head of their party, they do have great influence, but again, only so long as they can maintain a governing coalition within parliament).
It is precisely because of the gridlock created by a presidential system, with its “checks and balances”, that over time more power tends to be arrogated to the president in order to “get things done” that aren’t getting done otherwise, often without the political will to stand in the way of such arrogation when it occurs.
In the US specifically, another way in which the president has recently gained tremendous power stems from these “checks and balances”: the Supreme Court has opined that if presidential acts were subject to regular law, then this would give Congress the power to limit Article II presidential power.[1] This kind of consideration is normally not at issue in a parliamentary system, and thus the PM is normally subject to criminal law.
This basic logic seems very defensible to me, although they seem to have extended the notion of “official [presidential] acts” substantially beyond anything explicit in the Constitution, and then gone even further, to preclude not only prosecution for such acts, but even judicial consideration of such acts as evidence in a prosecution for non-official acts, under the theory that allowing such evidence would have a chilling effect on the president’s freedom to act within constitutional limits. However, this is very different from how we treat speech: we don’t say that a tweet is inadmissible in court as evidence for a non-speech crime, even though the tweet itself may be constitutionally protected speech which must not be chilled.
This isn’t because the president can’t pass legislation on his own, so without the support of Congress he’s a lame duck even without removal. And you ignore other elements:
This is a recent historical trend and not a defining feature of the system itself.
I think you mean it is because of that, not that it isn’t? But let me know if I’ve misunderstood you. I agree so far as legislation is concerned, though of course the president has a a huge amount of power beyond the ability to legislate.
I agree that some of these are differences giving a PM more power, in particular the ability to serve indefinitely and call elections strategically (which seems quite bad). The rest do not seem to me to be inherent in parliamentarianism, and indeed it is not clear to me that they are even tendencies.
It’s not just a historical trend within the US though, but an observed tendency of other presidential systems, and does follow somewhat from the game-theoretic logic of that system.
Yes, that’s a typo.
This is too historically contingent. Presidential systems have dominated the less stable American and African countries while European and Asian countries that have been more stable more often have parliaments. I’m not convinced that there is empirical evidence of this kind.
I agree that parliaments have a much more intuitive nature. Corporations are run with a sovereign board who appoints a dictatorial CEO, not with independent branches of power in a balance.
Why do you think it’s better to have term limits?